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ABSTRACT 
The provision of state pensions in the advanced countries face two significant 
and reinforcing challenges. Demographic change and global economic 
pressure impact the provision of public pensions by increasing social 
spending and depending on the method of financing, the base of 
government's revenues from which these programmes are funded. Countries 
belonging to the liberal welfare model, such as the UK and Canada, hold a 
common view on the primacy of the market and actively adapt measures that 
keep social benefits modest. Yet the reforms adqpted by the UK and 
c, 
Canadian government reveal divergence. This presents a puzzle as the 
welfare state literature predict convergence. Canada with its small domestic 
market and open economy has greater exposure to risks of globalisation than 
the UK, but it is the UK and not Canada that adopted the more radical 
reforms. To explain this puzzle, this thesis examines four cases: two different 
pensions' schemes in each of the two countries - Canada and the UK. The 
thesis argues that the concentration of political authority is central to 
explaining the variation, although not the sole factor. 
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Chapter 1 State Pension: A Diminishing Priority 
1.1 Introduction 
The ability of affluent democracies to maintain one of the central pillars of the 
welfare state, the state pensions system, is frequently presented as being 
dependent in large part on a strong fiscal position and low public debt levels 
(Bonoli 2000:1, Pierson 2001 :458). Both of these objectives, easily achieved 
under conditions of economic prosperity and stability, are increasingly being 
undercut by the liberalisation of capital and labour markets internationally; a 
phenomenon that is depicted as a process of economic globalisation (Krishnan 
1996, Schulze and Ursprung 1999, Hay 2001, Gelinas 2003). The challenge 
facing the state pension system is further complicated by an ageing population 
and prevailing conditions of economic austerity (a reduction in public spending -
a monetarist policy orientation in response to difficult economic conditions), both 
of which directly impact the provision of pensions. 
Since the 1980s, most of these countries began to adapt their income transfer 
provisions in line with this new reality. In the Anglo-Saxon or the liberal welfare 
states, the reform process itself raised new questions about the received wisdom 
of welfare state theorists: principally regarding the notion that countries with 
relatively liberal economic setup are more likely to converge towards a common 
neo-liberal policy response given the pressures they are facing (Chassard and 
Quintin 1992; Overbye 1996a). This meant the tightening of existing state social 
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provisions in order to achieve cost savings and to reorients welfare programmes 
towards a more or less market conforming stance. The liberal welfare model is 
historically in this sense an ideal candidate. The originals of its welfare state are 
deeply rooted in the shared belief in the efficacy of market forces - determining 
the price of goods and services including labour (commodification). The observed 
trends in welfare retrenchment so far run contrary to predictions. There have 
being divergence of policy response and some countries are showing puzzling 
capacity to moderate the external pressures. Within the liberal welfare model, the 
expectation that countries such as Canada, with its higher demographic 
projection and a smaller open economy should be more susceptible to radical 
reform measure than the UK for example appear misleading (Cameron 1978, 
Katzenstein 1985b, Pfaller, Gough and Therborn 1991). The story behind the 
new political economy of welfare state restructuring has become a source of 
interest and investigation (Pierson 2001, Bonoli 2002, Blackburn 2004). 
Despite the recent proliferation of literature on the significance of economic 
globalisation on pension reforms, little has been written to advance an 
understanding as to how each welfare state regime in reality translate these 
externally driven constraints into the policy context of distinctive and complex 
institutional settings (Skyes et al 2001, Castle 2002, Clasen 2002). Though the 
pressure of economic globalisation is expected to force welfare states to 
converge towards a common neoliberal response, it will become clear from this 
thesis that national reactions to these exogenous pressures remain strikingly 
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divergent. This thesis evaluates the reinforcing influences of economic 
globalisation, austerity and population ageing on pension provision. It argues that 
it would be beneficial to identity then explain the interaction between these and 
the institutional factors that produce variance within the family of welfare state 
types. 
In examining this central question, this thesis engages with the literature on 
pension policy reform, domestic policy making and welfare state retrenchment. It 
also provides a detailed consideration of the empirical estimates of the influence 
of interest and political institutions. Rather than trying to resolve this debate by 
arguing that one type of cause is more important than the others, the thesis 
combines them logically, identifying the conditions under which interests or 
institutions do or do not shape policy. The thesis argue that because national 
configuration of domestic institutions directly or indirectly shape the extent of 
which domestic and international pressures are translated into neoliberal policy 
reforms, the pace and depth of programmatic restructuring is different. It will 
become clear that given the evidence, domestic political institutions does offer a 
promising avenue from which to assess the depth and character of welfare state 
restructuring, although some thought is also given to the role of ideas and 
interest intermediation. As such the thesis builds on and extends theory 
developed by analysts such a Pierson (1998, 2001) and Swank (1998b) on how 
domestic institutions mediate the domestic policy impacts of external pressures. 
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The study thus follows a theoretical path much in ascendancy, although not 
without challenge. 
In the following section, the initial framework for studying the pressures on the 
welfare state identified in the literature (a critical review of the literature is carried 
out in Chapter 2.2) is introduced. This is followed by establishing the criteria for 
the case selection applied in the thesis. The relationship between the three 
essential components: on the one hand the economic globalisation thesis, the 
ageing population and economic austerity arguments are carefully examined. 
The study squares these off with the independent variables under consideration: 
the state pension policy, concentration of political authority and interest 
intermediation in Canada and the UK. The section concludes by setting out the 
methodology for the study. 
The Initial Framework for Studying the Pressures on the Welfare State 
Since the pioneering typological work of Esping-Anderson (1990) on welfare 
regimes, a number of reasonable objections have been raised about the 
adequacy of his regime analysis in explaining observed variance amongst the 
family of welfare state types (Scharpf 1997b, Iversen and Wren 1998, Kitschelt et 
al. 1999a, Korpi 1999:35). Esping-Anderson's work did not address the distinct 
reform dynamics within regime specific cases of which there are three principal 
ones. There are a number of reasons for this neglect. First there was a lack of 
consensus, during this period, of what social scientist should be looking for in 
4 
, 
I 
terms of the dependent variable. Second, the consideration of distinct reform 
dynamics within regime specific cases is now considered an important part of the 
research agenda on the politics of the welfare state in an era of retrenchment. 
The desire to generate relatively parsimonious measures of outcomes that make 
a serious enterprise of comparative explanation possible is driving the welfare 
state scholarship in this new direction. 
This move away from the single 'logic' of welfare state reform defined as the 
assessment of the reform across three principal dimensions: re-commodification, 
cost containment, and recalibration, creates new opportunities to recognise also 
the existence of quite different setting for the emerging politics of restructuring 
(Pierson, 2001 p:428). In Esping-Anderson's three worlds of welfare capitalism, 
he identifies the liberal, conservative and social democratic models. Together 
these welfare regimes form a complex relation between state, legal, 
organisational and economic features systematically interwoven (Esping-
Anderson 1990). It is assumed that different welfare state configuration are the 
products of complex conjunctural causation, with multiple factors working 
together over extended periods of time to produce striking different outcomes. 
And for this reason, a measurable shift in the value of one variable or another will 
not have a simple, direct, linear effect on outcomes across all cases. In exploring 
this argument, Pierson (2001) illustrates this point by arguing that the 
concentration of political authority is an asset for those seeking reform. Whether 
or not his assertion applies in all welfare regimes requires further exploration. 
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Huber and Stephens found the experiences of two pure Westminster cases, New 
Zealand and the UK, as particularly striking in terms of its government's capacity 
to implement aggressive restructuring program (Huber and Stephens 1999). 
Pierson argue that the examples provided in the Huber and Stephens study, 
illustrates the potential inherent in the liberal welfare model to implement radical 
reforms to existing welfare structures. A position that is supported by absence of 
institutional veto and where social actors are disorganised and popular support 
for the welfare state is (while still extensive) more limited than elsewhere 
(Pierson 2001). 
The liberal welfare model contrasts with the conservative and the social 
democratic model in a number of distinct ways. In the conservative model, the 
electoral system, for instance, generate multiple veto points. There is a 
propensity of governments to operate from a proportional representation system 
rather than by a single-party government. Federalism and the institutional role of 
social partners within these countries, reinforce tendencies towards negotiated 
reform (Golden, Wallerstein, and Lange 1999:204). 
The social democratic model, on the other hand, characteristically has generous 
transfer programmes covering a wide range of risks with high replacement rates. 
The political arrangement includes multiple features that create very strong pro-
welfare state conditions. Unions maintain close relationship with electorally 
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powerful social democratic parties (Goul Andersen 1997, Rothstein 1998a). The 
formal political systems contain few checks on parliamentary majorities, but the 
frequency of coalition governments makes political authority less concentrated 
than in the Westminster setting. In addition, governments in this system operate 
in a context of well established and encompassing employer and union 
organisations, which represent both possible partners in negotiations (Pierson 
2001). The bonds between employers and union organisations are quite strong. 
In the liberal welfare regime, previous studies on the welfare state have provided 
very little information on how policy response in the crucial area of state pension 
system and changes to existing schemes reflects the more general analysis of 
the welfare typology and this is particularly important when there are variance in 
the political arrangements as we see in the two case countries. Thus, the thesis 
evaluates the relationship between the three essential aspects identified above: 
economic globalisation, population ageing and austerity on the one hand and on 
the other, the concentration of political authority and pension policy design in the 
reform of state pension system in Canada and the UK. 
First, it analyses the ways in which political systems interact with the challenge of 
economic globalisation, austerity and population ageing in the context of state 
pension policy. Second, it shows how the political institutions and path 
dependent factors inherent in the design of the state pension system can either 
increase the likelihood of more radical reform or retard the reform measure. 
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Domestic institutions significantly influence the political strength and structures of 
opportunities of the interests ideologically opposed to neoliberal social policy 
response and by reshaping the decision making boundaries, the possibility of 
policy convergence predicted by the literature fails to materialise (Swank 2001 
p.198). 
Concentration of Political Authority 
The focus on the role of institutions in mediating external constraints is not new. 
One of the persuasive proponents of the neo-institutionalist thesis, Paul Pierson 
argues that, although changes in the global economy are important in assessing 
the current challenges facing mature welfare states, it is primarily the social and 
economic transformations occurring within affluent democracies that produce 
pressures on these states (Pierson 2001: 410). According to this view, major 
reform is a political process, dependent on the mobilisation of pOlitical resources 
sufficient to overcome organised opponents and other barriers to change 
(Pierson 2001: 411). 
Pierson (2001) has identified two factors that determine the capacity of reform to 
generate and sustain political mobilisation. First, the 'electoral incentives' to win 
politically is contingent on whether or not the provisions of the welfare state are 
universal or means-tested. This speaks to the role of voters as final arbiters of 
policy decisions. It is often argued that benefits of pension retrenchment are 
generally more broadly spread and uncertain, while the large constituencies for 
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pension have concentrated interest in the maintenance of pension provision. A 
large section of pensioners rely on the state pension system for a large share of 
their income. It follows that concentrated interests will generally be advantaged 
over diffuse one (Pierson 2001:413). With pensions more people are affected -
less with means-tested than with universal pensions - but they individually 
benefit significantly. 
Second, institutional arrangements tend to lock existing policy arrangements into 
place. This is what Pierson refers to as 'institutional stickiness' (Pierson 
2001:414). There are two variants of the 'institutional stickiness' that reinforce the 
electoral obstacles to radical reform: formal and informal 'veto points', and 'path 
dependent' processes. Both Pierson (2001) and Bonoli (2000) make the pOint 
about the impact of formal and informal 'veto points' in their analyses. Their logic 
is simply that political systems require that policy reform be dependent on more 
than a simple 51 percent majority, allowing minorities opportunities to block 
reforms (see also Scharpf 1986, Tsebelis 1995). Veto pOints have also been 
identified at various levels of the policy-making process. 
Interest Intermediation 
Formally veto points can be granted through constitutional court or indeed by 
convention or a strict separation of powers between the executive and 
legislature. On an informal level, veto pOints can also exist if the political system 
is used to negotiate with trade unions before the adoption of changes in 
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economic and social policy, then, in that system, the approval or acquiescence of 
the labour movement can become a de facto veto point through which the 
legislative process has to overcome if it is to succeed (Bonoli 2000:43). In this 
regard the role of interest groups advocating on behalf of its constituents is 
important. While the literature down plays their real impact, the findings of thesis 
suggest that the patterns are a little more complex and dependent on whether or 
not the pension policy is universal or means tested. 
Decision Making Environment 
Path dependence refers to the organisational adaptations to previous 
arrangements which may also make reversal of certain policies unattractive 
(Pierson 2001: 414). It is not just that organisational adaptation that make a 
reversal of course difficult, institutional veto point as noted above make a change 
of course harder to achieve (Krasner 1989, North 1990). Major social 
arrangements, such as state pension schemes, have significant consequences, 
even if they are suboptimal ones - because individuals make important 
commitments in response to government actions (Pierson 2001). 
An analysis of the contemporary debate enhances the development of a nuanced 
conceptualisation of the reform agenda by first setting out the dependent variable 
and second, by considering the distinctive reform dynamics of the liberal welfare 
state regimes. This allows the thesis to move away from the single logic of 
welfare state reform to focus within regime-specific cases and to examine a 
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number of crucial variables identified in the existing literature: namely, the effect 
of 3 mediating domestic institutions, the concentration of political authority, 
pension design, and interest group intermediation. 
In Esping-Anderson's typology of three worlds of welfare capitalism - liberal, 
conservative and social democratic, he admits that 'to talk of a regime is to 
denote the fact that in the relation between state and economy a complex of legal 
and organisational features are systematically interwoven' (1990:2). This will 
support the position already raised elsewhere that there exist a multiple 
interactive and cumulative effects of a number of interdependent causal factors 
that have potential in a conjunctural causation (Ragin 1987). 
These include the politically salient features of the liberal welfare model 
addressed by Pierson and others (Korpi 1990, Esping-Anderson 1990, 1994; 
Pierson 2000). By drawing from the experience of the two case countries which 
are exemplars of the liberal welfare model, this thesis is able to offer a plausible 
explanation to the observed policy responses. This in turn informs our 
understanding of why Esping-Anderson's typology, whilst useful, overlooks some 
of the key differences in the policy behaviour of family of welfare state types. 
Returning to Pierson's argument, it is useful to outline Pierson's claims. These 
can be summarised in two broad ways as follows: first, concentration of political 
authority coupled with a party with a political ideology that favours private 
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provision is an asset for those seeking reform; there is a weakness of 
encompassing interest organisations. The political clout of labour unions is also 
relatively modest; the liberal welfare state is relatively small and because of this, 
the 'core' support group for social provision is relatively small. Pierson (2001 :433) 
further asserts that reliance on means-testing may divide those who benefit from 
taxpayers. The institutionalisation of market alternatives weakens middle-class 
attachments to public provision. In order words, middle-class voters find market 
alternatives to state provision at a greatly subsided rate by the state. These 
features are supposed to set further apart families of welfare state types and 
provide an insight into the sources of policy variance. 
Integrating the three pressures on the reform process 
Establishing the approximate relationship between economic globalisation and 
welfare reform is a subject of much interest in recent welfare state analysis. Most 
analysts in the field tend to present the challenge facing the advanced welfare 
states as having to do with how these states deal with the dual pressures of 
economic globalisation and demographic change. The problem is further 
exacerbated by prevailing conditions of permanent austerity which impinge 
ultimately on finance and delivery on social programmes (Bonoli 2000, Scharpf 
and Schmidt 2000, Pierson 2001). In terms of costs, pensions generally 
constitute the largest single expenditure of social spending (Bonoli 2000). 
Consequently, the capacity to contain such costs would be beneficial to 
government budgets. Those who argue about the efficacy of the economic 
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globalisation thesis suggest that the Iiberalisation of markets, including labour 
markets reduces governments' ability to generate revenues from existing state 
pension funding mechanism since this can be seen as raising the cost of labour 
(Howard 1997, Huber 2001, Hay 2002). In the liberal welfare model, there is 
already growing concern that these countries are moving further a field, by 
making the value of labour subject to market decisions. Part of the reason is that 
their political economies allow wage flexibility as a principal buffer against high 
unemployment. As such the deteriorating market position of low skilled workers 
is necessary even accepted by policy makers because the new global 
environment requires larger wage differentials (Iversen and Wren 1998; Scharpf 
1997b). To maintain the spiralling wage differentials, governments make the exit 
options into the income transfer programmes, including pension schemes, less 
attractive. 
Given this constrained fiscal environment, governments are under strong 
incentives to take action (Longman 1987, Walker 1994, Thurow 1996, Bonoli 
2000:2). The analysis of public policy disagrees profoundly with this causal 
relationship. The heterogeneity of views is aggravated by a tension involved in 
assessing globalisation's implication for policy process. Divergent perspectives 
are grounded in different methodological assumptions as well as the distinct 
national prisms through which they are viewed. It is argued that the impact of 
economic globalisation is mediated through economically relevant structural 
conditions and policy legacies that are country specific (Scharpf 2000). The 
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prevailing view was that national economic boundaries were still effectively 
controlled under the international economic regime of 'embedded liberalism' 
(Ruggie 1982 : 379-415). 
Economic Austerity 
Prior to the pension reforms, both case countries were experiencing budget 
deficits, Canada to a higher extent than the UK. At the time both countries were 
dominated by right-of-centre majorities committed to retrenching in the area of 
pensions. The population projections suggested substantial increases in pension 
expenditure. This is consistent with initial socio-economic explanation of welfare 
retrenchment which would argue that cutbacks are likely in those countries 
experiencing serious financial problems in sustaining welfare expenditure. Yet a 
closer examination reveals relatively little correspondence between the 
seriousness of economic and financial problems experienced by these 
governments, and their actions in the area of welfare. 
State pensions remain important in the welfare state menu for several reasons. 
Most people eventually grow old and therefore most would take an indirect 
interest in the subject. It is to be expected that pension reform impacts the 
economic circumstances of a large section of society, and by implication the 
legitimacy of democratic polities. This is reflected in the fact that one of the 
fundamental principles upon which legitimate democratic government rests is the 
granting of consent by those so governed. Governments are therefore expected 
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to pursue policies that reflect on aggregate, the preferences of the largest 
number and they are in turn held accountable for policies that fail to meet with 
that standard. A government that fails to abide by this principle stands the real 
chance of losing its office. 
The provision of retirement income through state pensions directly impacts the 
public purse and itself is acted upon by the domestic balances of power, the state 
of the nation's economic health, the demographic distribution of the population 
and the general attitude of citizens towards the provision of retirement income 
and the taxation necessary to support it. 
The provision of state pension accounts for over 40 percent 1 of the social welfare 
spending in both Canada and the UK. An increasing number of the elderly 
receive one form of pension benefit or another. While the number of the elderly 
who will be solely dependent on state pension benefits as their primary source of 
income is expected to rise, income to fund state pension is projected to be tightly 
constrained facing intense pressure for austerity (Blackburn 2003). This has risen 
from a growing skepticism about the unlikely return to an era of high economic 
growth, fiscal pressures on welfare states are certain to intensify. This tension 
has prompted both governments to take action. 
Demographic projections 
I The Government of Canada official department website and the UK government, 
Department of Works and Pensions have this figures available (October, 2005) 
15 
, I 
Although, there is widespread agreement among demographers about the fact 
that the proportion of older people in western societies is going to increase over 
the next decades, this projection must be viewed with caution. What they say 
about future development is dependent on three important assumptions: fertility 
rates, life expectancy, migration and the current age structure. All three are 
volatile and difficult to predict (World Bank 1994b). As the table below show there 
exist substantial differences between countries in the expected transition pattern. 
In both countries the demographic structure of the population around the year 
2025/2030 is likely to be very different from what it is at present. The 
demographic projection (see Figure 1.4) below show that population ageing, 
which has already begun, would accelerate in 2011 when the first baby-boom 
cohort (born in 1946) reaches the age of 65. This rapid ageing is projected to 
continue for sometime until 2025 when seniors in the UK will reach 23.9 percent 
and 25.2 percent in Canada. This is likely to have huge policy implications, 
particularly in the area of pensions. 
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Figure 1.1 Demographic Projections UK I Canada 
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Source: Office for National Statistics (2006) and Statistics Canada (2005) 
State Pension Policy 
Pension policy opens a window of opportunity to examine the existing theory 
about the restructuring of the welfare states in light of the foregoing pressures. 
Pensions are simply defined as retirement income. State pensions are retirement 
income provided by the state, often through general tax revenues. There are 
several types of pension schemes, but they can be divided into two categories: 
state pension and private pension systems (one could add to this, the 
occupational pension schemes which are administered privately rarely ever by 
the state - see the flow graph Figure 1- 1 below. Benefit eligibility for these 
schemes could based on universality or means-testing. The table below does not 
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provide the full range of pension schemes available in both countries; rather it 
highlights the key schemes discussed in this chapter. 
Figure 1- 2 The Pension System 
Public or State Pension Schemes - First - Tier Provision 
UK CANADA UK CANADA 
Basic State Old Age Security Minimum Income Guaranteed Income 
Pension (BSP) (OAS) Supplement Supplement 
Second - Tier - Voluntary or Private Pension Schemes 
UK CANADA UK CANADA 
SERPS/S2P CPP/QPP Occupational PC;:C;:UgEltiQflElI $c;:h@m~ll 
both are state run both are state run ~C;:h@m@§ (r;lfiVEltf?) (pfiVE!t~) 
Third-Tier Schemes - all privately run UK/CANADA 
I I I 
Several options available through investment companies/businesses 
(Notes) Since the 1997 CPP Reform, CPP Pension Fund is now administered by a quasi-independent 
board. State Earning Related Pension Scheme (SERPS)/Second State Pension (S2P) Canada 
Pension Plan (CPP) and Quebec Pension Plane (QPP). 
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Together these three tiers make up the retirement income system for the retired. 
The motivation for the ongoing reform effort has thus been economic as well as 
ideological. The objective of the reform was principally to reduce the financial 
liability of state funded scheme. Beginning from the 1980s, both the British and 
Canadian governments began to retrench, that is to scale down the various 
aspects of their respective pension systems. The process of reform is not straight 
forward as this stylised analysis in the introduction would suggest. It involves 
difficult political choices in a rather heavily contested policy area. 
This thesis considers four of the state pension schemes in the UK and Canada. 
Table 1-1 illustrates the key characteristics of the four pension schemes on which 
the reform is evaluated. The UK Basic Pension, like the Canadian Old Age 
Security is a basic pension scheme. In Canada prior to 1989 it was more or less 
universal except that in the UK eligibility for benefits is means-tested. 
The Canadian Old Age Security (OAS) is universal and fully funded from general 
revenues therefore no contribution is required. In terms of reform barriers, 
politically the BSP and OAS receive strong and broad public support. The 
benefits from the OAS are universal, while payment to or from the BSP is means-
tested so tend to attract weak attachment from the middle-income population. 
This is important in terms of mobilising political support against radical reform. 
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Table 1-1 Four Case Study of Pension Schemes Pre-reform - UK/Canada 
--
- ~-... -
. __ . 
- -
< 
Scheme Type Universality/ Benefit Political Financial Managed by 
Means-Tested Replacement Barrier to Barrier to 
Level Reform Reform 
!d State/Employer/ 
dom Employee Funded Means-Tested Maximum Strong Double Central 
State Flat rate benefits 25% support but payment Government 
on (BSP) narrow 
Earni"ngs 
_._-
-- -
;!d StatelEmployer/ Means-Tested Maximum Strong Double Central 
ons Employee Funded 25% support payment Government 
ne Earning related which is 
PS) broad based 
da Federal 
Government Universal Maximum Broad base None Central 
,ge funded from benefits 25% support Government 
ity(OAS) General Revenue because of (federal 
the spread government) 
Flat-rate benefit of benefits 
fa --- - - ---
)n Plan StatelEmployer/ Means-Tested Maximum Strong Double Central and 
I Employee Funded 25% support payment Provincial 
Earning related broad base Government 
shared 
The BSP also faces one additional barrier, a formidable one and this has to do 
with the double payment problem which arises when there is a switch from a pay-
as-you-go (PAYG) financing method to a fully funded model. In reality, while 
contribution rebates would have to be granted immediately, the state would still 
be liable to fund current pensions and those of people near retirement age 
(Bonoli 2000:72) However, because the OAS unlike the BSP, is fully funded 
from general revenues, it does not suffer such similar outcome. 
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The two other pension schemes: the State Earnings Related Pension Scheme 
(SERPS) and the Canada Pension Plan (CPP) are more complicated. First, the 
SERPS system is an earnings related pensions' scheme and covers a large 
section of the population. It is not a flat-rated benefited but rather base on 
earnings contributions. Unlike, the BSP, the SERPS scheme receives strong and 
broad base support. An examination of the UK reform will show that to reform the 
SERPS scheme, the Thatcher government had to weaken this broad based 
support. Both the SERPS and CPP would suffer from a double payment problem 
if it were to switch from the pay-as-you-go (PAYG) model to a fully funded 
method. There is also the added moral dilemma of justifying cuts in benefits 
when contributors feel a sense of entitlement after years of making qualifying 
contributions. 
Case Selection 
The selection of the two case countries is justified on the grounds that they both 
belong to the liberal welfare state type. The crucial aspect of the country 
selection is the concentration of political authority. By selecting two liberal welfare 
states, Canada and the UK, this thesis provides a much narrower analysis of 
variance within welfare regime type and therefore able to test Pierson's claims on 
the centrality of political authority. The thesis focuses on 3 pressures on the 
welfare state: an ageing population, economic globalisation and austerity. These 
3 pressures are examined in the context of 3 mediating institutions: concentration 
of political authority, pension design and interest intermediation. This is important 
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because each welfare world is composed not only of particular types of welfare 
states, but also of distinct political settings. The second crucial reason follows 
from Pierson's speculation (stated above) that concentrated political authority is 
an asset for those seeking to adapt radical reform (Pierson 2001 :430) It is 
suggested that countries with small open economies are also more likely to face 
pressure to reform - the selection of Canada is appropriate in this regard. 
Canada has a relatively small economy, it political configuration in terms of the 3 
pressures and mediating institutions make it a good candidate for this study. 
Greater trade openness increases the likelihood of more radical reform; greater 
concentration of political power increases the likelihood of more radical reform. In 
terms of trade openness both imports and exports measure as well as foreign 
direct investment (FDI) figures are used to enhance reliability of figures. Both 
case countries are quite open to the international economy, although Canada is 
more exposed to this pressure than the UK. 
In light of this, the thesis tests two parallel predictions: the first based on 
concentration of political authority and a second on trade openness. 
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Figure 1- 3 Trade Openness, - Exports as a Percen!9.!le of GOP 
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Canada and the UK present an interesting paradox on the account of both of 
these: trade openness and concentration of political authority. First, the UK unlike 
Canada is regarded as operating a system of government that concentrates 
political authority at the centre given that it is a unitary state. This would lead to 
the expectation that pension reform would be more radical in Canada than in the 
UK, at least on the count of its size, demographic projections and trade openness 
(see Figure 1- 2 and 1-3). The opposite was found. 
Table 1.2 Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) Overview UKlCanada, selected years 
>< 
Canada UK Canada UK 
Year Iriward Flow Inward Flow outward Flow OutWard Flow 
---
as percentage of as percentage of as percentage of as percentage of 
GDP GDP GDP GDP 
-- ---
1980 12,4 liJ 8,t 21,3 
--
--
1990 19,1 20,6 -- 14,8 23.2 
--
2000 29,8 30,$ 33.3 62,4 
2005 31.6 
-- 37,1 
._--
35.3 
- -- - 56,2 
~ .. -.-
---
Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Report, 2006 
24 
Figure 1- 3 and 1- 4 show marginal difference in levels of import and exports in 
both countries as a measure of their trade openness. Import and Exports are 
expressed as a percentage of GOP over the period of reform starting from 1980. 
Table 1.2 show higher rates of inward investment for Canada than the UK at the 
starts of the 1980s. This presents an interesting puzzle: essentially the Canadian 
evidence discounts trade openness as a potential explanatory tool. This strongly 
suggests that the other proposition, the concentration of political authority, is 
important because Canada's political system has more veto points than the UK's. 
The question that arises is this: how much of the policy response is dependent 
on this causal relation in these two case studies? The thesis reassesses 
orthodox views, from the viewpoint of a theory of comparative institutional 
advantage, and suggests ways in which the variance in reform of state pension 
system can be explained in the new politics of the welfare state (Hepple 2005). 
As already noted Canada and the UK are both grouped under the liberal welfare 
regime type (Esping-Anderson 1990). Their political systems are similar in many 
respects. They both operate Parliamentary systems of government. Canada and 
the UK entertain ever present nationalist threats directed at the central 
government. In Canada these nationalist squabbles can be found in the political 
landscape of the French speaking majority in Quebec, and in the UK, by Scottish 
and Welsh nationalism and in the politically unsettled Northern Ireland. In this 
respect, there is noticeable centrifugal force compelling national actors to satisfy 
divergent regional preferences in the social policy arena, even where decision 
25 
making is either unilateral or shared, since such action could dampen potential 
conflict between centre and periphery (Beland and Lecours 2005). This is rather 
important for Canada, particularly in terms of decision making in the pension 
field. Both countries operated state pension schemes that were structurally and 
financially similar, or at least were until the start of the reforms in each country in 
the 1980s. The foundation of their welfare system shared similar roots in the 
Elizabethan Poor Law traditions that date back to the fifteenth century. The state 
pension system itself was first established in UK in 1911 and for Canada in 1927. 
The key difference between the two countries can be found in the constitutional 
arrangement that makes Canada a federal system and the UK a unitary state. 
The federal constitutional arrangement has helped to alleviate the burden of 
administering Canada, but it is equally apparent that it brings other problems in 
its wake that are not found in a state organised along unitary lines. The UK has 
an un-codified constitutional system while Canada operates under the 
Constitution Act of 1867, which was repatriated from London in 1982 following 
what was largely an incomplete amendment process that has endangered for 
Canadians a continuing constitutional quagmire. Nevertheless, the Canadian 
constitution is a codified legal document that clearly sets the legitimate claims of 
each branch of government and the relations between the state and the citizens. 
The state is supervised in the proper performance of its tasks by a Supreme 
Court. 
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As an additional test, the thesis considers four specific pension policies, two in 
each country: the first two basic state pension systems. The first basic pension 
provision, usually provides subsistence benefit which is often state funded and 
intended to meet the most basic needs). The second level, above the basic state 
pension, is an occupational pension scheme tied to the employment status of the 
contributor (this reflects previous earnings). A third tier provision is usually private 
and voluntary (very few people take up the third option which can add to basic 
income). The specific pension schemes examined are the - the Old Age Security 
(OAS), the Canada Pension Plan (CPP) in Canada and in the UK the Basic State 
Pension (BSP) and the State Earnings Related Pension Scheme (SERPS). All 
these schemes were restructured starting in the 1980s. This thesis therefore 
underlines specific ways in which the institutional variables shape the Canadian 
and UK reform of these schemes and help to explain the differences between 
them. 
Methods 
There is an expectation that countries such as Canada, with its smaller and open 
economy should be more susceptible to radical reform measure than the UK for 
example (Cameron 1978, Katzenstein 1985b, Pfaller, Gough and Therborn 
1991). Faced with comparable external pressures and distinct internal political 
institutions, the British and Canadian governments responded in a strikingly 
divergent fashion. To identify and explain this policy variance, this thesis relied 
on material taken from primary and secondary sources. The primary sources 
27 
consisted of interviews and government documents. The interviews focused on 
ascertaining the influence of interest groups. Claims made by groups were either 
confirmed or refuted by primary document sources which revealed how the 
government responded to specific demands. Most of the primary sources were 
drawn from extensive field work in Canada and the UK. This included semi-
structured interviews with 34 politicians, senior officials and interest group 
representatives involved in the reform process. 
The primary documents also included memo from the department of works and 
pensions, Human Resources Development Canada, the parliamentary 
committees' reports, and parliament debates recorded in Hansard about the UK 
and Canada. It was necessary, for example, to ascertain the relative impact of 
labour and interest group effects on the reform efforts in both countries. 
In terms of the organizations interviewed, there were similarities between these 
groups in both countries and so it was easy to select corresponding 
organizations. The UK Trade Union Congress (TUC) and the Canadian 
equivalent of Canadian Labour Congress (CLC); Age Concern and Canadian 
Association of Retired People are two such examples. 
The interview methods applied the process of triangulation. The process of 
triangulation involved the selection of questions specific to claims made by 
contending interest gtoups and clartfyin~ this through interviews with the 
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respective departments in question. This is further traced in the accompanying 
documents located in the library. The interview materials were transcribed using 
codes to identify sources and respect anonymity. 
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1.2 Contribution to the literature 
The thesis deals with the academic inquiry into questions raised elsewhere in the 
welfare state literature: this informs the core of the research hypotheses. The 
received wisdom contained in the typology of the welfare states has proved less 
revealing in light of the scope of transformation in the postwar welfare state. 
Monolithic regimes (family of welfare state types) are being converted into 
potentially pluralistic ones, internal institutions defined here as pension design, 
interest intermediation and concentration of political authority: coupled with the 
political will to change is creating new opportunities to revisit the prevailing 
explanations that first appeared in the 1990s. The empirical findings of this study 
show that there has been rapid divergence in the fate of liberal welfare countries, 
demonstrated, for example, in the observed outcomes of the UK and Canada 
state pension reforms. 
The liberal welfare model, to which Canada and the UK both belong, is less 
homogenized. The literature recognizes the variations within it. Differences in the 
size of the welfare state, the universality of programmes of benefits and the 
funding mechanism that finance benefits payments are key features. In the liberal 
welfare model, the role of the state is limited, encompassing interests have a 
diminished role, the private market make a bigger contribution to financing and 
provision, benefit levels are generally low and means-tested. It is also the case 
that all liberal welfare states almost exclusively operate a two party government 
with decision making conducted through the electoral partisan politics. The 
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decision making process tend to render external players less effective because 
of the absence of veto points. Despite the foregoing arguments about the 
commonality of shared interests and experiences, this is not an argument that is 
satisfactory in the long run. This study therefore raises further questions about 
the causal relationship between the institutions identified and its' interaction with 
the external pressures discussed earlier. 
The answers to these questions have helped the study to achieve its objective: 
that is to contribute to clarifying our understanding of the pension reform efforts in 
the two case countries. In a more direct way it addresses the question of 'how'? 
How does reform proceed? What shapes policy response and determines 
winners and losers? In other words, what are the political mechanics of getting to 
the end goal of a successful reform? A good starting point will be to examine the 
institutions of the state, that is, whether the state is a federal or unitary or, 
parliamentary or presidential. It may also be useful to consider the actors and 
factors that may impede or enhance the formation of state pension systems, in 
term of their interest representation. Questions may be raised about the 
formation of the public pension system and how the state institutions interact and 
intersect with factors within and outside of it to shape what policies are adopted 
in support or opposition to it. Is there any discernible difference between the so-
called 'expansion' and 'retrenchment' phases of the welfare state? 
This study's hypothesis is grounded on two promising avenues of explanation. 
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First, the existence of veto points can act to dampen the impact of concentrated 
political authority if and when contending centers of political influence disagree 
on the right course of reform. In the case of Canada, for example, the existence 
of veto points within the Canadian federal system while potentially can retard 
progress on reform, has turned out to be rather consolidatory because key 
players (provincial governments) decide to agree on points of difference and has 
been since the establishment of the Canadian Pension Plan (CPP) in 1965. This 
is so because there has been no clear veto power for any of the provincial 
governments (except Ontario and Quebec) which will enable them to act alone. 
To carry its full impact, veto points, in the liberal welfare model, must be singular 
in application and impact. This is not the same as concentration of political 
authority in the central government - rather it assumes de-concentration of 
political authority since sub-national governments will be acting in their own rights 
against other equally powerful centres. Such an arrangement fosters cooperation 
as a result of the interaction between government preferences and the 
institutional framework within which they are situated. 
The second avenue of explanation is that interest intermediation can be effective 
even in countries where avenues for input into policy are limited for external 
actors as in the liberal model. To achieve this, particular interest must attain 
universal appeal in specific pension policy areas. This particularly true if the 
scheme is universal rather than means-tested. 
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This hypothesis does thus promote the role of interest intermediation (although 
strongly influenced by the median voter thesis) to a dominant rather than a 
subordinate position because of the latent potential for mobilizing support from 
the deep reservoir of support as argued by Pierson (2004). Following from 
Pierson's argument, he suggests that encompassing interest organisations are 
relatively weak - this contrasts marginal from this thesis observation of the policy 
cases. Policy changes, he argues are executed almost exclusively through 
electoral and partisan politics and that the concentration of political authority 
makes reform easier. 
The findings of this thesis support the claims made by Pierson, however, with the 
following caveats. The strength of concentrated pOlitical authority and the 
weakness in interest intermediation never unfold exactly as Pierson suggest, 
although he provides a close approximation of contextual framework from which 
to develop an understanding of the restructuring process. In the UK as in Canada 
the outcome of the reform suggest that mediation by other institutional factors 
played a role also - this would probably explain why countries tend to adapt a 
mix of pension benefit packages. While interest groups do not have a seat at the 
decision making table in the liberal welfare model as Pierson argues, the specific 
orientation of the reform program could galvanize opposition support and make 
the reform objective difficult even for government acting from position of superior 
capacity. The role of interest groups in such cases maybe exaggerated and 
indeed masks the true level of strength. 
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The single plurality electoral system enhances the political power of the party in 
government. It creates electoral majorities and in the case of the Westminster 
model, the capacity of the governing party to dominate policy making also. The 
empirical evidence from the Canadian federal system suggest that while the 
single plurality electoral system inflates the electoral support of parties in power, 
it has little or no currency in pension policy making there. 
To estimate the relationship between the 3 independent variables: the 
concentration of political authority; pension design, and economic globalisation 
and the mediating domestic institutional is the central concern here. Economic 
globalisation and demographic change are treated as independent variables. 
While economic austerity is treated as an intervening variable. The variable 
controlled for in this study is the welfare state type and the crucial aspect of the 
distinct variable is degree of political concentration granted by the institutions of 
government. The selection of the variables has been carefully evaluated to allow 
the study to control for most non-institutional variables, thereby enabling the 
impact of political institutions to be highlighted. 
Externally demographic change is providing reforming governments the incentive 
to cut social spending. The demand for pensions, for example, is largely 
determined by the size and composition of the population2 . Thus, demographic 
2 Population changes as a phenomenon essentially is reacted to by government and cannot itself be affected 
by policy and planning. But population change can equally be regarded as being to some extent a 
dependent rather than an independent variable in the planning process. Consequently, projections can be 
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change is depicted as an essential variable. The UK population is ageing. 
Although the population grew by 8 percent in the last thirty years or so, from 55.9 
million to 60.2 million in mid-2005, the change has not occurred evenly across all 
ages (Office for National Statistics,[ONS], 2006). The proportion of the population 
aged 65 and over has increased, it represents 18.7 in 2005 (ONS, 2006). By 
2025 as Figure 1.3 show, the population of those of pensionable age in the UK 
will be about 23.9 of the total population (ONS, 2006). Canada's population is 
ageing fast and senior citizens would outnumber children in about a decade, 
according to Statistics Canada (Statistics Canada, 2005). By 2025, the number of 
people aged 65 and over would be about 9.4 million representing approximately 
25.2 percent of the total population. Comparatively, Canada's population 
projection for seniors is 1.3 percent higher than the UK projections. The World 
Bank confirms these projections and predict a percent increase of about 25 
percent (World bank 1994). This is likely to have substantial policy implications, 
particularly in the area of pensions. 
The point here of course is not just on economic growth but growth in the 
numbers of the elderly. Myles and Pierson (2001) state that with rather few 
exceptions, the size of the welfare state for the elderly in the next century will be 
larger than it is now if for no other reason than that benefits will rise more quickly 
than the capacity of policy makers to cut entitlements (Pierson 2001). If this is 
true, states may respond by taking radical steps to address the fiscal stress. This 
used to estimate the likely demographic impact of planning decisions and policy changes, as well as the 
planning and policy implication of demographic change. 
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would mean that issues relating to state pension would remain a higher policy 
priority rather a diminished one. 
Structure of the thesis 
The rest of the thesis consists of six chapters. The second chapter explores in 
greater detail the welfare state literature and provides a critique of the existing 
explanatory framework. It also lays out the major contending issues identified in 
this thesis. In the third chapter, the analysis of welfare state development, and 
different types of pensions. It will consider the reform options available to policy 
makers and their minders. The concept of concentrated political authority will be 
considered in light of the policy process. In addition all the independent variables 
already mentioned in the introduction will be examined. This will then lead into 
the central analysis of the case countries in chapters 4 and 5. The sixth and final 
chapter will summarise the key arguments. It will postulate a plausible 
explanation of the empirical findings and look forward to future research 
possibilities. 
In order to evaluate critically the reform trajectory between both countries, it is 
important to identify the essential aspects of the relationship between pension 
reform and economic globalisation, demographic change and austerity. The 
national institutional settings provide a backdrop for translating external 
constraints into political action. 
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Chapter 2 Welfare State Theory 
2.1 Major Issues of Contention 
2.2 Welfare State Theory and the Provision of Public Pension 
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2.1 Major Issues of Contention 
Two important themes from the first chapter are carried forward here: first, that 
interest representation and political institutions hold an important key in our 
understanding of the policy variance in the state pension reform effort in the two 
case countries in light of international economic pressure (Immergut 1992; Huber 
et a1.1993; Pierson, 1994, 1996). Second, that existing welfare state theory is 
limited in explaining the retrenchment logic and in particular fails to engage 
sufficiently with the policy variance observed in the liberal welfare model of which 
Canada and the UK are both examples. 
This chapter provides the theoretical background for analysing the pension 
reform and leads to the discussion of the major challenges confronting the UK 
and Canadian governments in the provision of public pension examined in 
Chapters 4 and 5. The first part considers the major issues of contention of the 
welfare state. The second part of the chapter engages with both the domestic 
policy making and the welfare state retrenchment arguments. Specifically the 
thesis questions a number of theoretical assumptions. For example, the thesis 
raises questions about the inadequacy of the 'logic of industrialization approach' 
as a plausible explanation (Bonoli, 2000). In the second part, the three broad 
schools of welfare state theory as it relates to the expansion of the welfare state 
is contrasted with the pension reform literature. It argue that the similarities 
between welfare state expansion and retrenchment serve also as a point of 
departure. 
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Pressure Points 
The reform of the state pension system is an integral part of the retrenchmene of 
the welfare state. The liberal welfare model, like most of the other welfare state 
regime types, suffer from a number of challenges - most of which have already 
been briefly discussed in the preceding chapter. From the point of view of this 
thesis, there are at least two central concerns: one relates to the policy process 
itself leading to reform and the other regarding the plausible theoretical 
explanation for the observed variance in policy outcome. These two challenges 
are not exclusive problems but rather mutually intertwined. 
First, these challenges are contentious from a policy process pOint of view 
because there is a lack of agreement on the effect of the key variables 
considered in the literature. Despite this disagreement concerning the root 
causes, it is generally accepted that the welfare state now faces a context of 
permanent austerity. The transformed global market, a sharp slow down in 
economic growth, the maturation of governmental commitments, and population 
ageing all generate considerable fiscal stress (Pierson 2001) 
In addition to this overarching fiscal stress, systematic challenges relating to the 
reform process itself are identified, such as the long-term financial sustainability, 
3 The term retrenchment and reform is used synonymously in the welfare state literature. In ordinary usage 
they do not mean the same thing. Retrenchment entails a process of policy changes that result in reduction 
of generosity, coverage or quality of social programmes. While reform, although involves a process of 
policy change is not always the case that such change will result in reductions of programme benefits. 
However, it is generally accepted that in the current climate, pension reform is more likely than not to 
involve the reduction of benefits. For the liberal welfare model, this is true because it has entailed a process 
of re-commodification. It is used here in this thesis to convey this sense of loss of entitlement observed in 
the case countries. 
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contextual effects, the impact of political decision making, pension design and 
finance, path dependence, cultural attitudes towards the state's involvement in 
pension provision, the electoral/partisan environment and interest intermediation. 
The process of reforming state pension systems is generally associated with 
retrenchment. It involves changes to policy that result in reductions in the level, 
coverage or quality of social programmes (Bonoli 2000). Retrenchment can be 
moderated by other measures which are geared towards meeting changing 
social needs. In practice, retrenchment alters the existing distributional equilibria 
(Bonoli 2000). 
The climate in which reform takes place is as important as the reform itself. For 
example, under conditions of permanent austerity a distinct set of political 
problems arise. The range of political actors represents the differing political 
cleavages and strategic alliance. This strategic alliance reshapes the relationship 
between opponents and supporters on the one hand and government and 
citizens on the other and what is desirable and achievable under the 
circumstances. In part, this stems from the mounting concern in the wake of shift 
the global economic both in terms of pressures and concerns over 
competitiveness and because economic shifts have altered domestic balances of 
political power (Pierson 2001 :193). A central objective of this thesis is to help to 
deepen understanding of forces shaping the reform of the liberal welfare state. It 
does this by paying close attention to the ways in which different national policy 
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patterns are embedded in, and help to shape, distinctive national variety. 
It is expected that the national variance is also shaped by the demographics of 
each state. Pensions are directly exposed to the twin pressures of economic and 
demographic change. The sharp slow down in economic growth over the 1980s 
reduced governments' ability to generate revenues - either through the 
traditional method via taxation or indirectly through labour market flexibility and 
increased productivity. On the other hand, population ageing is resulting in 
increased pension spending. This provides governments with strong incentive to 
take action. In the Section 2.2, these theoretical factors are considered further. 
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2.2 The Welfare State Theory and the Provision of Public Pension 
Section 2.2 provides a critical review of the welfare state literature as well as the 
literature on domestic policy making. The evidence reviewed in this chapter 
suggests that the single logic of welfare state reform have become less credible. 
The study of the welfare state suffers from a crucial dependent variable problem: 
this problem stems in part from the limitation of theory and the lack of available 
data. Attempts at accounting for the different hues of welfare state regimes, have 
being a subject of a simple dichotomy of 'more' versus 'less' (Pierson 2001: 421). 
This single logic implies that change is measured along a single continuum, 
stretching from the homeostasis or even expanding welfare state on one end, to 
significant erosion or dismantling on the other. Although the existing typology 
does not accurately depict the distinct processes, it seems clear that it serves as 
a useful heuristic device from which to assess the trend of reform across 
regimes. This is important because the context in which reform occurs involves a 
range of actors with complex motives, and the various forms of the dependent 
variable makes explanation on a single continuum futile. 
Disaggregating these reform dimensions enhances our chances of predicting or 
even making sense of relevant political processes, enabling a more minute 
account of actor interests and political activity. Government departments acting 
on behalf of national or subnational governments are actors in their own rights 
conforming to specific institutional norms of behaviour (Scharpf 1997). Interest 
groups can also be considered as actors representing specific or a multiplicity of 
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interests. Individual citizens, whether as pensioners or tax payers have interests 
too. These actors may have concerns about distinct dimensions of reform; 
particular actors may have multiple priorities but partly conflicting objectives. The 
existence of multiple priorities creates opportunities for issue-linkage and 
negotiated change. The actors preferences in pension policy is structured to 
some extent by the institutional design of the relevant programmes, so that a 
combined focus on political and pension policy improves the explanatory 
capacity of this thesis. 
Analysts elsewhere (Myles and Pierson 1997; Bonoli 2000) have stressed the 
centrality of distinct political and policy configuration - distinct regimes. They 
have called for the recognition of the existence of quite different settings for the 
emerging politics of restructuring. 
Our Starting point - welfare state development theory 
The pioneering research by Esping-Andersen laid a solid foundation upon which 
to begin the study of welfare state development (1990, 1994, 2001). His regime 
analysis was the first systematic analysis of the welfare state and it stands alone 
in drawing together the disparate perspectives namely: the logic of 
industrialisation, the power resource and the new institutional approach. 
The industrialisation nexus 
Esping-Andersen's regime analysis assumes an interconnectedness of state, 
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economic, legal and organisational features. He makes three principal pOints 
about the welfare state regimes. First, he builds on Richard Titmuss's (Titmuss 
1950) idea of social rights: he argues that the basis of social rights rests on the 
degree to which such rights permit individuals to maintain a living standard 
independent of pure market forces. This, he referred to as decommodification. 
Therefore any effort by government to reverse or create dependence on pure 
market forces is regarded as commodification (re-commodification). Second he 
contends that welfare states are seen as having come about as a response to 
stratification in capitalist societies. Welfare states in turn are themselves a 
system of stratification since the social rights thus confer to citizens rights to 
resources. Third Esping-Andersen attributes the differences between welfare 
states to the nature of class mobilisation, class-political coalition structures and 
the historical legacy of regime institutionalisation. The three worlds of welfare 
capitalism identified by Esping-Andersen are: the liberal welfare model, the 
conservative model and the social democratic model (Esping-Andersen 
1990:32). 
Esping-Andersen characterises the liberal welfare model as one with limited 
provision of income benefits. Another characteristic is that income transfers to 
low earners, state dependents, and working-class are modest. Reform has been 
circumscribed by adherence to work-ethic norms and the regime minimises 
decommodification and encourages a strong market-oriented welfare system for 
middle and upper-income groups (Esping-Anderson, 1990). The schematic 
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diagram below provides a general overview of these models. 
Table 2-1 Three worlds of welfare state overview 
UheraJ Social Democratic Conservative 
Political Support For Welfare State Moderate High High 
Adjustment Pressure Moderate Moderate High 
Re-commodification/ Cost Containment calibration! Reform Agenda Recalibration 
Cost containment 
UneofConflict Neoliberal retrenchment vs. No dominant cleavage 'Stand Pat' vs. 
compensated commodification Negotiated, incremental Negiotiated Reform 
adjustment 
Distinct Key Variable Concentration of political frequency of coalition dilutes Vulnerability of centrist 
authority concentration of political authority reform 
Source: Pierson, 2001 :455 
Unlike the social democratic and conservative models, in the liberal welfare state 
adjustment pressures have been moderate and so has been support for existing 
programmes (Pierson 2001: 455). There are several reasons for this. As already 
noted above, the level of support can be linked to a culture of reliance on self-
financed family support and care, supplemented by charity and occupational 
provision. It is a stigmatised, underfinanced and low-quality public social service. 
It has a high level of income inequality and relative poverty a central role of 
means-tested benefits, a low social expenditure as a proportion of GDP and low 
replacement levels of income by state benefits and pensions4 (Esping-Andersen 
4 Esping-Andersen (1990) Three Worlds of Welfare State Capitalism Oxford: Polity Press provides a 
comprehensive treatment of this subject as it relates to the other three models of the welfare state. Nonnan 
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1990, 1996, Sykes et al 2001, Pierson 2001). Because of the low social 
expenditure as a proportion of GDP and low replacement levels, the liberal 
welfare model does not have the added pressure to reform its' pension system in 
comparison to the other two. Bonoli argues that the 1986 reform of the UK's 
State Earning Related Pension scheme (SERPS), for example, was quite radical 
for a scheme that was in terms of spending levels, already too low by 
international and European standards (Bonoli 2000). 
The final point relates to the key variable in this study. It is generally accepted 
that the concentration of political authority is the distinct variable. The choice of 
this variable emphasises the impact of political institutions in contemporary 
welfare state theory over competing theories, for example, the 'the logic of 
industrialisation and 'politics matter' (Helco 1974, Skocpol and Amenta 1986, 
Immergut 1992, Huber et ai, 1993, Pierson 2001). The industrialisation thesis 
argues that welfare states developed along the lines of advancement in industry. 
The disjuncture that grew both within the family and in the market place with 
increased urbanisation and industrialisation, meant that the traditional social 
cohesion and the labour market arrangements which supported workers and 
families in old age could no longer foster such support relationships as the one 
that preceded it. This made room for the growth of the welfare state, and in 
particular the establishment of various pension schemes (Cutright 1965; 
Wilensky 1975; Myles 1989; Esping-Andersen 1990). 
Ginsburg "Globalisation and the Liberal Welfare States" in Sykes et al (2001) Globalisation and 
European Welfare States Challenges and Changes London: Pal grave also explores the challenges facing 
the liberal welfare model. 
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The 'logic of industrialisation' approach notable in the work of Cutright (1965), 
Wilensky (1975) and Esping-Andersen (1990) takes the view that the welfare 
state is a by-product of economic development. This view takes a functionalist 
approach and is supported by statistical analyses covering a large number of 
countries. Wilensky for example, conducted a quantitative analysis of data 
covering sixty-four countries. His findings concluded that 'economic growth and 
its demographic and bureaucratic outcomes are the root cause of the general 
emergence of the welfare state' (Wilensky, 1975: xiii). 
The assumption that social policy would respond to the needs generated by 
industrialisation is underscored by the prevailing convergence theory. The initial 
statistical data gathered using this theoretical approach supported the correlation 
between economic development, measured by per capita GDP, and the level of 
social expenditure. However, this would soon be dispelled as more comparative 
information came to light. It became clear that country variations went beyond 
what could be explained by differences in levels of economic development 
(Bonoli 2000:30). Thus the 'logic of industrialisation' approach was deficient in 
accounting for differences in the rates of entitlement and the degree of 
distribution or coverage. In other words, the measurement of 'welfare effort' of a 
country, based solely on expenditure had little or no value as far as comparing 
countries goes (Esping-Andersen 1990). The account of the welfare state, based 
on an industrialisation nexus does not fully engage with the current climate of 
retrenchment because policy makers are exposed to a changed political 
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environment in which dissatisfied voters are likely to react negatively to perceived 
loss of benefits due to cutbacks. 
Politics Matter 
The politics matter argument, also variously referred to as the power-resource 
model attributes the advancement of the welfare state on the ideological 
persuasion of political parties and agents. In this view the dichotomy of right/left 
party orientation is positively viewed as determining the type of welfare state that 
developed. 
The 'Power-Resources' model, rather than focusing on 'welfare effort' sought to 
delineate and identify factors that influenced the development of the welfare 
state. The hypothesis is that the strength of the labour movement and of left-wing 
parties is a key determinant of the level of welfare state development in a 
country. It follows from this premise, that successful mobilisation of the working 
class is the essential factor in explaining the different levels and models of social 
protection. Authors focussing on the Swedish case argued that left-wing parties 
can, once in government, prompt the adoption of generous and universalist 
social policies which were favourable to working-class interests (Castles 1982, 
Korpi 1983, Esping-Andersen 1985). 
The empirical work of Francis Castles shows that strong parties of the right have 
hindered welfare state expansion, while the existence of social democratic 
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parties has served as a stimulus (1982:85). With regards to pensions, a strong 
correlation has been shown to exist between the power of the left and his index 
of pension quality, which takes into account a wide range of variables (Castles 
1982). 
The 'power-resources' model illuminates our understanding on variance. It does 
this by identifying the nature of class mobilisation, class-political coalition 
structures and how this interaction shapes policy direction. It soon begins to 
falter, however, in light of the current climate of blurring distinction between Left 
and Right economic policies. As the case of New Labour public sector 
managerialism in UK will show, the 'power-resources' model does not have an 
answer to this emerging indistinctiveness of left-right economic policy orientation. 
It remains a useful but significantly diminished explanatory tool. Much attention is 
been given to a rival model, the New Institutionalist approach in explaining how 
the development of the welfare states comes to differ. 
The new institutional explanation 
The New Institutionalist approach highlights the impact of political institutions, in 
particular the concentration of political authority. To understand the differences in 
the development of the welfare state, this approach rests its arguments on a 
three key factors. First, it argues that countries which developed a strong state 
apparatus relatively early are associated with high levels of social protection. 
Second, they point to the fact that existing social policies have a substantial 
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impact on future development. Third, countries in which political institutions allow 
minorities substantial access to power are less likely to develop big welfare 
states (Bonoli 2000) 
The evidence for these claims is spread across a large section of the welfare 
state literature. Skocpol and Amenta (1986 p.147) identify the impact of existing 
policies on current politics, through a mechanism of 'policy feedback'. The logic 
of 'policy-feedback' is not dissimilar from the 'path dependence' situation 
whereby policies persist or lock-in place and exit from a current policy path is 
inhibited. 
In relation to the third point above, that is, substantial capacity of minorities to 
influence policy by way of veto points, Immergut (1992), Huber et al (1993) and 
Bonoli (2000) support the theory that constitutional structures have a substantial 
impact on the level of state welfare of a country. They argue that in countries in 
which interest groups are allowed substantial access to the policy-making 
process, and in which minorities have the opportunity to prevent the adoption of 
legislation given the existence of veto pOints solidaristic welfare reforms are more 
difficult to implement. Bonoli (2000) compares the different approaches to the 
reform of the state pension system in the UK, Switzerland and France. 
The new institutionalist approach offers a more promising line of inquiry because 
it establishes a framework that allows the study to examine the current reform 
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process. 
Adopting welfare development theory in a different environment 
The example provided above show that the absence of radical reform in France 
and Switzerland, is explained by the fact that, given the availability of 
referendums veto points interests groups that opposed pension reform were able 
to prevent reform, and in the case of France this led to the withdrawal of the 1995 
pension bill, which would have affected how the regime general was 
administered and electoral defeat of the right-of-centre coalition government in 
1997. The converse of this position would be that the ability of governments to 
enact legislation that is favourable to them will be enhanced by the absence of 
minorities with access to political to power. Huber et al (1993) found a 
correlation between various indicators of size of welfare states and power 
concentration with the executive branch of government. 
While these three strands of contemporary welfare state theory reveal the broad 
determinants of welfare state expansion, there are fundamental problems in 
applying their findings to current change which is the primary concern of this 
study. On the surface, the theories of expansion, while not entirely dissimilar from 
retrenchment, limit their capacity to explain the observed reform efforts. The 
accounts of current change tend to find ways to incorporate the constraints 
imposed by the national as well as the international economic order and where 
applicable the affects of supranational institutions. 
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Paul Pierson pursues this very line of thinking when he said that the differences 
between expansion and retrenchment in social policy are substantive (1996: 155-
6) He writes: 
"Retrenchment is not simply the mirror image of welfare state expansion. Why 
should we assume that theories designed to explain outcomes in a particular 
context and involving the pursuit of particular goals will still apply once the 
political environment and the goals of key actors have undergone radical 
change? The question of whether theories of welfare state expansion offer 
insights into the retrenchment process is still open, major modifications are 
probably required" (Pierson 1996 : 156) 
By implication, what Pierson is suggesting is that the two trends require 
distinctive conceptual frameworks. He acknowledges that the external economic 
dimension is important, but he believes that it is the internal events that shape 
the state's response. For example, the resilience of the welfare state in Europe 
as well as in North America supports Pierson's argument. It was expected that 
the welfare state may have collapsed given the demise of the left since the 
1980s. Rather what has been observed is the growing and widespread support 
for the welfare state in countries where there have been traditionally weak labour 
movements. Pierson offers another explanation. He states: 
"The sources of the welfare state's political strength are diverse, but are of two 
basic types: the electoral incentives associated with programmes which retain 
broad and deep popular support and the institutional 'stickiness' which further 
constrains the possibilities for policy reform. Together, these features have 
created tremendous resilience in the face of two decades of welfare state 'crisis'" 
(Pierson 2001: 411 see also 1994, 1996) 
According to this view; the primary place to begin the search for answers would 
be within the states. He actually insists that while the external influences are 
important, they themselves are reshaped by the social and economic 
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transformation occurring within affluent democracies that produce pressure on 
the welfare states (Pierson 2001: 410). To be sure, however, the retrenchment 
theory claims appear substantive and valid. First, the overall economic context of 
social policy-making has changed. Both Canada and the UK operate under 
conditions of intense economic competition in open rather then closed 
economies. This simply means that the relatively high degree of control over their 
economies, for example through Keynesian demand management, is no longer 
available. In contrast, the current international trends of economic and political 
integration mean that governments negotiate from a position of diminished 
strength (Scharpf 1997a, Bonoli 2000) 
Second, while welfare state expansion was popular and had far reaching effect, 
retrenchment is generally unpopular (Pierson 1996, 2001) Why? Social 
programmes have modified the socio-economic and political context in which 
they operate. As a result of the welfare state, a certain level of state-guaranteed 
economic security has become the norm in most western societies. When 
governments decide to reduce the levels of benefits, they are likely to encounter 
powerful resistance from relatively large sections of public opinion. According to 
Pierson, social programmes have created their own constituencies, which include 
a large part of the electorate (pensioners, social workers, families, middle classes 
and so forth) (Pierson 1996). These groups will tend to defend the gains they 
have by opposing and mobiliSing against cutbacks. The different levels of public 
support for expansion and retrenchment will thus generate different patterns of 
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coalition formation. Any theory that wishes to explain the current trend will need 
to amend the traditional welfare state theory to take this into account. 
The third point follows slightly from the second above. It posits that welfare 
retrenchment constitutes an alteration of the distributional equilibria because it 
involves transfers of resources between sections of the population (Bonoli 2000: 
35) It has the potential to create winners and losers. Unlike other areas of social 
policy, public pension suffers from a limited scope for efficiency savings. There is 
no room to recoup cost savings for example in the administrative side of things, 
because the spending there is already too low. So reduction in pension spending 
is financed by reductions in the level or coverage of current schemes, leaving 
some groups of recipients or potential recipients worse off as a result. This zero-
sum game plays out in the backdrop. The resulting pattern of advantage and 
disadvantage/winners and losers will shape the position of various groups in the 
political arena, and will obviously have an impact on policy outcomes (Bonoli 
2000: 35) 
These issues raise crucial challenges for this thesis. It has already been noted in 
the introduction, that this study engages with the retrenchment side of welfare 
state theory. This is approached by applying Pierson's new institutionalist 
hypothesis to two carefully selected case studies. The focus is on the unique 
concentration of political authority thesis using the Canadian federal system in 
comparison to the UK unitary state. The validity of the claim that political 
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institutions is important to our understanding of the policy variance in the state 
pension reform effort in the two case countries in light of international economic 
pressure is evaluated. This claim should actually be in two parts. The first is on 
the impact of political institutions and the lesser one is on economic 
globalisation5 . The latter part of this claim qualifies the former because the policy 
response in both of my case countries over the reform of their respective state 
pension systems have always been framed in terms of financial sustainability in 
context of permanent austerity (Pierson 2001). 
The phenomenon of economic globalisation and its impact on pension policy-
making has not been widely studied, although globalisation is a controversial 
topic and receives wide and in-depth attention (Fisher, 1930, 1935; Okun 1975, 
Gilder 1981, Pflaller et a11991, Scharpf 1991, Kurzer 1993, Pierson 1994,1996, 
Gough 1996, Rhodes 1996, 1997b, Held et al 1997, Cerny 1997, Garrett 1998, 
5 The term globalisation is highly controversial and complex. Within the political science, economics and 
political economy sub-disciplines, it is being contested. The term used in this thesis is economic 
globalisation. It is a deliberate attempt aimed at giving meaning and to differentiate from the rather crude 
term globalisation. See Jessop's sound advice on the usage of the term globalisation (1998) In his 
contributory chapter in S.Aronowitz and P. Bratis's (eds) book 'Rethinking the State: Miliband, Poulantzas 
and State Theory (Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press), Jessop explains: "Globalisation is 
generally better interpreted as the complex resultant of many dif.ferent processes than as a distinctive 
causal process in its own right. It is misleading to explain specific events and phenomena in terms of the 
process of 'globalisation', pointless to subsume anything and everything under the umbrella of 
'globalisation' and unhelpful to seek to link anything and everything to 'globalisation' as if this somehow 
conveys more insight than alternative rubrics coule!' (1998:1) So it is possible to look at the different 
angles of this phenomena as in - changing modes of regulation 'From the Keynesian Welfare national state 
to the Schumpeterian workforce post-national regime' in G. Lewis, S.Gewirtz and J. Clarke (eds), 
Rethinking Social Policy (London: Sage/Open University, 2000); new conditions and processes of capital 
formation 'European financial integration and uneven development', in R.Hudson and A. Williams (eds), 
Divided Europe: Society and Territory (London, Sage, 1999).; new communication technologies; new 
politico-spatial alignments and conflicts 'Imagining globalisation: power-geometries of time-space' in 
A.Brah, M.Hickman and M. MacanGhaill (eds), Future Worlds: Migration, Environment and Globalisation 
(Basingstoke:Macmillan, 1999) new cultural formation and relations (Jameson and Miyoshi 1998) 
Jameson,F. and Miyoshi, M. (eds) (1998) The Cultures ofGlobalisation (Durham,NC and London: Duke 
University Press)and so forth. In this dissertation the term economic globalisation will be applied in the 
sense captured by Jessop (1998) and Tickell (1999) 
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Hirst and Thompson 1999 ). The contribution of the referenced analysts would be 
considered in the pension policy section to follow. 
There are at least two schools of thought regarding the influence of economic 
globalisation on the retrenchment of the welfare state. For the purposes here, it is 
summed up as either a positive or negative externality. The following 
summarises the negative aspects of economic globalisation: 
o the welfare state represents a drain on competitiveness in an era 
of globalisation and the com petition state (Cerny, 1990, 1997 ) 
See Table 2-2 (below) 
Table 2-2 Negative Externalities of Welfare Expenditure 
Expenditure/taxation 
(indirect effects) 
Social programmes 
(direct effects) 
1. Borrowing crowds out 
investment 
2. Social costs encourage 
capital flight 
4. PAVE (pay-as-you-eam) 
pensions reduce savings 
Productivity of Capital 
and labour 
3. Direct taxes increase 
labour cost and 
reduces supply 
5. State pensions and 
unemployment and sickness 
benefits reduce labour supply 
6. Public Sector 
social provision 
less efficient 
Source: Adapted from Gough (1996:217) 
o however, institutional and cultural structures of the welfare state 
have become entrenched and embedded as to make its reform 
and retrenchment an iterative and incremental yet cumulative 
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process, which just began (Pierson 1994, 1996,2001) 
The positive externality contrasts with this view and argues that the: 
o welfare state (at least in certain institutional and cultural 
environments, is not a drain but rather it retains and acquires yet 
further positive impact on the macroeconomic and welfare 
outcomes (Finegold and Soskice,1988, Pflaller et aI., 1991, 
Esping-Andersen 1994, Gough 1996, Barr 1998, Garrett, 1998). 
The key arguments are presented below in Table 2-3 
o 
Table 2-3 Positive Externalities of Welfare Expenditure 
Marcoeconomic effects 
Social Programmes 
(direct effects) 
Welfare Outcomes 
(indirect effects) 
::ostlSuoply of Capital 
2. Public social provision 
boosts consumption 
5. Social inclusion tempers 
criminality:crime deters 
investment 
CostlSupply 
of Labour 
1. Macroeconomic stabilization 
effects 
3. Support for women's 
employment increases 
supply of labour 
6. reduced costs of health 
Productivity of 
Capital/Labour 
4. Human capital 
enhanched through 
education and 
training 
I. Contribution to 
internal work-place 
flexibility (truSt ant. 
reduced transaction 
costs) 
Source: Adapted from Gough (1996: 217) 
o Economic globalisation may be over exaggerated and that the 
aggregate empirical evidence in fact masks the actual degree of 
retrenchment and once we control for demographic and other 
'welfare inflationary' pressures, observed welfare expenditure is 
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in fact substantially below that we would anticipate (Esping-
Andersen 1996b, 1996c, Rhodes 1996, 1997b). 
o Depending on the pension design (for example, PA YG) the 
payroll tax needed to finance the state pension scheme could be 
negligible (Myles, 1994). 
o Aggregate evidence masks the degree of real retrenchment 
since the market-conforming nature of that process has served 
to increase welfare pressures by effectively trading inflation for 
unemployment. This is necessary since in certain climates, the 
social trends make pressures on the cost of social provision 
intense and unrelenting. This gives rise to political cleavages 
which are likely to become more complex requiring reforming 
governments to seek coalitions that back reforms that trades 
economic performance with emerging social demands. 
Consequently, although aggregate spending has proved 'sticky', 
once we control for increased welfare demand we observe both 
a narrowing of the scope of social provision and retrenchment in 
terms of the value of benefits to claimants (A. Martin 1997, 
Rhodes 1997b, Ferrera 1998). 
These bullet pOints highlight the nexus of economic globalisation and public 
pension retrenchment. The first point, simply suggests that globalisation imposes 
pressure for welfare retrenchment. The second point to the potential 
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competitiveness-enhancing role for the welfare state. The third bullet point 
acknowledges the attenuating and/or mediating role of institutional factors. 
Similarly, there exists a divergent view over the strict composition of welfare 
inflationary pressures in contemporary society - with some attributing these to 
long-term demographic trends - the fourth bullet point. The fifth raises the 
possibility that pension design could attenuate negative payroll tax effects. The 
sixth bullet point gives reference to those who attribute the inflationary factors to 
short-term political considerations. Yet there is also a real possibility to combine 
two or more of these factors. 
In terms of the negative externalities presented in Table 2-2, it does appear that 
the economic case for the net competitiveness-corrosive externalities is 
impressive at this stage of the analysis. The two most compelling cases are first, 
identifying a tendency for government borrowing to inject inflationary pressures 
into the economy, and second, suggesting that direct and indirect taxation 
burden associated with social provision increases the cost of labour. 
Interestingly, however, both of these tendencies are likely to be unevenly 
distributed amongst welfare states. Arguably, the presence of encompassing 
labour-market institutions and a social democratic tradition of coordinated 
national wage bargaining attenuates pressures for wage-push inflation that may 
be present in more liberal welfare regimes (Hay 2001). Moreover, as noted 
above, tax-induced additional labour costs tend to have a minimal impact on 
59 
economies which compete in capital-intensive and quality competitive sectors. 
Labour costs represent a tiny fraction of the overall production costs and it is 
quality and innovation rather than cost that are most likely to confer a competitive 
advantage. 
There are several implications from this situation. First it does suggest that the 
balance between competitive-enhancing and competitive-corrosive externalities 
is likely to be mediated by institutional factors. Principal amongst these are the 
degree of encompassment of wage-bargaining regime and what might be termed 
the 'regime of competitiveness' of the economy as a whole. For economies 
competing solely on the basis of cost in low-skill, labour-intensive industries, the 
welfare state is a clear burden on competitiveness, whilst for those seeking to 
pave a high-tech, high-skill route to competitiveness in capital-intensive sectors, 
any such negative externalities are significantly attenuated. 
Given the increasingly pervasive orthodoxy, we might expect to find little in the 
way of hypothesised competitive-enhancing externalities associated with 
inclusive social provision (Hay 2001) Yet what is most striking given the 
ascendancy of the conventional wisdom, is the sheer range and diversity of 
factors, even in quite mainstream economic analysis, pointing to the potential 
contribution of the welfare state to competitiveness in export markets. Table 2-3 
illustrates this point. 
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Referring to the first point on the table, microeconomic stabilisation effects imply 
that high levels of social spending will tend to promote economic stability insofar 
as they have the countercyclical economic effects. This is particularly true for the 
case with unemployment benefits which (higher underlying rates of structural 
unemployment notwithstanding) will tend to bolster demand in times of recession. 
Similarly, transfer payments to the working class are more likely to stimulate 
consumption (and hence demand) than tax concessions to the middle classes. 
Consequently, redistributive welfare regimes, especially those prepared to inject 
demand into the economy during times of recession are likely to facilitate 
macroeconomic stabilisation across the economic cycle. 
The second point on the table relates to public housing provision for instance. It 
has been argued that the subsidisation or direct provision of housing frees capital 
for consumption, thereby raising the aggregate level of demand within the 
economy. There is positive externality with regards to the support for women's 
employment in the labour market. The provision of nursery places and pre-school 
care is likely to facilitate access (especially that of women) to the labour-market 
and hence to improve the supply of labour with consequent benefits for the 
. productivity of the economy. 
Human capital is enhanced through education and training. Gough (1996) points 
out that most contemporary variant of competitiveness-enhancing view of the 
welfare state focus on its supply-side contribution. In an era of heightened 
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competitiveness, it argues, the skill level of the economy is crucial. Here the 
welfare state has a central role to play, ensuring flexible high-quality training and 
re-skilling programmes oriented directly towards the delivery of skills required by 
the economy. The implications of such a theory are that welfare retrenchment, 
though frequently couched in terms of competitiveness, may come at a 
considerable price in terms of the ability of the national economy to compete on 
any basis other than cost alone in international markets. 
Another prediction in the welfare state literature examined in this thesis, is that 
trade openness leaves particularly small size economies vulnerable to the impact 
of globalisation. However, the idea that growth in government spending closely 
follows the expansion in trade is challenged. This seemingly positive association, 
one that also holds for international capital liberalisation, has been argued to 
reflect a causal relationship between trade openness and welfare spending 
(Cameron 1978, Katzenstein 1985b). The basic premise for this line of argument 
is that integration into the international economy promises large potential welfare 
gains especially for small countries, but that such integration exposes economies 
to the boom and burst of the world markets while undermining the capacity of 
governments to counteract these business cycles. According to proponents of 
this view, governments solve this dilemma, by accepting high trade exposure, 
while simultaneously adopting comprehensive social programmes to compensate 
people for increased levels of labour risk refutes this view (see also Ruggie 1982, 
Iversen 2001). He insists that there are no compelling theoretical reasons to 
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expect trade openness and welfare spending to be linked (Inversen 2001 :47). On 
a separate study of 16 OECD countries 1960-1993, Rodrik (1998) found a 
positive cross-national relationship between trade openness and public spending 
(Rodrik 1998). Drawing from that work, it is seen that on trade openness and 
spending scale, as well as on FDI flows, Canada appears higher on that scale 
than the UK. 
Finally it has been the view of some, that welfare enhances flexibility via greater 
trust and reduced transaction costs. Inclusive welfare, according to Hays, 
particularly where associated with encompassing labour-market institutions, 
encourages relations of cooperation and trust (Hays 2001). Most crucially, this 
facilitates internal flexibility - in which workers adapt themselves and their 
working practices to new demands and new technology - as opposed to external 
flexibility (Le., recourse to labour market). This fosters cooperative relations 
between managers and labour with consequent reductions in the rate of labour 
turnover. The added effect of this is in rewarding the economy with higher levels 
of investment in human capital as workers are likely to depart with their newly 
acquired skills to the competition. 
The analysis so far, portrays economic globalisation as a form of dualistic history 
- the one old (optimistic view), and the other new (pessimistic view). The old one 
is commonly associated with Keynesian macroeconomic policy. In that 
environment, capital was endogenous to... the state the welfare state provided a 
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series of positive externalities, principally wage restraint, in return for investment 
incentives and a social wage. 
The 'new' is a distinctly post-Keynesian ideational environment with heightened 
capital mobility, when positive externalities have given way to negative 
externalities. Thus it is said to represent a burden on competitiveness. 
Pension Reform 
The dependent variable, that is, the type of welfare state, is also dependent on a 
number of other variables, such as whether or not the state operates from a low 
or high level of concentrated political authority, interest intermediation, pension 
policy design, enhanced electoral effects, and the political culture in state and 
civil institutions. By taking these into account, the thesis is able to achieve what 
Pierson has called a 'nuanced conceptualisation' (Pierson 2001) 
In that respect, it follows Pierson's (2001) analytic logic that the current economic 
environment is fundamentally different from when the welfare state was first 
established. As such the existing explanations are inadequate to account for the 
divergence. Currently, the welfare state faces a period of retrenchment defined 
as a downward pressure to reduce public sector spending. State pension which 
constitutes the single largest spending of welfare states face huge pressures. As 
already noted, the source of this pressure is diverse. Bonoli, for example, asserts 
that state pension is directly exposed to the 'twin pressures of economic and 
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demographic change' (2000:1). The reduction of levels, coverage and quality of 
benefits is now a common policy objective. 
The research in pension policy provides us with a very useful reference for 
understanding the range of welfare state type because state pension is the 
backbone of the welfare state given its sheer size and spending output. The 
scholarship in this area, to a large extent overlap with the more general effort 
aimed at classifying welfare states (Palme 1990: 147; Bonoli 2000). 
Retrenchment is difficult to measure and is understood as being different from 
restructuring, although in some instances they have been used interchangeably. 
Restructuring may not necessarily involve cutback while retrenchment invariably 
does. If, for example, the sheer cost of administering the social welfare 
programmes in our two case countries is considered it is hard to see the 
difference in their spending levels - this will confirm Esping-Andersen's criticism 
of the 'welfare effort' as a poor explanatory tool. Table 2-1 below shows a 
relatively similar welfare spending levels between the two countries. However, 
when the size of the population of each country is fully factored in and the 
retirement age cohort is taken into account, it can be seen that Canada's 
spending is slightly higher. Canada's overall spending per head is greater. 
When looking at these figures, it is important to remember that spending figures 
alone do not tell us a lot about the reforms. Consequently, in order to gain some 
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insight into what has been happening to pensions, a look at the legislative 
changes adopted in both countries and an assessment of the likely implications 
for pension coverage, level and quality of state pensions is more useful. The 
question we are addressing here is whether or not the concentration of political 
authority as in a unitary rather then the Canadian federal system offers any new 
insights as to the reform trajectories. 
Table 2-4 Social Security and Pension Expenditure between Canada and UK 
Total Social Security Expenditure Percentage of 
GDP 
1985 
Canada 16.4 17.1 
United Kingdom 21.1 22.8 
Pension Expenditure Percentage of GDP 
1985 1990 1996 
4.2 4.8 5.4 
8.3 8.9 10.2 
Source: World Labour Report 2000 ILO Geneva, 2000 Statistical Annex Table 3-1 
The retrenchment of state pension is politically relevant. It demands a different 
set of political accountability audit. It entails a process of mobilising political 
resources sufficient to overcome opponents and barriers to change. Given what 
has largely been accepted as an era of permanent austerity, governments 
everywhere were pushing forward reform programmes to reduce their financial 
liability for the state funded pension schemes (Bonoli 2000, Pierson 2001). 
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Domestic policy making 
The liberal welfare model is impacted upon by the political strengths of the 
welfare state. The political dimension of decision making in this area is 
dependent on how the diverging preferences expressed by different groups in 
society are aggregated. The capacity for influencing policy in the domestic arena 
is to a large extent determined by a range factors: power resources to purchase 
political support for its cause, the appeal it endangers in the public and more 
crucially the extent to which political institutions allow non-governmental actors 
opportunity to influence policy-making. 
Pierson presented a strong arguments about the reformatory scope of the liberal 
welfare model (2001) There Pierson's argument is summarised thus: a weakness 
of encompassing interest organizations, policy changes are executed almost 
exclusively through electoral and partisan politics; the concentration of political 
authority enhances the pace of reform; international economic pressure is 
moderated by internal social and economic transformation and therefore has a 
mute affect on the intensity of policy change. The thesis tests this claim by 
examining efforts of interest groups over the changes made to the four pension 
schemes. While the core assertion made by Pierson and others appears to 
stand, it was demonstrated that interests groups can have impact if the eligibility 
for schemes are universal rather than means-tested. The reason for this can be 
traced to the electoral and voting pattern of political actors. These factors are 
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considered in turn. 
The electoral system in market democracies can enhance the decision making 
processes. This is manifested in electoral system. The electoral incentive in this 
political system tends to give voters the chance to validate the government on its 
policies. In the case of the welfare state, many studies have shown that it enjoys 
deep and popular support (Flora 1989). In addition Table 2-2 is used to illustrate 
the population figures (Table 2-2 below) the number of people employed in the 
delivery of social welfare is very high. 
Table 2-5 Population and Percentage of Senior Citizens (July 2004) 
Country 1994 2004 Percentage of Population 65 years and over 
Canada 28,999,006 31,974,363 13 per cent 
United Kingdom 57,862,100 59,834,900 12 percent 
Source: Statistics Canada website (National census 2004). 
As a consequence, popular support generally appears to go beyond the confines 
of narrow economic self-interest. Pierson (2001 :413) has argued that the support 
for the welfare state is intense as well as broad. According to this view, intensity 
of preference matters because it is associated with higher rates of political 
mobilisation and voters' actual choices at election time (Pierson 2001). There are 
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two sources for the voters' intense preferences. 
The first, relates to the fact that most beneficiaries of the welfare programmes 
simply want to keep it. For a great majority of this group the benefits they receive 
from the state are their only source of income in retirement. Consequently voters 
are more likely to react negatively to potential losses than to reward potential 
gains. For this reason, voters are more likely to punish politicians for unpopular 
initiatives. The second point, claims that while the benefits of retrenchment for 
welfare state opponents are generally diffuse and often uncertain, the large core 
of constituencies for welfare state have a concentrated interest in the 
maintenance of social provision. It follows that such concentrated interest will 
generally be advantaged over diffuse ones. 
Voters can hold politicians to account for decisions that they see as being 
potentially negative. In chapter 1 it was suggested that Pierson's argument that 
voters exhibit a 'negativity bias' to potential losses than commensurate potential 
gains holds true here as well. A numbers of things need to be noted. First that 
the political strength of the welfare state stems from the electoral incentives 
associated with programmes which retain broad and deep popular support. 
Second, voting can be strategic. In practice, pOliticians are more than likely to 
weigh each policy decision against its complementary political cost. This exercise 
of aggregating interests means that some votes may carry more weight than 
others. 
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Krehbiel (1998) and Brady and Volden (1998) came up with the concept of the 
'Pivotal Voter' to capture the essence of this voting behaviour. They claim that in 
any collective choice situation where it is possible to allocate preference in a rank 
order, for example on a continuum, the pivotal voter's choice is what will 
determine if a particular set action proceeds or falters. In this respect, the pivotal 
voter seems to hold a disproportionate amount of power and the final choice 
selected would depend on the voter/actor. Politicians and election strategists 
would be looking in that direction. The pivotal voter is not necessary the voter 
who takes the middle road. His position on the rank of preferences depends on 
the institutional environment governing choice. What this simply means is that if 
there are limits imposed on the pivotal voter by institutional factors, such limits as 
multiple veto and super-majoritarian systems, the choice of the pivotal voters will 
generally be closer to the prevailing choice rather than around the middle ground. 
The reason, the pivotal voter is likely to favour the prevailing policy is that in the 
era of welfare state retrenchment, politicians who seeks to modify particular 
social welfare leave themselves vulnerable to attack and defeat. Therefore a 
much broader consensus, rather than a 'minimum winning coalition', is required 
to achieve desired outcomes (Weaver 1986, Pierson 2001). According to this 
view, politicians are encouraged to seek grand coalitions likely to consolidate 
reform effort and continuity. This means that Politicians will be seeking to extend 
the range of actors. To achieve this in practice, the pivotal voter is much more 
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likely to hover around the status quo. Another important reason why the pivotal 
voter will locate at the status quo is that the capacity of the government to enact 
reform at a much reduced political cost will depend on their credit worthiness on 
the issue in the eyes of the voters. At least this gives the voters some 
assurances that the government with this political capital is unlikely to embark on 
policies that negatively impact programmes. 
In the liberal welfare model of which Canada and the UK are both examples, the 
pivotal voter behaves slightly more transiently. According to Pierson (2001) the 
pivotal voters are likely to possess weaker attachment to social provision, and to 
be more susceptible to alternative political appeals - such as demands for lower 
taxes. As a result, political parties are provided with a rich opportunity to 
reconcile political success and a relatively aggressive, even openly hostile stance 
in relation to significant components of the welfare state. There are number of 
reasons for this behaviour. The scale of welfare state expenditure is 
comparatively smaller than in other welfare state models. There is over reliance 
on means-testing which implicitly divides those who benefit from taxpayers. Huge 
inequality has been observed amongst the social categories of voters -
demonstrating a bias in the electoral turnout during election, marking even a 
diminished turnout rate for those economically vulnerable. The role of unions as 
powerful political actors is modest. The institutionalisation of market alternatives, 
often subsidised by the state, weakens middle-class attachment to public 
provision. 
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Although not exclusively linked to the retrenchment argument, it can be argued 
that the retrenchment process faces the second half of the source of the welfare 
state's political strength: which stems from the 'institutional stickiness' of existing 
policy arrangements. Evidence to support this position has been found in the 
formal and informal institutional veto points and path dependent process, which 
in many cases tend to lock existing policy arrangement in place. Scharpf (1986), 
Tsebelis (1995) and Bonoli (2000) all found that political systems that make 
policy reform dependent on more than a simple 51 percent majority, and which 
include the allowance of minority veto, will tend to create the opportunity to block 
reforms. 
Beyond the handicap of the institutional veto, there is also the thorny issue of 
path dependence. Path dependence is essentially a way to capture the potential 
irreversibility of certain courses of political development. In such situations while 
a complete U-turn is not usually possible, it is still possible to make amend 
incrementally. There are several reasons why path dependence is so sticky. The 
reason is simply inferred that policy makers rarely inherit a blank state from 
which they can remake policies as the situation demands, but rather they carry 
the dead weight of previous institutional choices which can seriously limit their 
manoeuvrability. It is the case that individuals and organisations adapt to major 
social arrangement. These major social arrangements have major 
consequences. Often these involve large cost incurred for set-up or fixed costs, 
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learning effects, coordination effects or adaptive expectations (North 1990, 
Pierson 2001). The work of North do suggests that over time, as social actors 
make commitments based on existing institutions, the cost of 'exit' rises. Having 
said this, North makes it clear that path dependency does not hold policy 
positions in permanent frost but rather change can occur in incremental rather 
then a radical fashion. 
For example, the dynamism of the path dependence thesis can constrain the 
shift to a private scheme from a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) system (Myles and 
Pierosn, 1996). Furthermore, it has been observed is that, voters tend to display 
a negative bias towards potential losses and rarely commensurate potential 
gains (Offe 1991). The path dependent theory is a strong one. The public 
pension scheme in the UK and Canada operate under a PAYG financing method. 
The PA YG method of finance assumes a collective/solidaristic mode because of 
the way in which one generation of workers pay, through payroll tax deductions, 
the benefits of the retired. The cycle is repeated over time. In breaking this cycle, 
one creates a double payment problem whereby present contributors will still be 
forced to save privately for their own retirement while at the same time financing 
the benefits of existing retirees. This path dependence thus contributes 
significantly to the difficulty policy makers have in shifting from a PAYG to a fully 
funded private scheme. However, the idea that path dependence can somehow 
neatly predict the future is a misconstrued one (North 1990, Tsebelis 1995, 
Huber and Ray 1999, Pierson 1994,1996,2001). The findings of this study will 
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show that even in the area of state pension reform specific national settings can 
foster variance in the reform of public pension despite the fact that both of the 
case countries operate a PAYG financing method. 
Interest Intermediation 
Interest group participation in the domestic policy making arena is an important 
part of the equation that need to be considered. Analysts dismiss the political 
relevance of interest intermediation in the liberal welfare tradition. The claim is 
that interest groups are generally weak and marginal. By foreclosing input from 
these groups granted by the institutional framework, reforming governments find 
their preferences are much within reach (Pierson 2001, Swank 2001). 
In the case study countries, the observed patterns of policy response 
demonstrate that the political conflict between advocates of moderate 
restructuring and radical retrenchment are more equally matched. For example, 
the UK embarked on a much more radical reform than did Canada. In the UK the 
growing income gap amongst seniors is widely reported (Hill 1998, Blackburn 
2003,). In Canada, there is a deliberate effort to shore such wage gap (Myles and 
Quandgro1998, Battle, 1998) with supplementary income. As the case study 
chapters 4&5 will illustrate the reason for this has something to do with the 
manner in which interest are represented. 
Another example to illustrate the government freedom to institute measures close 
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to their preferences relates to the levels of commodification of labour (see 
Esping-Andersen 1990). The liberal welfare states which include Canada and 
Britain in comparative terms are already two of the most 'commodified' in the 
OECD. This raises questions as to why they are embarking on further 
retrenchment. Part of the answer may lie in the political weakness of those who 
might resist commodification. 
The impact of organized interests on pension policy reform was captured during 
in interviews conducted during this study. The initial observation was that these 
groups representation were moderated by the respective institutional provisions 
obtainable in each country. These actors pursue particular agendas on behalf of 
their organisations, such as provincial governments, departmental ministries, civil 
servants, unions, societies, and so forth. But these roles are institutionalised, and 
therefore, institutional 'rules of the game' define competences, veto positions, 
and modes of interactions that circumscribe the repertoire of permissible moves 
as well as the outcomes associated with particular constellations of moves, and 
they may also define institution-specific norms of appropriateness that may 
modify or even supersede preferences rooted in organisational self-interest 
(Scharpf 1997b). 
By implication, the institutional rules acts as a gatekeeper, allowing some actors 
in and shutting others out. Institutional rules do this by the incentive they offer 
those who approach the gate. Some are deterred by the obstacles leading to the 
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gate, and others by the price of entry. To take the economic metaphor one step 
further, some might even suggest that the economic condition favours only 
monopolies. For instance, we should expect the adoption of major policy 
changes is generally more difficult in the competitive Canadian political system 
with its multi-actor and multi-veto characteristics than is true in the single-actor 
'Westminster model' that is obtained in the United Kingdom (Lijphart 1984, 
Scharpf 1988). 
The above examples show that the relative strength of actors to influence major 
policy changes can be constrained or enhanced by the system of government. 
But how decisions are made reveals something about the institutional 
environment itself. It is given that one of the central functions of democratic 
institutions is to aggregate the competing and diverse interests within it. There 
are at least two competing views. Interest intermediation can be considered in 
terms of : corporatist and pluralist system of interest representation (Pratt 1996, 
Swank 2001). The corporatist model of interest intermediation generally provides 
an institutional mechanism whereby factions of labour affected adversely by 
different aspects of globalisation and domestic change to articulate preferences 
and press claims on national policy makers to maintain social protection (Swank 
2001, Katzenstein 1985, Lehmbruch 1984) In corporatist countries, there is a 
wide acceptance of economy-wide bargaining in which broadly organized and 
centralised labour movements have regularly exchanged wage restraint for full 
employment commitments and improvements in social protection (Katzenstein 
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1985) Such national bargains or social pacts have attempted to forge politically 
acceptable national policy strategies for equity and efficiency (Rhodes 2001). 
Neither Canada nor the UK operates a corporatist system of interest 
representation and therefore it is easy to dismiss that as an explanatory 
framework. The pluralist model is more closely associated with what is obtained 
in the case countries. The pluralist model, suggests that interest intermediation is 
voluntary, competitive and unorchestrated. Pluralism facilities a process of 
representation whereby groups vie to influence the policy agenda through 
various means (Schmitter 1982). It implies that at the national level, at least, 
there is conflict between groups. Each group has its own issues and interests to 
advance. 
The process of interest representation can be envisaged as a dynamic atomistic 
environment in which individual groups engage in one-on-one relations with the 
offices and legislature whose decisions affects their interests. This grouping 
imposes the so-called 'iron-triangles'; the tight-knit alliances between key 
legislators, influential groups and the leaders of agencies, over policy decisions. 
How effective this is in explaining the cases in Canada and the UK will be 
considered more fully in the case country chapters 4 and 5. For now, the 
evidence is that both Canada and the UK operate under different political 
environments - specifically there is varying degrees of political concentration and 
that interest represents also do differ - if only to reflect the political structures of 
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decision making . 
The organisation of formal policy making authority in the political system should 
influence the political capacity of focal groups and, in turn, shape the ways in 
which national policies respond to international and domestic change6 . The work 
on the welfare state (e.g. Huber, Ragan, and Stephens 1993; M. Schmidt 1996b) 
suggests that the 'dispersion of policy making authority' shape the development 
of welfare state. 
Federalism and bicameralism constitute potentially important 'institutional' veto 
points that allow conservative interests the opportunity to oppose welfare policy 
development and slow policy change. Unlike in the social corporatism model the 
institutions do not create collective veto points through a means of encompassing 
representation; rather there is a dispersion of policy making authority with 
attendant weaker welfare state clienteles, groups, and coalitions as well as broad 
policy making orientations and climates that are conducive to retrenchment 
(Swank 2001). 
Pierson (2001) has argued that the partisan-institutional setting shifts the pivotal 
voter to the right in the liberal model, whereas more generally, the pivotal voters 
6 Bonoli (2000) and Tsebeli (1995) explore the logic of institutional and partisan veto points. Tsebeli 
(1998) fully explore this. In that work, he argues that the member of institutional or partisan veto players 
will be related to slower policy change, subject to the degree of divergence among veto players and the 
cohesion of constituent units of veto players. Tsebeli, George (1995). 'Decision Making in Political 
Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicamerialism and Multipartyism'. British 
Journal of Political Science, 25: 289 - 325. 
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are expected to be closer to the welfare state status quo than the median voter. 
Yet not only is that median voter likely to be comparatively far to the right in the 
liberal model, but the pivotal voter may actually be to the right of the median 
(Pierson 2001) During its eighteen years in government the Thatcher 
government, for example, never received more than 44 percent of the vote, but 
the Conservative government exploited the first-past-the-post electoral system 
and a divided opposition to translate a plurality of votes into comfortable 
parliamentary majorities. 
Pushing this illustration further, the evidence does suggest that in light of the 
diminished electoral support, the government faced limited risk at the polls. 
However, in the area of welfare provision in general, for example the NHS, 
government was far less aggressive because of concerns over the popular 
middle class vote. The Canadian institutional arrangement gave Jean Chretien 
no such unfettered control over CPP reform. In the Canadian context, an 
embedded federalism and well-organised, relatively encompassing interlocutors 
with whom to negotiate and implement a more consensual process of 
retrenchment, made the UK option unattainable. 
Another interesting aspect of the partisan-institutional setting relates to the 
political party system. Herbert Kitschelt (2001) provides an alternative hypothesis 
in his recent typological comparative approach to the study of party systems. His 
main distinction, for the purposes of this thesis, is between the largely Anglo-
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Saxon liberal welfare states, which typically have two-party systems that are 
highly polarised in relation to economic issues (macro-economic policy, but also 
the funding of social programs) and various other non-liberal party systems 
where accommodation and moderation is more typical. In relation to economic 
globalisation, the key research question for Kitschelt is whether these distinctive 
party systems respond to its pressures for programme retrenchment differently; 
he hypothesises that the two-party polarised system characteristic of liberal 
political economies will be most responsive to retrenchment demands. Canada 
does not fit into the two-party model assigned to the liberal settings by Kitschelt; 
its party system has long been dominated by relatively non-ideological brokerage 
parties, and political success has required that they accommodate regional, 
linguistic, religious and cultural pressures effectively (Haddow 2004 :403). 
The thesis so far, has followed the logic established earlier, that the reform of 
state pension alters the 'distributional equilibria', between winners and losers 
more broadly. More crucially amongst the different social economic class and 
between regions as the case study countries will show. This cultural 
distinctiveness is very pronounced in both countries - after all, the UK comprises 
of three or more nations, separate and perhaps distinct nations. Canada's 
provinces and territories are on the other hand, distinct in terms of language, 
ethnicity - a multicultural mosaic and religion for example (Lijphart 1971, McRae 
1974, Kymlicka1989). 
This chapter has set out to examine the nature of the relationship between the 
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dependent variables and the observed pension reform effort. It has demonstrated 
that the way in which these variable often involve in pension policy reinforces 
their relative strength as a plausible explanation which accounts for the variation 
in policy direction in both countries. This explanation goes beyond the existing 
theoretical explanations provided. It does this by comparing both the internal 
dimensions of reform within the case study countries itself and across them. It 
contends that the existing theoretical conceptualisation, while holding some basic 
strength that collaborates with the starting hypothesis, misses the nuance of the 
internal political dynamic within the liberal welfare model realised in this thesis. 
Evidence from the case study chapters 4 and 5 demonstrates the validity of 
North's claim that path dependence impinges upon governments in cases where 
veto points exist. In other words it does not have universal application (North 
1990). There is opportunity to investigate path dependence in cases of pure 
Westminster's parliamentary model. This chapter presented the argument that 
attention ought to be paid to the little studied relationship between economic 
globalisation and pension reform. It has been argued that the national translation 
of this 'exogenous' pressure is dependent upon institutional advantages inherent 
within the countries and not necessarily present across regime type. The UK 
state pension systems for example differ from Canada with regards to the 
decision making and the methods of financing as table 1-1 above shows. It is 
expected that given this difference the trajectory of reform would reflective of this. 
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Chapter 3 Situating the Politics of Pension Reform 
3.1 State Pension Historical Overview 
3.2 State Pension Reform in an Era of Retrenchment 
3.3 Pension Types and Reform Options 
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3.1 State Pension Historical Overview 
The state pension schemes in both Canada and the UK are part of a system of 
income transfer developed to cope with the social disjuncture that emerged as a 
result of mass industrialisation and the diminishing role of the crafts and artisan 
economy. The supportive position of the individual and the family as the primary 
source of welfare assumed a subordinate role to that of the state. It is important 
to highlight also, the implication of development and design on the pension 
system and subsequent efforts of reforms. All the welfare state regimes manifest 
this inherent development and design issues. In the conservative and social 
democratic welfare states, the programmes are less vulnerable to cuts than the 
liberal welfare states. One way to explain this is with reference to their higher 
degree of middle-class integration built into the development and design (Bonoli 
2000). While the target of current retrenchment has being on the residual 
elements of the welfare state, the losers of program reform had little potential for 
political mobilization, and were de facto unable to influence policy making - this 
is specific to the liberal model. 
Development in penSion systems 
Asa Briggs writing in the 'The Welfare State in Historical Perspective' defined the 
Welfare State 
""as a state in which organised power is deliberately used (through politics 
and administration) in an effort to modify the play of market forces. Which can be 
schematically characterised under three main headings: - first, by guaranteeing 
individuals and families a minimum income irrespective of the market value of 
their work or their property; second, by narrowing the extent of insecurity by 
enabling individuals and families to meet certain social contingencies (for 
example, sickness, old age and unemployment) which lead otherwise to 
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tnOlv/Guai ana ramiiy crises; and third, by ensuring that all citizens without 
distinction of status or class are offered the best standards available in relation to 
certain agreed range of social services' (Briggs in Pierson and Castles, 2000:18) 
All three objectives identified by Briggs are now met in varying degrees by the 
state. The provision of pension benefits under the rubric of the welfare state has 
been closely linked to the rise of industrialisation and capitalist accumulation - or 
what has been referred to as Fordism7 (Myles, 1989). The provision of a public 
penSion system and other social programmes for the elderly made possible the 
spread of the retirement principle by which individual are permitted, required, or 
induced to leave the labour force prior to actual physiological decline (Myles, 
1989: 1). The requirement to work until such a time that the individual becomes 
disabled or can no longer give of their skills had slowly been reshaped by an 
emerging industrial age. 
The labour market which was seen as a pool of journeymen, craftspeople and 
the like, with a self-sustaining system of employment faced a new challenge in 
the controlled factory floors of industry. Prior to the genesis of mass production in 
large factories (Fordism), the majority of the labour force owned their own 
workshops and passed them on to the younger generation within their own 
families. The emerging factories that employed the journeymen or craftspeople 
as it were did not abolish the traditional age-graded system of craft production 
7 Fordism is generally associated with the American car manufacturer Henry Ford. It was a term coined in 
the 1930s to focus on the extent to which new American production techniques (in particular, moving 
assembly- line and product standardisation) and their attendant social relations signalled the beginning of a 
new epoch in capitalist development 
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but rather brought it into the factory floor. The skilled craftsman worked along 
with the unskilled workers. Surviving this new arrangement was the pre-capitalist 
ethos that required employers to assume responsibility for the protection and 
support of their older workers - not necessarily in the financial sense. As a result 
most of the skilled older workers continued until death or disablement (Myles, 
1989). 
In other words, there were no financial retirement plans for the older worker. The 
economic 'boom and bust' made steady work difficult to maintain. An increasing 
number of the aged were thus becoming poor and unemployed. Capitalism itself 
as it developed began to face some challenge, including the productivity of the 
older worker. 
The phenomenon of population ageing which begun to appear in Europe in the 
nineteenth century and in the twentieth century became characteristic feature of 
all industrialiSing countries (Sauvy 1948, Myles, 1989). The notion of a nation of 
elders began to gain rapid salience in the discussion about the threats to 
economic prosperity. By the Second World War, the problem of population 
ageing had become firmly linked to the problem of productivity. One report by the 
League of Nations in anticipation of labour requirements after the war, argued 
that maximum production was thought to be reached by 'men under the age of 
35' (Myles, 1989). 
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The attack on the older worker continues in the work of Ben Franklin in his now 
famous aphorism "time is money" (Myles, 1998). The older worker was seen as a 
cog in the wheel of capitalism. Under the merchant capitalist of pre-industrial 
period the trader who purchased finished products and sold them in the market 
cared less about how much time was required to produce the goods purchased. 
The price paid to the direct producer was unaffected by it. The question of 
whether it took the older worker ten hours to produce what the younger worker 
could produce in eight was inconsequential. 
This was no longer the case under a new labour market where labour itself 
became the commodity to be bought and sold. Gosta Esping-Andersen's 
pioneering typology of the welfare states was in part based on the distinction he 
made in the degree of commodification of labour present in the various welfare 
states (Esping-Anderson, 1990). The entrepreneur no longer purchased actual 
labour (a finished product) but rather the workers' time (potential labour). The 
critical problem with such a system was that of converting this potential labour 
into actual work. How much each worker produced during a fixed period of time -
what is now referred to as productivity - became the crucial measure of a firm's 
viability in a competitive marketplace. Under these circumstance the risk faced by 
the older worker or slower worker became apparent. The introduction of wage 
contract exposed the vulnerability of the older worker. 
The new system of production based on wage labour allowed purchasers of 
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wage labour to organise both the labour process (the way work is done) and the 
labour force (who works) to ensure maximum advantage. The changing 
dynamics of the workplace were little understood by the new industrial class who 
continued for some time to manage the factory floors based on the old system of 
the traditional workshop. All this was about to change at around the turn of the 
twentieth century by a long-term process of capital concentration and 
centralisation. The small units of production were to be transformed into new, 
few, large and increasingly corporate enterprises. The changed workplace called 
for new systems of management of labour within it - those who were responsible 
for ensuring its success were not the entrepreneurial risk takers. The class of 
men of power that emerged had new powers in their capacity to manage, not 
dependent on the ownership of capital or the risk-taking synonymous with the 
entrepreneurial adventurer. Their asset was their capacity to manage - that is, to 
systematically apply rules of rational calculation to the maximisation of corporate 
profit. It is here that the term Taylorism makes it contribution to the new 
organised labour process. 
Taylor argued that efficiency could be had not only by the reconstituted labour 
process but also a reconstituted labour force - one selected according to 
'scientific' principles rather than by custom and sentiment (Taylor 1911). Under 
the new regime, personnel policies were to ensure that only those fit for the job 
were to be selected and fitness was increasingly associated with speed. The 
contribution of organised labour played a part in this ensuing battle. Earlier the 
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labour movement had won concessions for higher wages and a shortened 
workday. In exchange the employer demanded the speed up of work to gain 
ground on the shortened workday. New technology also played a key role in the 
workplace transformation. The costs of new technology can only be justified if 
they are operated at a high speed to defray capital investments. The combination 
of these factors added to the challenge faced by the older worker. Soon, the 
demand for retirement as a means of absolving the enterprise of responsibility to 
provide work and income for the elderly worker began to grow. 
A number of key events helped consolidate the general trend towards the 
establishment of an obligatory retirement based on chronological age. First, 
managers in the new corporate enterprises could manage perhaps more 
effectively the stock and flow of labour supply. Internally within firms, younger 
workers had better opportunities for promotion and hence the boosting of morale. 
The second key event was the depression which created excessive labour, which 
could have been reduced by retirement of the older worker. 
However, until the 1930s, other considerations competed with the retirement 
principle and the benefits that presumed to flow from it. Some of the managers 
began to resist the Taylorist principles, perceiving them as a threat to their 
autonomy. The managerial resistance was reinforced by the opposition of 
organised labour. Most managers were not applying the principles laid out by 
Taylor. As a result some of the older workers were retained. Another mitigating 
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factor was the growing militancy within the reorganised firms amongst the 
younger workers. The young and increasingly militant labour force found the 
older worker brought stability and conservatism to the resistance. To move the 
momentum to the next level, the new managerial class sought to gain political 
support by way of the institutionalisation of retirement. However, to 
institutionalise retirement it was first necessary to institutionalise the retirement 
wages. This required some consensus between the three parties - the state, 
employer and employee. The consensus was not easily reached. First there was 
the prevailing idea of the limited role of the state. Second, there was the problem 
of the very notion of retirement wage for able-bodied persons under capitalist 
thinking. 
Prior to the World War II public systems of old-age support were intended to 
supplement, not replace, the market wages of older workers and their families. 
Possible expansion of social provision was considered an affront to the great 
victory of the 'bourgeois' revolution that gave rise to the present period. For the 
State to assume responsibility for the economic well-being of its citizens 
(especially those still able to work) was the very antithesis of the emerging 
capitalist order. 
Much of the period leading to the emergence of the new order was spent 
coercing the non-entrepreneurial class to respond to the wage incentive. Under 
the circumstances, the key to a successful crafting of a penSion system was to 
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make the income received by retired workers less eligible than that of the poorest 
worker in the labour force - the doctrine of less eligibility, which formed the basis 
of the UK poor-law reforms of 1834 (Myles, 1989). The reform of the inchoate 
welfare state that followed was aimed at remedying the appalling conditions of 
the aged and invalided and their families. The adoption of the retirement principle 
made welfare reform inevitable. 
Broadly speaking then, state pensions as they exist today, started after the 
Second World War. Guided by the new Keynesian economic theorl , 
governments everywhere began to assume increasing responsibility for 
distributing the national income. Part of the reason for this renewed vigour, has to 
do with the climate that obtained at the end of the hostilities, which dealt with the 
collective experience of war that reinforced social bonds. Additionally, most 
countries had to confront the need to rebuild devastated economies with very 
limited resources. 
8 Keynesian economic theory purports that recurrent depressions and the occasional inflation were not 
necessarily consistent with the assumption of the invisible hand dealing fairly with society. Keynes argued 
that it was not unreasonable to expect that some monetary institutions could be found that could eliminate 
or mitigate the boom and burst cycle. The demand theory that he proposed entailed two key principles: 
first, government must manage the economy and secondly, it must manage it by manipulating demand. He 
noted that during periods in which the level of employment declines, the government should run a budget 
deficit to provide unemployment relief. He believed that such actions would increase people's ability and 
wiIIingness to consume, thus extricating the economy from recession. The creation of unemployment 
insurance, social security and welfare sharply reduced the economy's tendency towards instability. Keynes 
economic theory however suffered significantly in the late 1970s and 1980s because of the neoliberal 
opposition ofthe supply-side theory (See Hailstones T 1982 Viewpoint on Supply-Side Economics Virginia: 
Reston Publishing Company) The short approximation of the supply-side argument is simply that the 
deterrents, that is, increases in taxes, interest rate hikes, inflation, outweighed the incentives created by 
demand. Following from this, the fact that social security expenditure accounts for a substantial figure in 
current budgets, the debate on pension reform is connected to that broader ideological question and that is: 
how much public expenditure can the State incurred to maintain stability or should it? (See Dunnett, A 
1998 Understanding the Economy 4'h.ed London Pearson Hall) 
91 
The frameworks under which the national arrangements for pension schemes 
were ultimately constructed were broadly comparable and can be characterised 
as follows: 
o A context of full employment 
o A reference based on a male breadwinner in a steady job 
enjoying a full employment career, and whose life cycle was 
divided into three periods: education, employment and 
retirement 
o A non-contradictory conception of social protection and 
economies (Hughes and Stewart, 2000 p.1) 
Within this framework, many of the countries in Western Europe and North 
America implemented similar pension regimes. The difference in the emergent 
welfare state types are discussed at length by various authors (Karim-Claude 
1973, Esping-Anderson 1996, Pierson and Castles 2000, Bonoli et al 2000). In 
the liberal welfare state, the design of the public pension system had seriously 
considered limiting role of public pensions in place the private initiative and to 
ensure strengthening of the general work ethic. The pension system that 
developed from this idiosyncratic view only provided a minimum benefit sufficient 
to meet basic subsistence. Eligibility for benefits were either universal or means-
tested with funding for such programmes provided through the state or payroll 
deductions. 
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3.2 Pension Reform in an Era of Retrenchment 
This section begins from a basic premise: that the aspiration of the post-war 
social contract was challenged by the changes in the international economic 
environment starting from the 1980s. The challenge to the welfare state had to 
do with the normatively salient goals of full employment, social security and 
social equity (Scharpf 2000).The present section, considers more broadly the 
pressures on penSions regimes in the 1980s. 
Both the international economic environment and the political institutions are 
treated as independent variables, which influences the policy responses of the 
two case countries. It postulates the proximate causes of these variables in the 
reform orientation. So far, this thesis has argued that the actor's incentives to 
pursue particular goals; their perceptions and preferences are constrained by 
institution-specific norms of appropriateness. It implies that institutional settings 
influence the orientation of the policy objectives. In Canada and the UK, the 
crucial variable being considered is the concentration of political authority. In the 
case of Canada, the federal system of government which allocates decision-
making authority equally between the provincial and federal governments in the 
field of penSion policy creates multiple-veto points that can retard the policy 
process. The UK's majoritarian form of government is less constrained by the 
existence of multiple-veto pOints. The central government in Westminster is able 
to proceed with policies they consider to be sound. 
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The explanation to account for the variance in policy response in both countries 
cannot be that simply settled. It recognises also that the economic and political 
impetuses in both countries are different. Scharpf (2000), for example, it has 
being argued that the decade after 1970, all advanced welfare states faced 
broadly similar changes in their international economic environment which made 
it difficult to maintain the promises of the post-war social contract, yet these 
challenges produced startling country-specific response. The question then is: 
what were the challenges and how did the two liberal welfare states respond? 
Was the response moderated by the institutional conditions? In what ways are 
the post-war aspirations for full employment, social security, and social equity 
impacted by this? 
First, the 1980s marked the beginning of a transformed global economic order. 
The public pension system was impacted upon by the shift in a number of ways, 
least of which has already been covered in chapter 2.2. A crucial challenge was 
the state's ability to sustain the goal of full employment. The context of this shift 
is important to our understanding of the economics of the new politics of the 
welfare state. The Bretton-Woods system of fixed exchange rate, which had 
operated since 1944, collapsed in 1971 (Dunnett 1998). The Bretton-Woods 
system subsumed the previous Gold Standard of exchange - which required the 
value of each country's currency to be linked to gold - in theory, linked at an 
immutably fixed exchange rate. The Gold Standard was designed to promote 
stability in international monetary relations so as to encourage trade between 
94 
nations, as well as to ensure that balance of payments disequilibria would be 
eliminated in the long run. At the start of 1931, the inter-war depression began to 
bite deeply. The maintenance of the gold parity would have resulted in domestic 
deflation. This would have worsened the situation which had already severely 
depressed the domestic economy. At the commencement of World War 
hostilities in 1939 many countries were generally experiencing a slump in their 
production output. International trade was also very low. In order to boost 
international trade, many countries, including the UK and Canada, had to 
devalue their currencies. This response provoked retaliation by other countries 
(Dunnett 1998 p.146). The confidence in the international monetary order was 
further shaken by the beggar thy neighbour series of competitive devaluations 
that followed. 
The Bretton-Woods system of exchange was formulated to address this crisis of 
confidence. In practice, it was a system of fixed exchange rate. Countries were 
required to fix the value of their currency to the US dollar. The value of the dollar 
was in turn linked to gold at a fixed rate of $35 an ounce (Dunnett 1998). Under 
the terms of the exchange arrangement, countries could not undertake to 
unilaterally devalue their currency unless to address a fundamental 
disequilibrium - usually this will include situations in which balance of payment 
deficit could not reasonably be financed out of reserves, or by borrowing from the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) - nor could the situation be dealt with through 
domestic deflation and unemployment. On both of these accounts, there was 
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considerable latitude as to what may be considered 'reasonable'. So countries 
were able to a limited extent to adopt measures to fit 'reasonably' within the 
Bretton-Woods guidelines. 
Since it's inception in 1944, the Bretton-Woods exchange rate mechanism 
heralded a period of unparallel economic growth yet there were deficiencies in 
the system. First, the US dollar was the only intervention currency and second, it 
was linked to gold. This meant that an increase in the price of gold could only be 
brought about by devaluation of the dollar. This was not acceptable. Thus, the 
price of gold remained fixed. This method was not the right solution, since the 
cost of mining under the prevailing atmosphere of creeping inflation meant that 
the mining firms could not keep up with supply at the depressed prices. 
Over time, the shortfall in gold supply did not increase at the same pace as the 
volume of world trade. This was referred to as 'insufficient liquidity' - a situation 
in which the central banks ran short of reserves (Dunnett 1998). To counter this 
problem, two options were suggested. First, the IMF could move to increase the 
credit allowance granted to the central banks; unfortunately, this still did not solve 
the problem. The second option was for central banks to hold other assets, 
instead of gold as reserves. The American dollar and the British Sterling were the 
natural choice for most central banks. There are at least two reasons for this: first 
Britain was the leading trading nation besides America. Second, both America 
and Britain had a balance of payment deficit problem. This made both currencies 
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readily available. However, over time, a different type of crisis began to brew. 
This concerned, not the supply of gold, but the potential for capital loss should 
America devalue the dollars given the weight of her deficit. Hence central banks 
became unwilling to hold dollar thus creating another crisis of confidence. 
From 1972 onward, the exchange rate mechanism shifted to a floating currency 
method, in large part due to the aftermentioned crises. The distinctive feature of 
the floating exchange rate is the lack of declared parity which was the hallmark of 
the previous exchange mechanisms. Because of the flexibility of the floating 
exchange rate, in theory, its does mean that it did not require intervention on the 
part of the authorities. 
In the period leading to the decline of the Bretton-Woods regime, the volume of 
currency trading internationally had increased sharply. Hence when finance 
ministers came to an agreement to let their currencies float, the expectation that 
exchange rates would correspond closely to the actual value of currencies as 
determined by trade flows and inflation rates was unmet (Scharpf 2000). The 
reason for this had to do with the rampant speculative currency transactions. 
From then on, the shift was to the domestic level where policy choices taking 
place could have immediate repercussions on the exchange rates of national 
currencies and hence on the competitiveness of exports and the level of inflation. 
The 1973 Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) decision to cut 
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oil production within the OPEC cartel resulted in a new crisis in the nascent 
macroeconomic policy environment. This was a major blow because it increased 
fourfold the price of crude oil in the winter of 1973-74 (OECD 1980:120). For the 
industrial economies this meant a massive cost push which generally accelerated 
the rise of inflation. More crucially, it created a huge diversion of purchasing 
power, reflected in an increase of current-account surplus of OPEC countries 
from $8 billion in 1973 to $60 billion in 1974 (OECD 1980 :125). This situation 
presented a major problem for both sides of this transaction. For OPEC member 
countries, it meant that the new acquired wealth will need to be recycled back as 
additional industrial imports or the surpluses thereby attained would be fuelled 
into currency markets offshore. In the first instance the recycling of surpluses and 
industrial imports was not immediate - that is, not fully realised in the short term. 
Subsequently some of the surpluses were shifted into offshore dollar markets 
where they increased the volume of assets available for speculative transactions 
as well as for loans. As odd as the scenario may appear, this situation presented 
to be a tempting bait for both industrial and developing countries who were 
hungry for low interest credit to boost the falling aggregate domestic demand. 
For most industrial economies, Canada and the UK included, whose welfare 
states were already fledgling - and built on promises of full employment, social 
security and social equality - the situation was much more desperate. First, the 
slow recycle of excess surpluses meant that in the industrial economies, 
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aggregate demand fell. If nothing was done, the result would be a sharp rise of 
demand-deficient unemployment, particularly for countries with nascent fiscal 
and monetary retrenchment to fight inflation. Both Canada and the UK had 
committed to practicing Keynesian demand management by switching between 
fiscal and monetary reflation or deflation. Essentially then, they were caught 
between a rock and a hard place - that is a veritable dilemma. Under this new 
condition, if they chose to fight unemployment through demand reflation, they 
would generate escalating rates of inflation; and if they chose to fight inflation 
through restrictive fiscal and monetary policies, the result would be mass 
unemployment (Scharpf 2000: 29). 
In theory, the prevailing Keynesian model which was the tool of macroeconomic 
policy intervention in both the case countries was sufficiently robust to deal with 
the dilemma, that is by way of 'Keynesian concertation' (Scharpf 1991). This 
represents a quid pro quo where the government and central bank would prevent 
job losses through demand reflation while the unions would reduce inflationary 
cost pressures through wage restraint. To achieve this however, the existing 
institutional conditions need to be examined. 
According to the modern version of Keynesian macroeconomic theory, a variant 
of monetarism, the falling aggregate demand and job losses could be mitigated, 
perhaps avoided if constraints on nominal aggregate demand were compensated 
by declining labour costs and prices, so that real aggregate demand could be 
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maintained (Carlin and Soskice 1990). Monetarist policy, however, assumes an 
exclusive responsibility for price stability, while employment is controlled by 
wage-setting institutions (Soskice and Iversen 1998; Inversen 1999). Scharpf 
(1991, 2000) has argued that union wage restraint, which was a necessary 
precondition for the success of Keynesian concertation strategies, depended on 
the institution of wage setting: highly unlikely in fragmented wage setting 
institutions. 
In light of the above categorisation, the UK and Canada can be described as a 
variant of the fragmented wage setting model, which contrasts with the 
coordinated collective-bargaining system obtainable in countries such as 
Switzerland, Germany, Denmark and the Netherlands, whereas the statist model 
operates, for example, in France and Belgium. In the fragmented wage setting 
system, the institutional support for collective action in wage bargaining is 
diminished (Scharpf 2000). In the UK, for example, the 1979 government of 
Margaret Thatcher was able to use a variety of measures and the sheer threat of 
mass unemployment to weaken the strength of the unions despite their potent 
strike which toppled the previous Labour government in the Winter of Discontent 
-1978-1979. Labour unit cost in national currency actually fell from 1982 to 1983 
and increased much more slowly than before during the rest of the decade. This 
allowed the government to let the effective exchange rate of the pound slide by 
more than 20 percent between 1981 and 1988 (Scharpf 2000), which also 
reduced relative unit labour costs by the same amount. From 1975, 
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governments in Canada, as in the UK, chose to fight inflation at the expense of 
employment through restrictive monetary and fiscal policy (Battle 1998). 
The central focus of the discussion so far in this chapter has to do with the 
macroeconomic environment, particularly as it relates to the exchange rate 
mechanism and the OPEC oil embargo. This is important because the capacity 
of industrial economies to maintain their post-war social contract aspirations 
depended on their ability to carry through economic policies that responded to 
domestic priorities - of full employment, increased demand, low inflation, and 
competitive wages. 
Under conditions of effective control of economic boundaries, national 
governments and economic actors, could ignore the exit options of capital 
owners, tax payers and consumers. As a consequence, the governments were 
able to raise taxes and support public services and transfers at the expense of 
captive tax payers. Thus, economic decision making, more or less, was 
subordinated to political constraints. Increases in wages, and non-wage labour 
costs, although borne by competing firms, were usually passed on to the 
consumers without endangering the profitability of capitalist production (Scharpf 
2000). Furthermore, national governments were able to determine and vary the 
minimal rate of return that investors could expect on long-term investment, since 
governments' deficit spending could be accommodated by an expansion of 
domestic money supply, most of this through a dampening of macroeconomic 
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fluctuations through Keynesian demand management, to achieve and maintain 
full employment and relatively robust economic growth. 
Public sector deficits were low and state expenditures were not exceeding 
available revenues. The relative stability and growth seen in the first decade of 
the twentieth century and immediately after the post war period, was in the early 
1970s confronted with cost-push inflation and demand-deficient unemployment 
which the existing fiscal policy instruments proved inadequate to resolve (Scharpf 
2000: 238-279). The new solution designed to address the dilemma made 
necessary by collapse of the Bretton-Woods settlement, effectively took away 
from national governments the ability to manipulate their economies and this 
disadvantaged investors. National government control over revenues was more 
or less limited by the more porous economic boundaries which the new system of 
exchange controls demanded. 
The UK welfare state, like that of Canada, was not designed to deal with 
substantial unemployment. These economic conditions created in countries 
where the Beveridge model was in use, flat rate benefits that were far from 
income-maintaining except for those in the lowest wage brackets (Woodwards 
2004). Governments in the UK and Canada were under strong normative and 
political pressures to avoid unemployment in order to protect workers from 
poverty. The challenges of the 1970s and the 1980s narrowed policy options. 
Monetary reflation was no longer feasible, because the cost of public sector 
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deficits had greatly increased, and because rising of business profits had now 
become a precondition for maintaining private sector employment. The objectives 
behind the reform measures were to restore the compatibility of social policies 
with the changing economic and demographic conditions. In addition there are 
pressures on government to reduce, or at least not increase, rates of taxation. To 
do otherwise would put the competitiveness of their national economies at risk, 
with potential serious consequences for their countries' prosperity (Rhodes 1996, 
Gough 1996). 
Pierson (2001) has argued that a combination of factors has provided the 
backdrop for the intense pressure for austerity and the enduring popularity of the 
welfare state. These have included changes in the global economy, the sharp 
slowdown in economic growth, the maturation of governmental commitments, 
and population ageing. Moreover, in this view, there is little reason to expect 
these pressures to diminish over the next few decades. 
The finance of state pension schemes through payroll taxes, as is the case of the 
pay-as-you-go (PAYG), depend on high wage growth, high fertility and high rates 
of labour force participation (Myles and Pierson 2001). The first and third of 
these points have been challenged by the economic events at the beginning of 
the 1980s. The growth of the welfare state that was achieved during the post-war 
period is being adjusted to accommodate current realities. The case study 
countries seem to have responded differently? This thesis considers this more 
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specifically in the case study chapters 4 and 5, but provides a more generic 
overview here. 
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3.3 Pension types and reform options 
The thesis points out that the Canadian as well as the UK pension systems 
operate within relatively similar context. Pensions are provided on the basis of 
universality or means-testing. The public pension system consists of two general 
types: the basic level pension and the occupational pension schemes. The 
capacity of the central government to act unilaterally in the implementation of 
new pension policy is greatly restricted at two levels: through constitutional 
arrangement granted for decision-making and by the pension design itself. Both 
case countries face policy specific problems in terms of decision making. In the 
case of Canada's occupational scheme as we shall see in chapter 4 requires the 
assent of 2/3 of the provincial governments representing 2/3 of the Canadian 
population before any amendment can be made to the occupational pension 
plan. In the UK decision regarding changes to the occupational scheme is 
entirely within the hands of the central government. 
This implies that institutional factor ultimately moderates the terms of action 
taken. The design of the pension system provides problems in terms of 
entitlement claims that come with contributions and the financing of the scheme 
itself. The following section focuses on types of pensions and problem of reform. 
The different types of pension have already being outlined in figure 1.2 and table 
1.1 in chapter 1. They are highlighted here for explanatory purposes. The first 
basic level pensions in both countries are universal requiring minimal contribution 
by those of working age. In Canada the central government finances the basic 
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state pension. In the UK it is jointly funded through payroll deduction by way of 
the national insurance scheme (NI). The second level scheme is an occupational 
pension. In both countries contributions are made through payroll deductions. 
Employers pay into the pension scheme as well. 
The design of public pension schemes is informed by particular political and 
economic idiosyncrasy. In the liberal welfare we have noted that welfare state 
provisions are residual and aimed at encouraging private markets in pension 
provision. Each of the pension policy examined in this thesis is faced with 
particular problems. In both countries the first level and second level pension 
schemes are financed on a pay-as-you-go basis, although there has been 
significant shift since the reforms. 
The welfare state literature suggests that pension schemes once established can 
tend to lock in place existing programmes and make the introduction of new ones 
difficult. This 'freezing' in place type of effect is referred to as 'path dependence'. 
The PAYG model is an exemplar of this 'path dependence' tendency. Both case 
countries operate PAYG pension schemes so it is important to assess their 
impact. Furthermore, as Bonoli (2000) has pOinted out, state pensions have 
received broad support and reform involves, in most cases, the alteration of 
benefit levels, this distorts the 'distributional equilibria' and thus reform will be 
resisted by those seeking to preserve the existing social order. In order words, 
public pension programmes have created their own constituencies, which include 
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pensioners, social workers, civil servants, workers and organised interests -
these will mobilise to oppose detrimental change. 
The rising cost and demand for pensions are not the only problems driving 
pension reform. The debate is also about the difficulty with particular method of 
financing, and distributing benefits: the pay-as-you-go (PA YG) defined benefit 
plans financed through payroll taxes (Weaver 1986, Bonoli 2000, Myles and 
Pierson 2001, Cesaratto 2003). Myles and Quadago (1996) identify two principal 
post-war pension designs, namely: the Beveridge model and the Bismarck 
model. The Beveridge model consists of means-tested benefits funded usually 
from general revenues. Because of the method of financing, cuts can be easily 
justified as satisfying the fiscal realities. 
The Bismarck model which is earning-related insurance based model, is much 
harder to rationalise because the right to pension is based on employment. One 
way to explain the value of these classifications is to consider that redesigning a 
public pension system hinges critically on prior assumptions concerning the 
juridical and moral basis on which the right to a pension is granted. Niemela and 
Salminen (1995) distinguish among three traditional bases on which the right to a 
pension has been justified: need, citizenship, and employment. Each of these 
models contains both a juridical and moral rationalisation embedded within it. 
Politicians seeking to restrain the growth of pension spending have at least to 
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consider two important facts: first, they need to craft rhetoric to legitimatise not 
only cuts in general but also the distribution of those cuts. That is who gets what 
and by how much? Second, they must devise cuts in a way that minimises voter 
backlash. In other words, they ought to employ 'blame avoidance' strategies. 
Myles and Pierson (2001) have argued that the key variable shaping broad 
reform outcomes is the scope, maturity and design of these PAYG pension 
schemes. All four pension schemes considered in this thesis, save the CPP 
which has more recently (1997) shifted to a partial funding method, are organised 
under a PA YG financing structure. So the key arguments presented here would 
apply to it. 
Payroll taxes are presented as constituting an increasingly problematic base for 
pension finance and particularly difficult for those on low wages (Myles and 
Pierson 2001). Cesaratto takes a more economic analytic view on the funding 
mechanism. He describes the PAYG method of funding as a 'progressive income 
taxation' which is the fairest financial source of PAYG (Cesaratto 2003). 
Although, he concedes that PAYG does not require much economic theory in 
order to explain it, he argue that the PAYG is a result of a political decision to 
transfer part of the current income from one section of the population to another. 
The motivation of that political decision, he argues has to be explained in the 
context of the historical and institutional circumstances (Cesaratto 2003). 
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This does not mean that PAYG is devoid of any economic analysis. It means that 
the starting point of the inquiry ought to focus on the 'motivation' for a PAYG as 
noted above. That motivation stems from the intention of government ministers, 
on the advice of policy experts to extract maximum advantage of the rapid 
increases in high wage growth, high fertility and high rates of labour force 
participation. Myles and Pierson (2001) provide a useful framework to help in the 
analysis. They see two distinct clusters of welfare states that adopt the PAYG. 
One cluster is the long established and mature welfare state; the other, the 
'latecomer' state. The 'latecomer' states did not have significant PAYG earning 
related programmes at the end of the 'golden age'. These two clusters 
essentially followed different paths to reform. 
Following from the general notion of 'path dependence' what Myles and Pierson 
(2001) argue is that those states that had a mature PAYG scheme found it 
difficult to reach comparable levels of cost reductions. The principal problem was 
the thorny double payment problem. With the latecomer states, the PAYG has 
not yet matured and therefore the cost of shifting from a PAYG to a fully funded 
scheme was much less. To illustrate this point, the UK is an example of a 
latecomer state. Its SERPS programme was passed in 1975 and the first 
contribution was in 1978. Thus, in 1985, when the Conservatives began 
considering reforms, the new SERPS system had been in place for only seven 
years. Canada, on the other hand, is considered a mature PAYG state. The CPP 
was first established in 1965. The 1997 reform was a modest transformation to a 
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partial funded method. It appears that the window for full-scale privatisation had 
long closed. Additionally, given the institutional veto available it was possible for 
the left-leaning Parti Quebecois working in tandem with the social democratic 
governments of British Columbia and Saskatchewan could potentially block 
reform initiative under the legislation creating the plan (Author Interview 2004/5). 
The Quebec government at the time had opposed any significant cuts in benefits 
(Quebec 1996). This is an important insight in as far as it reflects the 
governments' policy in the debate. 
There remains a combination of options available to politicians wishing to effect 
change in the PAYG system. 'Policy by stealth' is one such method, where the 
government tries to conceal and diffuse responsibility for cutting benefits by 
making the effects of policies difficult to detect (Battle 1990, Arnold 1990) 
However, as hard as government try to avoid blame, such reform strategies deny 
governments the right to claim legitimacy in the eyes of the citizens given that 
state pensions are one way a citizen makes claims on the government. So the 
issue of justice, fairness and honouring the implicit post-war social contract 
comes to play here. There are at least two principal pension designs: the 
Beveridge and Bismarck model. 
Unlike the Bismarck model, the liberal welfare regime is not designed to preserve 
pre-retirement status. The system operates income transfer on a means tested 
basis for those who have been unable to build up a sufficient amount of savings 
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to finance their own retirement. 
Changing the benefit formula was another problem. Here the idea is to modify 
the variables that determined the amount of pension paid. It is usually the custom 
to calculate the benefit level by taking into account the reference salary, the 
qualifying period and the accrual factor. Governments can influence pension 
expenditure by changing any of these variables. Changes to the BSP in the UK 
would be an example of the change to benefit formula. 
Another problem would be to change the indexation mechanism. Indexation 
concerns both the value of the flat-rate and earnings-related benefits, as well as 
the calculation of the reference salary in earnings-related benefits systems, and 
in this respect is an option available in all systems. Typically the reform of the 
BSP and OAS would be another example. In both countries, the reform of the 
basic state pension involved a move from wages to prices as a basis for 
indexation of pensions. 
The last concern considered relates to the increase in the retirement age. This is 
a straight forward way of increasing revenues because it increases the size of 
the working population by returning older workers, and decreasing expenditure 
by reducing the number of beneficiaries. The UK government adopted this 
measure and equalized the retirement age for both men and women starting in 
2010 and 2020 (Blackburn, 2004). 
III 
The obvious downside to the deferred retirement age option is that it may delay 
the replacement of older workers at a time when the economy is no longer able 
to create full employment. That means that younger workers may find it difficult to 
enter and remain in the labour market. In many sectors of the economy, 
Taylorism is still an acceptable management practice. The idea that 
flexibility/productivity can be somehow equated to age is not an antiquated 
notion, but a present reality. 
All of these design models present unique opportunities for reform and both 
operate in the UK and Canada. This design analysis will be discussed further in 
the case study chapters 5 and 6. 
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Chapter 4 Politics of 'Supermajoritianian Consensus Building in Canada 
4.1 The Welfare State - the Making of a Nation 
4.2 The Canadian Pension System 
4.3 The Great Pension Debate in the 1980s 
4.4 The 1989 Reform of Old Age Security - the End of Universality 
4.5 The 1996 Canadian Pension Plan Reform 
4.6 Federal/Provincial Policy Making - the Case of CPP 
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4.1 The Welfare State - the Making of a Nation 
The reform of the state pension system in Canada has historically proceeded 
incrementally (Banting 1997, Myles 2000). It has resisted the more radical 
approach to restructuring observed elsewhere, for example, the U K. This stands 
in sharp contrast to the formulated hypotheses intended to account for the 
convergence towards neoliberal policies in the advanced welfare states in light of 
external and internal economic pressures. One such formulation suggests that 
given the small size of her economy and its trade openness, Canada would be 
expected to pursue radical reform measure. It has also been suggested that with 
a weakness in interest organisation, the lack of power to veto changes and the 
capacity of organised interest to pursue negotiated reform through interest 
intermediation, meant that the reform of the welfare state, within the liberal 
welfare model, ought to be easier and quicker to achieve (Pierson 1994, 1997, 
2001 Bonoli 2000). How these assertions apply in the context of pension reform 
in Canada is the focus of this chapter. The present chapter describes the 
Canadian case study. It evaluates the reform of the OAS and CPP in greater 
detail. It presents the two different planes of decision making accorded to these 
two public pension schemes as a result of the Canadian federal system. It would 
draw material from the field work as well as from other document sources. 
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Table 4.1 Summary of Policy Change in Canada 
Dates 1965-
Universality 
P~y;A~'" Y ou~(Jo· 
(PAYG) 
Universal 
PAYG· 
After Reform 
1997 
Universal-
, Partial Funding -
~ -Contribution R~t~ 5,8% 
= 
= 
U - Minimum A~e of 
Entitlement 
Dates 
Universality 
Pay-As-You-Go 
(PAYG) 
ContributIon Rate 
Minimum A~e of 
Entitlement 
1951 1989 
Universal 
PAYG pAVG 
Nil 
Source: Adapted from Government of Canada, Department of Finance 2001 
Table 4.1 above summaries the pre and post reform measures of the two 
pension policies considered in this study. In chapter 6, the thesis compares this 
with the results obtained in the UK drawing conclusion about the severity of each 
reform measure. 
Two important issues have emerged from the analysis so far. The first is that the 
concentration of political authority and the absence veto pOints enables 
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government to limit the strength of outside actors in policy making. The second is 
that trade openness poses a direct threat to reform. It is acknowledged that while 
policy decisions could occur quickly in unitary states, it travels poorly in federal 
states because of the decision making rules, which in this case are evenly split 
between the federal and ten provincial governments. In the Canadian case study, 
this thesis shows that decision rules for the non-contributory OAS operate in a 
similar fashion to the UK state pension schemes - managed by the central 
government - unlike the management of the CPP. therefore, the opportunity for 
radical reform will be constrained by the institutional context as well as by 
strategic political interests at the federal level for the OAS and a combination of 
federal and provincial bargaining with respect to the CPP. This will result in 
dramatic variance in policy orientation, first within these programmes, and 
second in comparison to the UK. It is to be expected that the ten provincial 
governments, and to a lesser extent, the three territorial governments, will come 
to the triennial negotiating table from unique positions of strength, setting the 
stage for federal/provincial diplomacy. With the exception of the federal and the 
Ontario government, which exercises a veto over changes to the CPP, the 
remaining nine provinces are handicapped by the judicial interpretation of 
competence. 
This section begins with a discussion of the welfare state in Canada. It considers 
briefly the development and retrenchment of the welfare state there, highlighting 
the incremental changes that have taken place within the OAS and CPP. It 
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contrasts the political dimensions of the changes within each of the schemes. 
The decision making rules, which establish the competence of the two levels of 
governments in pension policy making constitutes the primary institutional 
context for the case study. 
Welfare State and Nation Building 
The purpose here is not to explain the Canadian welfare state, rather it is to 
identify and describe the crucial aspects that shaped the subsequent 
development and retrenchment of the state pension schemes. 
The Canadian welfare state as it relates to the provision of public pensions has a 
common heritage with that of the U K which takes root in the Elizabethan 'Poor 
Law' traditions (Gifford 1990, Banting and Boadway 1996, Pratt 1996). The 
liberal welfare state, of which Canada and the UK are exemplars, were reluctant 
to accept the premise that national government has a positive obligation to 
address the concerns of needy and economically insecure elderly persons. 
Despite the existence and continuation of poor-relief in both countries, it was 
believed that poverty was largely due to idleness. Poverty was not a condition to 
be pitied and relieved, but a moral failing to be despised and condemned (Blake 
2003:6). Those at work were expected to be thrifty and save for their retirement 
in order to avoid the workhouse in old age. In pursuit of this social doctrine, the 
conditions of the workhouses were made even harsher in order to discourage the 
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idle. The Poor Law Reform in the UK, for example, was designed to relieve 
temporary distress but not to end poverty (Blake 2003). 
In Canada, opponents of this manifestation of the Protestant work-ethic were 
able to argue that the extent of poverty amongst the elderly was so great that it 
was not simply a question of one's inability to save for their old age but rather 
that the economic situation was rather severe - so through no fault of their own 
the elderly poor arrive at the workhouses (poorhouses). Bryden (1974) reports 
that the Elizabethan poor law was not accepted in any of the Canadian colonies 
except New Brunswick and Nova Scotia, where it was indifferently applied. Yet 
the English thinking and experience affected Anglophone Canadians. Therefore, 
in the ad hoc expedients devised to deal with welfare problems, one is able to 
detect the influence of the principles of both poor law doctrine and the efficiency 
of institutional care (Bryden 1974). Quebec applied a system of poor relief that 
departed from the English precedents, with it is adoption of principles inherent in 
the social doctrine of the Roman Catholic church (Bryden 1974). 
Traditionally, it was families which constituted the primary source of financial 
support for the elderly. Individuals were expected to cater for their own families 
and the extended ones, including parents and sometimes grandparents. For 
some time this system of financial support worked well, as most of the population 
in Canada (two-thirds) lived in rural communities and small towns (Gifford 1990). 
The rural family had a valued place for its older members, sharing in the work of 
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the farm, the home, and child-rearing. However, the trend had changed overtime, 
and more people were taking up residence in the sprawling big cities. The older 
members of the family fared less well in the cities. A Montreal businessman, Sir 
Hubert Brown Ames, studied a working class district of Montreal in the 1890s and 
found that jobs were far and few between, particularly so in the winter months. 
Some employers took advantage of the oversupply of surplus labour to reduce 
wages for those in employment. So for those who had work, most were poor 
(Gifford 1990). 
A 1891 Ontario Royal Commission report identified this problem and 
recommended the establishment of poorhouses in every Ontario county to take 
care of the homeless people most of whom were destitute elderly (Bryden 1974, 
Guest 1980, Gifford 1990). The stigma of, and the attitude towards, the elderly 
poor with no pension, no housing programmes, and no health insurance were to 
give rise to brewing political discontent. 
Rebellion of a growing mass of urban working class against a possible penniless 
future in workhouses was enough to cause unrest in Canada throughout the 19th 
century. Elsewhere, in the industrialised west, for example in the newly united 
Germany, Prince Otto Von Bismarck wanted to stem the envisioned socialist 
revolutionary trend by establishing a social security system. Pension legislation 
passed in Germany in 1889. By 1900 ten European countries, Australia and New 
Zealand had introduced public pensions for their citizens (Gifford 1990, Blake 
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2003). 
In Canada, Morden Lazarus writing for the Canadian Labour Congress (CLC) 
charted the chronological events leading to the establishment of the Canadian 
public pension system from the earliest times (Lazarus, CLC Department of 
Education). There he argued that Canadians were becoming aware of events in 
Europe and with the Trade and Labour Congress (TLC) acting as the principal 
protagonist, started to agitate for such a public pension system as early as 1905 
(Lazarus CLC, Gifford 1990). Although there is some dispute regarding the 
political influences behind the Canadian public pension system, it is generally 
agreed that the work of a number of individual political actors and organised 
interests were to be credited (Bryden 1974, Gifford 1990, Pratt 1996). 
One such notable political actor was the Conservative Member of Parliament for 
Stormont, Ontario, R.A. Pringle, who moved in the House of Commons that the 
government give early consideration to the subject of improving the conditions of 
the aged, deserving poor and providing for those who were helpless and infirm 
(Gifford 1990) Mr. Pringle's motion was supported by the Labour MP, Alphonse 
Verville from Montreal who at the time, was also president of the TLC. 
The incumbent government of Sir Wilfrid Laurier accepted to consider in some 
detail the issue raised through the Royal Commission. Sir Laurier did, however, 
later betray his commitment on this matter, by neglecting to consider the 1889 
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report of the Royal Commission on the Relations of Labour and Capital (Gifford 
1990). The report looked at the condition of those too old to work and 
recommended a system of government annuities. 
The issue was forced upon subsequent governments by the active agitation of 
dedicated interests, including British Columbia (BC) Nanaimo MP, Ralph Smith, 
who favoured a universal pension scheme, and the TLC who proposed a national 
pension plan. The issue of annuities was raised again in the 1912-13 
parliamentary session. Again these efforts were thwarted by the then Finance 
Minister W.T. White who refused to accept that a problem existed to which a 
public pension could solve. His view was contrary to the view of the 
government's own appointed House Committee findings (CLC Education 
Department). 
The CLC took credit for the shift in the government's stance on this issue and in 
the subsequent passing of the Annuities Act of 1908 (Lazarus CLC). The 
Annuities Act of 1908 would serve as the precursor of the present day Old Age 
Security Pension (OAS). Prior to the establishment of the OAS in 1951, a number 
of Royal Commissions were to pass several volumes of recommendation for a 
Canadian public pension scheme. Most of the recommendations, for example 
the one by the Commission on Industrial Relations 1919, called for an immediate 
inquiry into state insurance against unemployment, sickness, invalidity and old 
age. This was after a serious industrial strife in Winnipeg. The Winnipeg General 
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Strike in May and June 1919 was a reaction to both rising inflation and 
unemployment following the war. 
Those involved were mostly soldiers returning back from the war and unable to 
find work. It also included unions who were fighting to obtain wage increases to 
correspond to the rising costs in the standard of living. At that time, the great 
majority of workers was earning about 25 cents per hour and had to work long 
shifts. Most of the working poor also supported large families. The idea of being 
thrifty under these conditions was generally misplaced as most of the workers did 
not even reach old age (Statistics Canada - historical data, 2004). 
Another significant pressing issue at that time had to do with a customs scandal 
and a constitutional issue that forced an earlier election in the fall of 1926. The 
September election ousted the Conservatives and replaced them with the 
Liberals. The new Liberal government was elected in part as a result of their 
support of the pension issue. In 1927, two Labour MPs, J.S. Woodsworth and 
A.A. Heaps, introduced legislation to help the unemployed, and made provision 
of old age pensions a condition of helping Mackenzie King's minority government 
hang on to power (Gifford 1990, Gray 1998).The subsequent legislation 
established Canada's first pillar pension scheme. 
Despite early opposition to the legislation, by the Canadian Senate, on the 
grounds that a state pension of $20 per month would weaken family solidarity 
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and discourage thrift, the governing Liberal Party senators came under pressure 
both internally within party and externally from the public. The internal squabbles 
were dealt with fairly quickly by the discipline of the party whip. The bill became 
law. The newly established Old Age Pension Act came into being in February of 
1927. It provided pension benefits of $20 per month for persons aged 70 and 
over. It was initially financed jointly by the provincial and the federal 
governments. However, it would later be taken up by the federal government's 
and solely funded through general revenues in the following year. 
Following the passage of the pension measure, the provincial governments took 
the necessary steps to adopt this law within their own legislation. The province of 
British Columbia was the first to pass the required provincial legislation in 1927. 
Ontario and four more western provinces would adopt the bill into law by 1929 
and thus were able to join the new pension plan. The Maritime Provinces and 
Quebec committed themselves by 1936 (Byrden 1974, Gifford 1990). 
The creation of this first pillar of state pension scheme was an important 
achievement. The emergent Canadian welfare state nestled between what 
Titmuss described as a 'Residual' and the 'Industrial Achievement Performance 
Model' (Titmuss 1951). Titmuss characterises the 'Residual' welfare state as 
being dominated by individuals naturally meeting their needs through the 
channels of the private market and the family and where public welfare benefits 
are offered begrudgingly and only as a last resort. The 'Industrial Achievement 
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Performance Model' is marked by a general acceptance of various types of social 
welfare institutions including state funded but in which the definition of need 
remains focussed on recipients' merit, work performance, and productivity 
(Titmuss 1951). The Old Age Pension Act provided a means tested benefit and 
was so meagre that a person had to be virtually destitute to get it (Lazarus CLC). 
As a vehicle of nation building, although the emerging Canadian welfare state 
was largely politically incoherent, it showed promise. As it was, huge differences 
existed within the regions and across provinces. While some provinces were 
quick to adopt the 1927 pension legislation, others got on board at a later stage. 
Interest organisations were significantly weak or non-existent nationally. Except 
for the work of the National Pensioners and Senior Citizens Federation (NPSCF) 
and the TLC, pension advocacy rested in the hands of a few politicians - the 
likes of J.S. Woodworth and A.A.Heaps. Pension benefits were subject to 
stringent means testing. This would suggest that the welfare state was still in a 
residual mode. 
Still, despite the limited application to the new programme, the federal 
government had taken a bold step in accepting full responsibility for elderly 
peoples' welfare and income security. With it, the creation of a recognisable 
social grouping: the pensioners and the attendant bureaus and agencies which 
had the potential to be the focal point of future pension advocacy (Pratt 1998). 
This was achieved through the broad language in which policy enactment was 
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framed - giving administrative officials (civil servants) an open opportunity to 
shape the course of future pension policy and hence being themselves a focus of 
intense network lobbying. More recent understanding of the policy making 
process would suggest that such input is not only necessary but essential 
(Montpetit 2003). The democratic accountability debate does place demands on 
governments to improve public input into the policy process in the social policy 
arena. For example, the government had provided 12 months of public 
consultations leading to the 1997 CPP reform. 
The TLC was active in lobbying the state as well as other interest organisations 
in the early days. For example following the enactment of the 1927 Old Age 
Pension Act, the TLC unions in Quebec urged for the implementation of the 
federal pension plan. They worked in tandem with the Confederation of Catholic 
Workers of Canada (Confederation des Travailleurs Catholiques du Canada; 
CTCC) in pushing the Quebec provincial government to accepting the 1927 
pension legislation in 1936 (Lazarus CLC). According to a CLC paper, the open 
proclamation that the social legislation like pension was consistent with the papal 
encyclical De Rerum Novarum by the Montreal Labour Council (CTCC) had the 
effect of undermining the stiff opposition by Quebec catholics, the clergy, and 
politicians (Lazarus CLC). 
By the end of 1936 all the ten provincial governments had accepted the 
implementation of the Old Age Pensions Act. The great depression had 
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exacerbated the number of the elderly dependent on the new pension scheme 
whose number was estimated at 500,000 by the end of the 1920s (Gifford 1990). 
This new social grouping began to organise ways to improve their circumstances 
in the 1930s. The British Columbia Old Age Pensioners' Organisation (OAPO) 
was founded in 1932 the first federation of community-based seniors' groups 
formed anywhere. An Alberta federation followed in 1935 (Gifford 1990). 
However, the bulk of policy articulation and outcome monitoring was provided by 
the National Pensioners and Seniors Citizens Federation (NP&SCF) and by the 
Canadian Labour Congress (Pratt 1996). 
There was progressive acceptance by all the three main political parties in 
Canada on the desirability of the public pension. As a consequence the pattern of 
the establishment of public pension in Canada has followed a wave of political 
initiative, demonstrating a consistent logic based on experience. The bedrock of 
Canadian pension programmes, the Old Age Security pension, was established 
in 1951. The Old Age Security pension was a universal non-contributory pension. 
Before the establishment of the second pillar pension, namely the Canadian 
Pension Plan in 1965, the monthly OAS benefits amounted to $75 per month 
(HRDC 1996). It was adjusted annually to cost-of-living increases by a maximum 
of two percent. The benefit levels were clearly inadequate and provincial 
governments worked on providing additional supplements. The Ontario 
government, for example, passed the Ontario Pensions Benefits Act in 1963. 
This required every employer with 15 or more employees to adopt at least a 
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minimum pension plan by the January 1, 1965, with the contributions vested in 
the employee (Bryden 1974). 
The federal government began seriously to look into a second public pension 
scheme about the same time as the Ontario Pension Benefits Act was 
announced. Senate David Croll headed an appointed Senate committee to look 
into the issue of aging. The final Report of the Special Committee of the Senate 
on Aging was published in 1966, the year the CPP was introduced. The 92 
recommendations scripted into the report highlighted the problems faced by 
seniors in housing, employment incomes, health and other needs (Bryden 1974, 
Lazarus CLC). 
The Canada Pension Plan (CPP) was introduced in 1965 to provide an earnings 
related pension amounting to 25 percent of earnings up to a maximum ceiling. In 
1973 the ceiling was $5,600 and in 1979 it jumped to $11,700 (HRDC 1996). The 
amount was subject to a joint review by provincial and federal officials, and was 
at the time set for two percent of cost-of-living increases. In terms of contribution 
to the CPP fund, both employers and employees were required to contribute 1.8 
percent of the employees' earnings up to maximum of $600 annually (HRDC 
1998). All nine provinces and territories adopted the CPP except Quebec who 
established their own Quebec Pension Plan - a legally separate plan but one 
which remained portable and parallel to the CPP. 
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Although the income security system so far been fashioned was supported by all 
three leading political parties in Canada, it would be a few years later that 
political pressure began to mount in favour of fundamental overhaul. There are at 
least two principal reasons for this. First, the principle of universality, upon which 
the OAS originally had been grounded, was soon called into question. Many of 
the influential persons who had supported the scheme wanted to see the existing 
system include benefits based on the contributory principle. This leads us to the 
second reason: the issue of cost-containment. The idea of containing the 
government fiscal debt was rather appealing with a contributory pension scheme. 
Cost-containment would be achieved with a contributory pension scheme 
because increases in economic growth and high employment levels in the 1960s 
will absolve benefit increases and make enhancements affordable. The CPP was 
designed on a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) financing model. Given the prevailing 
values in the 1950s and 1960s - rising wages and a growing workforce was seen 
as a potent mix by treasury advisers who would have governments opt for a 
PAYG design. The PAYG design satisfied all the concerns raised at the time: 
concerns over government control of large pools of capital and the public general 
distrust of capitalised pension schemes in countries where depression and war 
had but all wiped out entire pension funds in the first half of the century (Myles 
and Pierson 2001: 310). During this initial expansion phase of the welfare state, 
since there was no preceding generation of entitled pensioners, politicians could 
offer immediate 'unearned' benefits for those near retirement age and a modest 
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payroll taxes. 
In the Canada, financial figures provided by the Department of Finance illustrate 
the change in levels of real growth in total wages and salaries and real interest 
rates. (See Table 4 -1) 
Table 4 -2. Real growth in total wages and salaries and real interest rates, 
Canada, 1960s - 90s 
1960-9 1970-9 1980-9 1990-4 
Real growth in Total wages and salaries 5.1 4.8 2.1 0.0 
Real Interest rates 2.4 3.6 6.3 4.6 
Source: Canada, An Introduction Paper for Consultation on the Canada Pension 
Plan (Ottawa: Department of Finance, 1996) 
The inverse relationship between real wage growth and real interest rates has 
provided a powerful motivation for some of the reform measures analysed in this 
thesis. With respect to the design of the CPP, the figures in Table 4 -1 show that 
it made economic sense to have adopted the PAYG. 
The PAYG model of pension financing raised other issues relating to the implicit 
benefits to the welfare state. It has already been noted that in Canada, as in 
other western countries, the social tension that resulted in industrialisation was a 
primary motivation for a state funded social security system. It served to quell 
the social disjuncture that emerged from industrial growth. After the end of the 
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world war hostilities, the welfare state programmes generated a share sense of 
community where individuals were willing to pool resources together against the 
common risk of joblessness, poverty in old age and in health, for example. 
These nation building implicit outcomes have been contested. James, for 
example, argues that the idea that only governments can insure pensioners 
against group risks, such as inflation, is a myth (James, 1996). She contends that 
most developing countries do not index pensions for inflation in their publicly 
managed programmes, and that some privately managed plans do index benefits 
(James 1996). 
We know that Canada and the UK both index their state pension schemes, so 
James' criticism does not apply in these cases. Canada's welfare state 
developed in a pragmatic fashion with strong intraparty agreement on the desired 
outcomes. This was not the case in the UK where there is a strong disagreement 
on reform measure. The de-centralised political system in Canada allows the 
federal government acting in unison with its provincial counterparts to craft a 
reform measure that is evidently incremental. Canadian pension system is 
presented in Section 4.2. 
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4.2 The Canadian Pension System 
The Canadian post-war welfare state consisted of a complex retirement income 
system composed of a variety of public and private programmes, each with 
distinctive purposes and parameters. Together, these programmes represented 
massive financial outflows, with tentacles reaching into different aspects of 
Canadian life. Socially, the system was responsible for providing income support 
for the retired in Canada and contributing to a larger sense of fairness and 
security (Banting and Boadway 1996). The economic impact was huge. The 
design of the Canadian pension system was carefully chosen and had wider 
implications for the overall levels of savings, investment and productivity growth 
and occupational pensions represented large pools of capital which controlled 
substantial portions of private industry in Canada. The beneficiaries of the 
income security system constitute a formidable political constituency that were 
capable of forcing issues with the government. As a consequence, politicians 
approached questions of reform with considerable caution. 
Although the retirement system that emerged from the post-war period served 
Canadians well in reducing poverty among the elderly, it became the subject of 
intense public debate from the 1980s onwards. Often described as one of the 
best retirement income systems in the DECO countries, the Canadian pension 
system consists of three pillars (Miles 1998, 2001). The construction of the three 
pillars differs in very practical ways, with significant implications for its reform. 
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Graphically, it can be depicted as shown in Figure 4-1. 
Objective 
Form 
Financing 
I"gYfl!'l§tigfl €If f'!y!:)li§ 
Pension System 
Non-contributory 
was universal until 
1989 Reform 
Means-tested 
-
Funded by Federal 
Govemment through 
General Revenue 
1 st Pillar, OAS 
Old Age Security 
Guaranteed Income 
Supplement (GIS) 
M§fl!'l§Wy eigmbifl@§ 
Pybli§ §fl!'l 
~§§YP§tiQfl§1 P@fl§iQ §y§t@m 
.. 
Contributory 
Means-tested 
Partially Funded 
State/Employer and 
Employee 
2nd Pillar, C/QPP 
Canada/Quebec Pension 
Plan. Plus several 
Occupational Plans 
Flexible Insurance Plan 
Regulated through tax 
system encourages 
individual plans 
Contributory Flexible 
Benefits are based 
on individual lifetime 
contribution 
Fully Funded 
_. 
3rd Pillar (Private Scheme) 
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The first pillar is made up of public programmes that are funded fully from 
general government revenues. The Old Age Security (OAS) , the Guaranteed 
Income Supplement (GIS), and a number of smaller supplements offered by the 
provincial and territorial governments all draw from the general revenue fund and 
are fully funded. The OAS was introduced in 1951 as a universal, flat-rate benefit 
awarded to individuals who retire at age 65. It makes up for about 14 percent of 
their retirement income. Initially this was the principal source of income for the 
elderly in Canada. Because of the financing design, the OAS constitutes an 
intergenerational transfer from working-age Canadians to retired Canadians. 
Over time, as the other pillars developed and matured, the first pillar was 
eclipsed by the more robust second and third pillars - nevertheless it remained 
an important part of the retirement income system for low-income Canadians. 
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The evolution of the first pillar transpired over a long history. In 1927, the Old Age 
Pension Act provided merge means tested benefits of $20 per month (Bryden 
1974, Gifford 1990). The OAS, which followed the Old Age Pension, was 
enriched by the GIS, an income-tested benefit, and a number of provincial 
supplements which appeared shortly thereafter. 
The Liberal Party of Canada was dominant in Ottawa throughout this period, and 
had earlier identified the possible electoral advantages of being associated with 
the penSion reform cause. As early as 1943, the then Prime Minister, William 
Lyon MacKenzie declared that "a comprehensive national scheme of social 
insurance should be worked out at once" (Bryden 1974). His successor, Louis St. 
Laurent, would take up this vision five years later. 
The 1951 reform deviated from the incrementalism associated with Canadian 
pension reform. It constituted a massive overhaul of the Canadian pension 
system. It introduced two pieces of legislation: the Old Age Assistance Act and 
the Old Age Security Act. The former of these was the less controversial since it 
involved less of a programmatic change (Pratt 1996). It authorised the increase 
in the size of the existing federal subsidy to the 1927 means-tested benefit, 
thereby enabling the ten provinces to raise existing pension benefit levels, while 
simultaneously lowering the age of pension eligibility by five years - from seventy 
to sixty-five. The latter piece of legislation involved a more fundamental change. 
The Old Age Security Act established a universal pension for every Canadian at 
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age seventy subject to a single requirement: residency. At the enactment of this 
piece of legislation, Canada's federal pension scheme was transformed from one 
involving benefits payable only to the demonstrably indigent and needy into one 
covering every Canadian citizen above a defined age regardless of need or 
circumstance (Pratt 1996). 
The reform measure attracted lively debate, and in the end the governing Liberal 
Party gained the support of the opposition Progressive Conservative Party in 
endorsing the two reforms when it came before the federal parliament (Bryden 
1974 :117). The resultant OAS is a purely federal programme. The institutional 
arrangement achieved under a 1935 Supreme Court of Canada ruling, gave the 
authority to the federal government to act unilaterally in terms of making changes 
to the programme without any interference from the provincial government. This 
institutional arrangement made it necessary for interest groups and policy 
networks to lobby the federal government, directly bypassing the provincial 
governments - at least this was consistent with the findings from primary sources 
in Canada. 
The OAS would enjoy a long period of growth for the next three decades, only 
witnessing slight modifications, for example in benefits levels. Having failed to 
de-index Old Age Security in 1985, the federal government made a more 
successive attempt in 1989. On this occasion, the federal government took a 
decisive step to phase-in an income test for the OAS. This meant that benefits 
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awarded to upper-income recipients were to be 'clawed back' - to use the 
Canadian terminology - through the tax system. This was a crucial undertaking 
because it ended the universality of the first pillar pension then it was previously. 
A second programme of reform was announced in the 1996 federal budget. This 
proposed to consolidate the OAS and GIS and two income-tax credits currently 
available to the elderly, into a single income-tested Seniors' Benefit; however, 
this proposal did not materialize (Canada 1996b). It is quite unclear why the 
reform was put off, but it has been suggested that cost consideration played a 
part, and that more time was needed to properly phase in the proposed 
programme. In addition, the federal government was at the time embarking on 
the CPP reform, which is usually a trickier and more demanding policy issue. 
The Canada and Quebec Pension Plan (C/QPP) makes up the second pillar of 
the Canadian retirement income system. The CPP was introduced in 1966. The 
Canada Pension Plan (CPP) operates generally in all provinces except Quebec. 
The Quebec government established the Quebec Pension Plan, a parallel 
programme to the CPP. The two pension schemes are broadly similar in design: 
benefits differ only marginally, and contribution rates are identical. The QPP is 
portable with the CPP. In other words, contributors to the QPP can at retirement 
draw their penSions from any part of Canada outside Quebec and vice versa. 
The basic function of the CPP is income replacement. 
The adoption of the C/QPP Pensions Act in 1965 introduced an important 
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earnings-related element into Canada's existing system of federally funded 
benefits for the elderly. The CPP is contributory programme that is financed 
through contributions from employees, employers and self-employed persons 
aged between 18 and 70 who make more than a minimum level of earnings 
during the year. The social insurance scheme protects the contributors and their 
families against the loss of income due to retirement, disability and death. The 
contribution rates have varied over the years. At the start of the 1996 CPP 
reform, the contribution rate, shared equally between employers and employees, 
was 5.6 percent of earnings above the basic exemption of $3500 (Department of 
Finance 1996). Below this amount, individuals were not required to contribute. 
The maximum pensionable earnings, for the CPP is $35,400. Benefits are 
earnings related and replace 25 percent of employment earnings yielding a 
maximum monthly pension in 1996 of $727.08 (Canada Department of Finance 
1997). A small number of beneficiaries receive the full amount. Although the 
CPP is designed on a pay-as-you-go basis, it has a small fund for each plan, 
equal to about two years of benefits. Current benefits are funded by current 
contributions. In effect, today's pensioners are supported by today's workers. 
At the onset of the CPP programme, the provincial governments were able to 
reach an agreement whereby they could borrow substantial amounts from the 
CPP fund at below market rates. This loan helped fund projects within the 
provinces unrelated to the primary intent of the£PR fund. Over time, as the CPP 
matured and was drawn upon- for the PUfpase5i"fof. which it was set up, the 
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reserve fund was found to be low (CPP Actuarial Report 1995). Coupled with low 
birth rate and decline in labour force participation in Canada, the CPP became 
vulnerable to the pressure for reform because of the declining reserve and 
increasing outflows. 
The third pillar, which was actually the first to be set up, is made up of private 
schemes. The system consists of tax-sheltered private savings, in the form of 
occupational pensions and personal savings. Social policy makers in Canada 
wanted a healthy private pension market. The long history of the Elizabethan 
poor law tradition still resonated in the social policy thinking of officials. Pension 
groups representing the business and right of centre think tanks, such as the 
ACMP and the Vancouver based Fraser Institute, has argued on the merits of an 
expanded private market provision. Hence from the early origins there was 
considerable room for the private market. Given the design of the CPP, that the 
expected maximum replacement rate is limited to 25 percent of average 
earnings, and that the first pillar pension scheme acts only as an income support 
for the poor elderly, middle- and upper-income Canadians tend to seek additional 
income replacement through occupational pensions or private savings. The 
government have encouraged the expansion of these forms of savings through 
tax assistance. Tax payers are permitted to withdraw from their taxable income 
contributions to the Registered Pensions Plans (RPPs) and Registered 
Retirement Savings Plans (RRSPS); income earned by these plans is also free 
from tax. The tax shelter for both the RPP and RRSP was limited to $13,500 per 
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year as of 1996 (HRDC 2004). These savings become taxable when they are 
withdrawn from the plan prior to the date of retirement. In this respect, the RPP 
and RRSP are considered as deferred tax. 
The RPP and RRSP have received some criticism about their use as instruments 
of pension planning. Many low-income Canadians are said to bear the burden of 
the foregone tax, as many are unable to benefit from the tax instruments. 
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4.3 The Great Pension Debate in the 19805. 
For over four decades, Canada has fashioned a fairly progressive state pension 
system. There has been a tacit cross-party agreement on the desirability of a 
public funded retirement income system (Gifford 1990). This vision has been 
pursued in a logical and systematic fashion since 1927 (Pratt 1996). The by-
product of this social engineering, has been an elaborate three pillar pension 
system, namely: the Old Age Security (OAS), the Guaranteed Income 
Supplement (GIS), the Canada/Quebec Pension Plan (C/QPP) and a complex 
maze of private pension and savings schemes. This retirement income system 
compares quite favourably with the pension system in Europe (OECD 1996, 
Baldwin and Laliberte 1999). 
Despite these successes, the Canadian retirement income system has come 
under pressure. The source of this pressure has several foci (a) demographically, 
it has been estimated that by 2010, the large post-war 'babyboom' generation will 
begin to retire. This transition has powerful implications for social policy 
generally, and especially retirement income policy (Banting and Boadway 1996). 
The pay-as-you-go (PAYG) financing method which applies to the CPP is 
especially susceptible to the changing balance between beneficiaries and 
contributors. According to Statistics Canada, during the 1990s, there were five 
people of working age for each person aged 65 and over. By the year 2030, 
there will be only three (Statistics Canada 1996b). 
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(b) The demographic pressures have been accentuated by weak performance of 
the economy. The public pillars of the Canadian retirement income were 
constructed in a period of strong economic growth, and increases in real wages 
and salaries which in effect enhances the government's treasury by way of tax 
contributions. During the last two decades, however, productivity growth has 
slowed sharply, and wages and salaries have stagnated in real terms, 
necessitating larger than expected increases in contribution rates to support 
benefit commitments undertaken in earlier era (Canada 1996a). 
(c) Successive Canadian governments since 1981 have endured fiscal crises. A 
long string of deficits and the resulting accumulated debt have caused a shift in 
the financial management style of the country's public finances. At the start of the 
1990s, debt-servicing was eating up approximately 35 percent of federal tax 
revenues, placing huge pressure on all other spending commitments. The 
Canadian public pension spending, although substantial, has up to this point 
been sheltered from the fiscal restraint observed in other programme areas. 
Gradually, however, as the government's fiscal position weakened, the sense of 
taxpayer resistance to further tax increases set the context within which 
policymakers considered how to manage the mountain of unfunded liabilities 
implicit in a pay-as-you-go system and an aging population. 
Emerging from these was a real sense of crisis. Public confidence in the public 
pension system was eroded following a wave of bad news stories regarding the 
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demise of the CPP. Coupled with the realisation of growing unemployment, 
diminished economic prospects for young people, retreat by the government on a 
number of social programmes, and technological changes, the result was a 
pervasive sense of insecurity about many aspects of Canadian life, including the 
retirement income system. A Gallup opinion poll conducted in 1994 (Figure 4-2) 
seemed to capture the sense of pessimism, particularly amongst younger 
Canadians. 
Figure 4-2 Percent of people who are confident they will receive OAS and CPP benefits 
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Figure 5-2 demonstrates that the erosion of self confidence in public pension is 
highest amongst the 30-39 age category, while the over 65 age cohort are more 
optimistic about their chances of receiving OAS and CPP benefits. This result 
truly reflects the assertions in the literature. According to the Canada Statistics 
referred to earlier in this section, by 2030 the ratio of worker/retiree will be in a 
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range of 3:1. Those in the age cohort of 30-39 are the ones most likely to feel the 
crunch. 
Thus, the 'great pension reform debate' of the late 1970s and early 1980s began 
to emerge from its hiatus. In 1972, the governing Liberal Party long associated 
with the pension reform cause, suffered its major election defeat in large part as 
a result of measures outlined in a 1970 government white paper, Income Security 
for Canada (Pratt 1996). Implicated in that white paper was the government's 
intention to freeze benefit levels and increase the required residency period 
before eligibility could be granted. In order to retain office, the Liberal Prime 
Minister, Pierre Trudeau, had to enter into a coalition with Canada's third party, 
the New Democrats. In doing so, he conceded sufficient ground on both counts 
of his 1970 white paper. 
The central question in the debate over the previous fifteen years has been 
whether or not the Canada and Quebec Pension Plan should be doubled for 
everyone, or augmented by a homemaker pension (Canada. Task Force on 
Retirement and Income Policy 1980; Canada. Department of National Health and 
Welfare 1982; Canada. House of Commons 1983). Furthermore, throughout the 
1980s and well into the 1990s and even leading to the 1997 CPP reform, 
significant interests have called into question the method of financing the CPP. A 
review of the CPP Consultation Report (Canada. Department of Finance 1996) 
highlighted the divergent views contained in that report. While many of the 
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pensioners' rights interest organisations were clear in advocating for an 
increased and secure public pension system, the business lobby, were calling for 
a narrowing of provision and a market investment of a fuller funded public 
pension. 
At the provincial government levels, there were other more pressing concerns. 
The reform options to be pursued had to take into consideration the various 
strategic interests of the provincial governments. Alberta for example, had 
expressed rather eloquently her desire to create an Alberta Pension Plan, similar 
to the Quebec scheme. Alberta took one important step in this direction. This was 
in the form of an academic report published by the Institute for Public Economics 
in 2000 and a legislative consultation paper prepared by the provincial legislature 
under the chairmanship of the Member of Legislative Assembly (MLA), Ian 
McCeliand (Boothe (ed) 2000; Alberta: Strengthening Alberta's Role In 
Confederation Consultation Paper 2004). The general thrust of Alberta's position 
was to move the CPP "in the direction of a mandatory fully funded private 
pension plan" (Boothe 2000). The study also wanted to redress the inherent 
intergenerational transfer from younger to older workers and retirees present in 
the CPP design. 
The Ontario government would seem to have exercised an implicit veto over the 
1997 CPP reform when her Minister for Finance made public his government's 
unwillingness to approve of rate increases beyond 10 percent. This was what 
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was implied by an Ontario Ministry of Finance official who said it was essential 
that one "walk quietly and carry a big stick,B (Interview with author, May 2004) 
The federal government and the rest of the provincial governments approved a 
rate increase of 9.9 percent - the so-called steady state increase (HRDC 2004). 
There seemed to be good reasons for accepting that rate of increase. The 
government Chief Actuarist after reviewing the CPP funds came to the 
conclusion that if the increases did not occur soon, meaning 1997, there was the 
real possibility that the CPP contribution rate could have reached 14.2 percent by 
2030 (Canada. Actuarial Report 1996). 
The maximum replacement amount for the CPP was 25 percent of industrial 
wage. A 14.6 percent contribution for a 25 percent on benefit was a road too far 
to travel. There were also other unsettled issues relating to outstanding unpaid 
loans which had been drawn from the CPP fund. Ontario with her massive 
population base is both the chief benefactor and debtor of the CPP pension fund. 
An acceleration of the rate of contribution will quickly start the process of 
rebuilding the CPP reserve and buy the heavily indebted provinces time to 
recover from their fiscal deficit in order to start repaying the loans. 
In the author's interviews, the international economic dimension did not feature 
much as a concern to Canadian interest groups. Although the international 
economic climate features prominently in the backdrop of the debate, it was not 
9 Author's interview with an Ontario Ministry of Finance Official in Toronto, Ontario, Canada, May 3Td, 
2004 
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explicitly mentioned during interviews, except at the Department of Finance in 
Ottawa. Even then, it was downplayed. Canada's trade relation with the US, is 
central to Canadian economic growth and was often spoken of. For example, the 
province of Ontario's trade with the US is one of the most important trading 
relations in the world (Ontario. Department of Finance 2004). This part of the 
author's findings collaborates with the initial point made by Paul Pierson, that 
while the global economic environment is important, it is the social and economic 
transformation within each state that is crucial in determining the reform 
orientation (Pierson 2001). Canada appears to be in a rather unique position 
because of her relations with the US. Both the US and Canada are notorious for 
low wages and if the bulk of Canada's external trade is with the US, it is possible 
to undermine the economic globalisation theory espoused to explain the policy 
variance, since labour and wage competition is between two comparable 
economies. 
One cannot quickly dismiss the economic globalisation theory, because how 
each state responds to the external and internal pressure is still important. It is 
generally recognised that the economic pressure resulting from slow economic 
growth, high rates of unemployment and rising deficit is the catalyst for reform 
(OECD 1988; Ploug and Kvist 1994). 
The institutional features of pension systems, as Pierson (1994, 2001) has 
argued create an opportunity structure for certain kinds of debates to take place 
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and help determine who is likely to win them. In this thesis, the author has 
organised these institutional factors as independent variables: namely, the 
pension design, the electoral environment and the centralised versus 
decentralised system of government. The intention in this section is to look at the 
decentralisation of political authority as it operates in the area of public pension 
as well as to consider pension design and the electoral environment. 
It has already been noted that the decision-making structure is embedded in 
legislation that defines the political actors whose participation and consent is 
required to change existing legislation. In Canada, reform of the CPP requires 
the consent of two-thirds of the provinces representing two-thirds of the 
population and cannot unilaterally be decided by Ottawa. 
Second, there is some element of rational choice logic that requires that those 
who engage in the political debate, possess at a minimum a basic understanding 
of the rules of the games - scripted as it were, into their collective psyche of what 
permissible moves are available. Those who advocate for a fully funded pension, 
for example, might be aware that under the Bismarck design of the CPP, the 
PAYG financing format had created a 'path dependent' dilemma which makes it 
difficult for current contributors to continue paying into the CPP fund, while at the 
same time paying into their own private pension scheme - the double payment 
problem. Hence the Bismarck model could allow for the tightening of the nexus 
between contribution and benefits, rather than adopting a radical overhaul. This 
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assertion is not universally true as the UK SERPS programme and the Canadian 
CPP reform will show. On the other hand, the Beveridge flat-rate pension model 
is usually sponsored from general revenues and therefore the opportunity to 
reform can be made by reducing benefits and directing it towards those in need 
rather than to citizenship. 
Third, the electoral environment is implicated in all reform options noted above. 
Following from Bonoli's argument that pension reform entails a disturbance of the 
existing distributional equilibria, politicians who seek to retrench are primed for 
electoral punishment if they wrongly underestimate the support for their plans 
(Bonoli 2000). Welfare retrenchment is also a process of 'blame avoidance' 
argues Paul Pierson (Pierson 1994). Thus the most likely reform is the one that 
alienates the smallest number of voters. 
This follows from the idea that the conventional critique of income testing in 
welfare state theory is premised on an understanding of the politics of traditional 
social assistance programmes in which needs-based tests exclude the majority 
and provide benefits to a small, powerless, minority - the 'poor'. Without support 
from the median voter, such programmes are likely to erode with time (Myles and 
Quadagno 1996). This is not necessarily the case with insurance based schemes 
such as the CPP. The political sustainability of programmes that exclude 'the 
rich' will depend on t~e size and electoral influence of those who remain in the 
programme. The challenge for the politician in pursuit of the median voter is to 
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accurately gauge how far down the income distribution he/she can go with a test. 
In Section 5.4 the analysis of the reform of the OAS is considered in light of the 
debate. 
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4.4 The 1989 Reform of Old Age Security - the end of Universality 
The Old Age Security (OAS) represented for Canadians the basic foundation of 
the pension system. And the federal government has historically used the 
provisions of the OAS to enhance its visibility in the provinces. It had remained 
universal until 1989 and federally funded from general revenues. The OAS was 
not immune from the inexorable challenges facing the pension system namely: 
rising government deficit which undercut funding and the dramatic predictions of 
demographic change. The economic and political climate at the end of the 1970s 
and beginning in the 1980s strongly signalled the government's public policy 
direction. In May 1985, the government of Brian Mulroney proposed a partial de-
indexation of the federal OAS pension. The proposal was vigorously resisted. 
Speaking at the 3rd reading of Bill C-26 to introduce reform to the OAS on the 
floor of the House of Commons, Mr. Ernie Epp, the then Minister of National 
Health and Welfare stated: 
"we in this house hear a lot about pension reform. I am in favour of a very strong 
approach to pension reform. Those Canadians who are retired or close to 
retirement have limited flexibility in retirement planning, obviously. But those 
Canadians who are in the workforce or coming to the workforce have to 
recognize that planning for retirement is something that should be looked at 
much sooner than statistics indicate most Canadians do, that is in the last 10 
years it at the end, so to speak, and then starts to make plans, much of one's 
flexibility is lost. The House has a responsibility, and I have a mandate, for 
penSion reform, not only incrementally as is being done through Bill C-26" 
(Hansard 3rd Reading of Bill C26 1985) 
The Minister's statement was strongly worded and suggests that the proposed 
reform ought to break away from the incremental approach traditionally 
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associated with Canadian social policy making. Bill C26 was defeated. The 
reason for its failure is as valuable for the analysis as the lessons it offered to 
interest groups working in this area. It showed that the existing OAS was not 
impervious to possible cost cutting and programme reduction under certain 
conditions. But also, it demonstrated the lack of strategic planning which should 
have correctly accounted for the strength of the opposition. The Conservative 
government that succeeded the Liberals in 1984 achieved a massive electoral 
victory under the leadership of Brian Mulroney. The previous Trudeau 
government had been in office since 1968 and had only conceded power just 
briefly in 1979. The election of Brian Mulroney gave the Conservative a large 
parliamentary majority. 
The newly installed Minister of Finance, Michael Wilson announced in his first 
budget, the government's intention to alter the indexing formula under the ~AS. 
This would have meant that pension benefits would no longer be fully protected 
against inflation. Henceforth, in response to any increases in the price level, OAS 
benefits would be raised only up to a set maximum, with pensioners themselves 
expected to absorb any additional cost-of-living increases (Pratt 1996). SenSing 
that the Wilson-Mulroney penSion plan, if allowed to stand, would have 
represented an important shift in pension policy, opposition to the plan was swift. 
Both opposition forces in the House of Commons in Ottawa came in defence of 
the ~AS. The leaders of both the Liberal Party, John Turner, and the New 
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Democratic Party, Ed Broadbent, soon voiced impassioned opposition, and de-
indexation now became headline news in the print media as well as on radio and 
television. Television reporters reported on interviews with senior citizens leaders 
in cities across Canada, thereby indirectly helping to mobilise opposition to what 
the Wilson budget had proposed. 
Meanwhile the liberal party and the New Democrats fanned out across the 
country aiming to arouse grass roots support for their cause. The mobilisation 
was enhanced by the support the movement received from unexpected quarters: 
among the Canadian Chamber of Commerce and the Business Council on 
National Issues. These two latter groups spoke for constituencies not normally 
inclined toward support of high social welfare expenditures. The situation defiled 
the logic implicit in the welfare state theory: namely that the median voter is most 
likely closer to the right. 
On June 26 1985, two days after meeting pension group leaders, Michael Wilson 
announced in the House his government's decision to withdraw the de-indexation 
proposal. Interest group theorists may claim that interest intermediation was 
potently effective in this instance (Pratt 1996). While, those with institutional 
leaning may argue, as Myles and Pierson, has done that welfare programmes 
that are means-tested and fashioned under Beveridgerian principles can be 
effectively reformed if the losing constituencies are small, and the median voter is 
quite up on the income distribution pole (Myles and Quadagno 1996, Myles and 
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Pierson 2001). The reform effort in 1985 runs contrary to this thesis because it is 
not easily explainable on the basis of existing interest theory. In either case the 
mobilisation of those interests was crucial. What is clear is that there is no 
formally enshrined veto points to which organised interests could employ in 
Canada to make the interest group theory stick. Informal veto was however 
within reach. 
In the 1989, the second attempt at introducing pension test into the OAS was 
successful. As is shown by Beland and Myles (2003) this reform was rather 
modest because it narrowed the focus on a small band of high income earners 
only (Myles and Quadagno 1996, Beland and Myles 2003). 
Perhaps having learnt from the defeat of the 'partial indexation in 1985, the 
Conservatives adopted a strategy of 'blame avoidance' aimed at reducing 
political risks related to retrenchment while ending universality by 'stealth'. They 
managed to 'claw back' OAS benefits from very high-income seniors. The media 
and most of the organised interest appeared to have ignored this. Since 1989, 
benefits for individuals with income greater than $51,765 were reduced by 15 
percent for every dollar of income above the threshold with all benefits 
disappearing at approximately $89,000 per year (HRDC 2004). However, the 
threshold $51,765 where the 'claw back' would take effect was only indexed to 
inflation in excess of 3 percent so that in real terms a growing share of seniors 
could be affected with the passage of time (HRDC 2004). This less visible 
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strategy was not well understood by the public and affected by very few seniors 
hence was reported less on. 
In terms of policy making, the case of OAS reform generates interest because it 
collaborates with the theoretical prospects identified by Pierson (1994, 2001) and 
others (Myles 1997, 2001; Banting 1997; Scharpf 1998, Bonoli 2000). That is, to 
say that public pension reform· responses to the institutional dynamics within the 
states. Pension design, interest intermediation and the electorally enhanced 
governing environment allows those seeking to reform the existing social contract 
to gauge their prospects and map their strategy efficiently. The OAS reform 
introduced in Canada in 1985 was quite modest (Beland and Myles 2003) and 
provided the governing Conservatives with a lesson or two about minimising 
political risks. The reform project itself failed for a number of reasons already 
outlined above namely: the number of potential losers were too great; the median 
voter was in this case closer to the status quo then would have been predicted; 
the grand coalition included sections of whose were traditionally opposed to 
social security expansion, i.e., the right wing think tanks and the pro-business 
lobby; interest group were efficient in mobilising support through several 
channels in society into the mass media who showed interest in the story. As a 
senior manager at the Canadian Association Retired Persons (CARP), informed 
during an interview "everyone get it - they only start to 'claw back' at $56,000" 
(CARP 2004). 
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The efficacy of interest intermediation is unclear, however, the case of the OAS 
show that the power of grey lobby can be ignited with the right mix of interrelated 
factors. Grey lobby was effective because of the mass support it received from all 
sections of society including all opposition political parties. On the government 
side they failed to recognise that given the centralised parliamentary power, 
voters were primed to punish the federal government if they had refused to take 
on board the concerns expressed by organised interest. The federal government 
as the sole custodian of the aspiration envisioned in OAS, unlike the CPP, have 
no hiding place. The lessons learnt from the doomed 1985 reform allowed the 
federal government to succeed by 'stealth' in 1989 (Battle 1997). This success 
was also enabled by the institutional arrangement. The Prime Minister was able 
to justify clawing back benefits from 'rich banker's wives'. This time, the narrow 
and tax laden reform was less widely understood and passed with little fury. 
There is the real possibility that the less obvious reason could be the fact the 
OAS draws from general revenues, hence the direct impact of economic 
globalisation in the decision making is negligible, although the direct impact of 
economic globalisation has been dismissed by writers such as Iversen (2001). 
The reform of the OAS demands a different set of explanatory tool. Explaining 
what was achieved by government in the context of Canadian federalism is 
important in furthering the explanatory power of the analysis. First, it does 
suggest that pension reform can be enhanced by power residing in the centre. 
The OAS is entirely administered by Ottawa free from any provincial wrangling. 
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The federal government was able to adjudicate on its' preferences to maximise 
impact. Initially the option open to it in light of concerns over deficit and changing 
demographic was to extend the residence requirements and/or reduce benefits. 
In the end the government opted for 'risk avoidance' by narrowing the scope of 
pensioners affected by the reform measure. This measure was considered less 
radical than could have been possible under the decision making conditions 
available to the federal government. The reform was itself at odds with the 
conventional wisdom. Second interest intermediation was insufficient on its own 
without formal or informal veto. Interest groups in Canada had to 'piggyback' on 
the mobilisation of a broad coalition of actors to have been able to force the 
government to reconsider its' 1985 reform measure. In the long term the 
governments was able to overcome the opposition to reform by narrowing the 
impact of such change as the 1989 reform demonstrated. Their success can also 
be attributed the tax implicit nature of the changes - 'reform by stealth' (Battle 
1997). The federal government is not able to act alone with respect to the CPP 
as the framework for reform differed significantly In the next section, attention is 
given to the 1996 CPP reform. This section would appraise the supermajoriatrian 
consensus that achieved the CPP reform in 1997. 
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4.5 The 1996 Canadian Pension Plan Reform 
The 1996 CPP reform started life as a set of principles outlined in new Finance 
Minister Paul Martin's 1995 budget speech to the House of Commons. The 
speech covered broad principles aimed at confronting the fiscal deficit and fears 
about population ageing. Five key principles outlined the reform plan. First, the 
government stated its' intention to ensure an undiminished protection for less 
well-off seniors. Second, the plan made commitment on continuing full indexation 
to protect seniors from inflation. Third, provision of GAS benefits on the basis of 
family was to be strengthened. Fourth, the government was planning on greater 
progressivity of benefits by income level and finally, the reform will manage 
program costs (1995 Budget Speech). 
Given the dual competence of federal/provincial in the area of CPP decision 
making, the five principles outlined in Mr. Martin's 1995 budget speech, could 
only speak specifically to the GAS/GIS but not to the CPP, however, it did signal 
the government intentions in pursuing poliCies already began by the previous 
Conservative government. The following year, 1996, the Liberal government 
moved to bring to fruition, the reform of the GAS/GIS outlined in the speech. The 
GAS/GIS were to be consolidated into a single Senior Benefits (Canada 1996a). 
Like the 1985 GAS reform that preceded it, the Senior Benefits proposal was 
shelved before it began. The opposition to the proposal was quite organised and 
vocal. It included a 21 strong Retirement Income Coalition which comprised of 
the Canadian Teachers' Federation, the Investment Dealers Association and the 
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Canadian Association of Retired Persons (Geddes 1998). In bringing this matter 
to a close the finance minister was quoted as saying: 
" the reform of the OAS/G/S was launched at a time when our choices were 
restricted by overwhelming constraint of a $38 billion deficit and, as importantly, a 
debt-to-GDP ratio that had risen virtually uninterrupted since the mid-1970s. 
Because of these two very real fiscal factors, the proposal made in 1995 
represented the best choice available at the time. That being said, any choice 
that depended on taking money out of the retirement income system was far from 
ideal. Three years later, our prospects have changed for the better and a much 
wider set of choices is now available" (Martin 1998). 
The government immediately began to position itself for the triennial 
federal/provincial CPP review. 
In regards to the triennial review, the federal government, benefited from the 
fiftieth Actuarial Report of the CPP which depicted a dismal picture of current 
CPP reserves in a context of future requirements. The content of the report was 
sufficient to push CPP reform back on Canadian policy agenda. The report did 
project a higher schedule for future contributions than anticipated by previous 
actuarial report and this was due to sharp increases in disability benefits and the 
impact of economic recession. As a consequence, without any significant change 
in the current schedule of contribution rates, by the year 2015, the CPP would no 
longer collect enough revenues to pay all the benefits (Battle 1997). 
The first round of the triennial consultation produced a consultation paper which 
was published in February 1996, Information Paper for Consultation on the 
Canada Pension Plan (Federal/ProvinciallTerritorial CPP Consultations 
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Secretariat 1996). The consultation included joint federal-provincial public 
consultation in every province and territory across Canada from April to June of 
1996, as well as a series of ministerial meetings (Canada 1997). David Walker, 
Member of Parliament for Winnipeg North Centre, was the chief federal 
representative on all the panels (Canada 1997). 
During the two months public consultations, more than 270 individual Canadians 
and organisations made formal presentations at 35 sessions in 18 cities across 
Canada (Canada 1997). The CPP Consultation Secretariat in Ottawa received 
more than 140 written submissions and almost 6,000 telephone calls to a 
dedicated 1-800 information line (Canada 1997). The result of the consultations 
was released in a report titled 'Report on Canada Pension Plan Consultations' in 
June of 1996 (Canada 1996). 
The general framework that informed the consultations was encapsulated in the 
February 1996 paper 'An Information Paper for Consultation on the Canada 
Pension Plan'. There were nine fundamental principles, two of which is 
specifically relevant here: 
o The CPP must be affordable and sustainable for future 
generations. This requires fuller funding and a contribution rate 
no higher than the already legislated future rate of 10.1 percent. 
In deciding how quickly to move to this rate, governments must 
take economic and fiscal impacts into account. 
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o CPP funds must be invested in the best interests of plan 
members, and maintain a proper balance between returns and 
investment risk. Governance structures must be created to 
ensure sound fund management (Government of Canada, 
1996c). 
The first of these principles took account of and reflected a need for Canadian 
economic competitiveness. This is important because the CPP is designed on 
the Bismarck model. Contributions come from payroll taxes. The second equally 
significance is in the way it signals a departure from the previous management 
style accustomed to by the rest of Canada except Quebec, whose Caisse de 
depot et placement du Quebec has been styled as pseudo independent 
investment board since its formation in 1966. The proposed CPP investment 
board will certainly satisfy the key players in the business community who have 
long called for an investment board. 
For example, in one of its recommendations to the government on public pension 
reform, the Association of Canadian Pension Management (ACPM) stated: 
"Meanwhile, the $1 trillion retirement savings pool Canadians have already 
accumulated, and which will continue to grow steadily during the next decade, 
will not produce the largest possible retirement 'nest eggs' down the road as it is 
currently being regulated and managed ... " (ACPM January 2000). 
It was an obvious reaction from the ACPM when the proposal to create a new 
CPP investment board as part of the CPP reforms was made. The ACPM 
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comment was positive. They reacted to the legislation to bring the CPP 
Investment on line as "bringing them in closer alignment with private market 
sector requirement" (ACPM 2000). 
Meanwhile, the Canadian Labour Congress (CLC) in its official submission to the 
House of Commons Standing Committee on Finance concerning Bill C-2 (the 
CPP reform bill) said: 
"Bill C-2 creates a Canada Pension Plan Investment Board that has some 
serious shortcomings as it is established in C-2 .. " (CLC November 6, 1997). 
In addition to this, the CLC reacted strongly to key issues in the process itself. 
For example they called on the federal government to publish the impact of CPP 
changes on the incomes of retirees and other affected groups, now and in the 
future (CLC 1997). 
Opposition to the CPP reform was slightly less reported and this could be due to 
the fact the decision making centres was split between federal and provincial 
governments. Work of mobilising support in central and provincial capitals were 
huge and often beyond the reach of small voluntary based interest groups. 
Except the work of FADOQ, CARP and the CPC which were more visible. Yet 
their efforts were weak in confronting the changes. A more general observation 
was that most if not all the groups interviewed seem to be negotiating from 
positions of diminished strength. The groups were highly fragmented nationally 
and therefore could not sustain the type of support that was seen with the OAS 
reforms for example. (See Table 4-2 of a sample of the senior organisations) All 
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four organisations are headquartered in Toronto with mostly volunteer staff. 
Table 5-2 Amateur-Style Retiree and Senior Citizens Organisations 
Name 
Year Founded Site 
National Pensioners and 1945 Toronto 
Seniors Citizens Federation 
Canadian Pensioners 1969 Toronto 
Concerned 
Canadian Council of 1977 Toronto 
Retirees 
Canadian Institute of 1977 Windsorrr oronto Seniors Centres 
Source: Pratt 1997 p.1S9 
Staff Type 
Volunteer and part-time 
paid 
Volunteer and part-time 
paid 
Volunteer 
Volunteer 
In interview with officials of some these groups, demonstrated their perceived 
effectiveness as being rather weak except for FADOQ who felt their input into the 
Quebec parallel consultations was valued. According to the analysis on interest 
group theory provided by Henry Pratt (1997) there is good reason for the FADOQ 
perceived effectiveness in Quebec. Unlike the other national seniors' interest 
organisations, the FADOQ had representative liaison at the national Assembly in 
Quebec. This allows for a special hear and input on key legislative initiative 
absent elsewhere (Pratt 1997). 
At the provincial government level, the government of Quebec made it clear that 
it would oppose any significant benefit cuts as would Saskatchewan and British 
Columbia, then ruled by the social democratic New Democratic Party, effectively 
removing that option from the political calculation (Beland and Myles 2003). The 
government of Ontario had already indicated it unwillingness to support 
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contribution rate increases beyond 10 percent. Alberta has been posturing on an 
Alberta Pension Plan (APP) for which there had been some province wide 
consultation aside from the federal-provincial road show which commenced in 
April of 1996. In all these, the provinces had each strategic interest in the way 
the reform shapes. The CPP reserve fund was running low, this was accepted by 
all parties concerned because the Actuarial report made that much clear. The not 
so talked about issue is the debt that have accrued to the provinces, especially 
Ontario, from borrowing from the CPP fund. Ideally, it would be in everyone's 
interest if the CPP reserve was quickly replenished before the loans were called 
in. 
This would have had the benefit of cushioning the high debt provinces to pay 
their way back to a balance at a more sustainable rate. Without a rapid increase 
to the CPP contribution rate, the return to sufficient reserve would have taken 
much longer, actually until 2015. This would have meant that the provinces would 
have no alternative but to pay up. On the other hand, if the proposed contribution 
rate increase were too high, the economic recovery which began in the early 
1990s could have been jeopardised. On the part of the federal government, their 
position was closer to the middle because already they have retreated on a 
number of significant social policy issues since 1995. Furthermore, given the 
jurisdiction created on decision making, federal unilateralism was seriously 
curtailed. The solution as it did turn out lied in the middle - an incremental 
approach. 
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Paul Martin finally presented the draft CPP legislation before the house in 
February 1997. It was decided to increase the CPP rate from 5.6 to 9.9 percent 
by 2003 in order to build up a larger reserve fund. In additional part of the CPP 
reserve was to be managed by an arm-length quasi-independent body, the CPP 
Investment Board. By 31 March 2001, the CPP Investment Board had '7.2 billion 
dollars invested in Canadian and foreign equities and by 2011' the board 
'expects to be managing at least $130 billion in diversified investment portfolio' 
(CPP Investment Board 2001). The CPP reform bill, Bill C-2 was enacted in 
January 1998 (Government of Canada 1998). 
The CPP reform bill secured the support of federal government and the 
provinces of Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island, 
Quebec, Ontario, Manitoba and Alberta. This support was sufficient to meet the 
statutory provision which requires that changes to the CPP receive the 
concurrence of at least two-thirds of the provinces with two-thirds of the 
population of Canada (Canada 1997). Table 5-3 provides details of changes that 
took place with the CPP. 
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Table 4-3 Comparison of Pre and Post CPP Reform - Core Components 
Existing CPP New CPP Proposals 
Reserve Fund Equal to two years of benefits and declining 
Growing to five years of benefits 
Rising to 10.1 per cent by 2016 Rising to 9.9 per cent by 2003 then held Contribution Rates Steady 
_ .. _. 
Projected to increase to 14.2 % in 
2030 Will not rise above 9.9 % 
.. -~ .. -
Year's basic exemption Currently $3,500 indexed to wages Frozen at $3,500 
Yea?s maximum pensionable 
. 
"" .-
earnings (YMPE) Indexed to wages No Change 
Investment Policy Inv§nt§!'Iifl nf:!n=n§9€1ti§!t§!!,>I§ Pf€lvinl';i1. New funds invested in diversified portfolio hnno. - nf .,,' ",nl;", 
._. 
Limited provincial borrowings at their own market Provinces borrow at federal rates Provincial Borrowing 
rates 
NeW r~!irem§nfi"'A§i9A .mcj ~§!§§g €In §!V§f§!~§ f:!f !§!§t ~ Y§§!f§' YMf' -~ Based on YM!"l:;inlill§ earnings-related portion of disabirrty 
-wrtfl m§!jf:!rity 
... 
_ .._" 
Source: Canada Government (HRDC 1997:6) 
The content of the changes has already been explained. Table 4-3 draw attention 
to contribution rates and investment policy. It shows that the contribution rates 
seem to be accepted by most Canadians. With respect to the investment 
proposal, again, there are reasonable differences as to how to approach this. 
The thesis notes two contrasting views on this when the submissions of interest 
organisations such as Association of Canadian Pension Management (ACPM) 
and the Canadian Labour Congress (CLC) are considered for instance. 
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4.6 Federal-Provincial Policy Making - the case of the CPP 
The new Liberal Party that succeeded the Conservatives in 1993 showed little 
reluctance in continuing the path of state pension reform started in 1985 by their 
predecessors. It has already been noted that the Canadian response to fiscal 
crisis associated with economic globalisation and population aging have been 
both coherent and incremental. Intra-party differences on the issue have been 
generally very minor. The Conservative Party of Brian Mulroney started on a 
path of reducing the size of the federal government liability in unfunded state 
pension through partial indexation of the OAS in 1985 and 1989. The Liberal 
government went further with significant cuts in other areas of social 
programmes, for examples to transfers to the provincial governments earmarked 
for health, education and social services (Battle, 1997). 
With respect to public pensions, the federal government, succeeded in reforming 
the CPP second pillar pension. 12 months of federal-provincial government 
ministerial consultations which also included public submissions succeeded in 
making the Canadian second pillar state pension a partially funded scheme. An 
investment board took over management of 17 percent of the fund's reserve at 
the onset with progressive increment in the subsequent years. 
The reform of the CPP has been considered significant but incremental (Banting, 
1997, Beland and Myles 2003). The reform of state pension system in Canada 
has historically proceeded incrementally (Banting 1997, Myles 2000, Beland and 
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Myles 2003). It has resisted the more radical approach to restructuring observed 
elsewhere, for example, in the UK. This stands in sharp contrast to the economic 
globalisation thesis which suggests that countries with small and open 
economies, for example, Canada, become susceptible to pressure to radical 
overhaul their public pension schemes (Scharpf 2001, Skyles 2002). There are a 
number of reasons to explain this divergent response. The Canadian welfare 
state is comparatively smaller than for example, the other liberal welfare states 
including the UK. In terms of program restructuring the federal could find other 
social programmes to cut. Canadians are one of the most insured people on the 
planet, most of which involves government (Cochrene 1997). More crucially, 
however, the institutional arrangement that governs the management of pensions 
systems in Canada is important. 
The three pillars of the Canadian pension system have been outlined. It was 
stated that the first two pillars were public schemes with a third private pension 
system. The first pillar which consists of a federal government funded scheme, 
the GAS, is managed by the federal government. The second pillar which is 
made up of the CPP is jointly managed by the federal-provincial governments. 
This tortuous arrangement has generated interesting federal-provincial dynamics 
that has shaped the design and reform of the CPP pension system. First, the 
thesis contends that Canadian governments encounter both political and 
economic inertia when it comes to delivering on CPP reform. Second, the design 
of the CPP based on the Bismarck formula of earning related pension makes the 
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rationalisation of radical cuts difficult to sustain. This is induced by a path 
dependent scenario most evidenced by the inherent 'double payment' situation. 
Third, the electoral environment is primed to punish unpopular cuts to programs 
that enjoy wide spread appeal. Canada enjoys a strong parliamentary system of 
government which is federal in character. The electoral system is organised 
around a first-past-the-post (FPTP) model which is notorious for producing single 
party governments. Canada like the UK had experienced long periods of single 
party governments, particularly during and after the period of penSion 
retrenchment starting in the 1980s, with a brief coalition government between the 
governing Liberals and the left leaning New Democratic parties in 1978/79. While 
governments can take credit for achieving growth in benefit levels, they are 
vulnerable to blame and electoral punishment when cuts to program are 
implemented. 
Thus, the strategy of 'blame avoidance' does imply that those seeking to reform 
the system must first appeal to a large section of the population and ensure that 
the cut in program benefits affect the least amount of people. Fourth, the 
absence of formal veto extended to organised interest makes interest 
intermediation weak. Those who manage to mobilise against cuts in pension 
benefits must do so piggybacking on the wave of mass support as witnessed in 
the 1985 OAS protest. On their own merits, Canadian interest organisations are 
too fragmented and organisationally weak to impact policy. The one time victory 
in the 1985 OAS reform could not be replicated in 1989 nor was it the 
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determining factor in 1996. 
Returning to the federal-provincial arrangement, the argument is that Canadian 
governments face economic and political inertia when it comes to delivering on 
CPP reform. Politically the tortuous arrangement that determines the rules of 
engagement is worth noting here. 
In 1935 the government of Prime Minister RB. Bennett introduced the 
Employment and Social Insurance Act as part of his New Deal (Muszyuski 1995). 
It was struck down by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (JCPC) as ultra 
vires after several provinces challenged the law. At that ruling the JCPC took the 
view that constitutional authority for social insurance fell squarely within 
provincial jurisdiction and that the proposed unemployment insurance 
programme was an intrusion into a field reserved by the constitution for 
provinces. 
However, the pressure of high unemployment on provincial and municipal 
treasuries were too great and by 1940 the provinces were willing to give up the 
exclusive responsibility for social policy, the BNA Act was amended to allow the 
federal government exclusive authority over unemployment insurance because of 
its importance for the national economy (Muszyuski 1995). 
Constitutionally it was still unclear if other contributory programmes fell under 
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federal or provincial jurisdiction. It was through administrative accommodation, 
within the provinces that programmes such as non-contributory pension plans, 
disability and survivor benefits were deferred to the federal government. The 
result is that unemployment insurance is exclusively of federal jurisdiction, 
workers' compensation is exclusively provincial and contributory pension plans 
are under concurrent jurisdiction with the provinces having paramountcy in law 
over contributory pensions. 
This exercise of authority over contributory pensions following the 1935 judicial 
ruling clearly established that social insurance was a provincial responsibility and 
that constitutional amendment was required before the federal government could 
enter the contributory pension field (Banting 1984, 1997). Amendment to the 
BNA Act was obtained in 1951 and 1964, but only on terms which assured them 
of a continuing role in pension politics. The amendment retained provincial 
paramountcy (Banting 1984). 
Reference for such authority can be found in section 94A of the BNA Act 
(Constitutional Act as it is currently referred) (Banting 1984). The Act stipulates 
that no federal pension plan 'shall affect the operation of any law present or 
future of a provincial legislature in relation to any such matter.' (Banting 1984). 
At the beginning there was substantial uncertainty about the precise meaning of 
this clause, and the provincial governments also sought much more specific 
powers when the Canada Pension Plan was established. In return for provincial 
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agreement to the 1964 constitutional amendment, the federal government had to 
agree to write explicit provincial rights into the proposed pension bill. 
Accordingly, the Canada Pension Act provides that amendments to the plan must 
be approved by two-thirds of the provincial governments representing at least 
two-thirds of the population. In addition, the Act states that any provinces may 
opt out and establish its own plan, in which case the CPP ceases to operate 
generally in that province. Quebec opted for this option from the onset. It remains 
an option for other provincial governments. Ontario and more recently Alberta, 
have hinted at such action. 
These rules have created a system of multiple-veto points. First, the federal 
government has the authority to block any change of which it disapproves. 
Second, the requirement that two-thirds of the provincial governments must 
assent means that any four provinces can, in concert, block a change. Third, and 
more importantly, the requirement that the assenting provinces represent two-
thirds of the total population gives special weight to the largest provinces. Ontario 
has a veto in its own right, and will retain that power as long as more than one-
third of Canadians live in that province. Furthermore, the amending formula 
contains one of the most fascinating anomalies in Canadian federalism: Quebec 
is included in the two-thirds rule governing changes to the CPP, even though, it 
operates it own pension plan - the QPP. Quebec's share of the population does 
not entitle it to veto in its own rights, but Quebec and one other similar province 
could conceivably block a CPP amendment desired by every other Canadian 
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government (Banting 1984). 
Neither Quebec nor Ontario has exercised their veto powers. The insistence by 
Ontario for a less than 10 percent increase to the CPP contribution rate can be 
viewed as an implicit veto. Quebec had no support to make good of her potential 
veto power. 
In the 1996 CPP reform, Ontario had more at stake to gain or loss. As a province 
it has within its border 38 percent of Canadians living there. 52 percent of CPP 
outlays go to recipients in that province. The ratio of CPP debt is quite substantial 
for Ontario. On the one hand, it was in their best interest to see that the CPP 
reserve is quickly replenished. On the other, their immense trade with the US is 
dependent on fairly competitive labour cost. Contribution to the CPP fund is tax 
on wages. For this reason, the less than 10 per cent position perhaps was to 
them their optimal position. The Conservative Government of Mike Harris, at the 
time of the CPP reform, was also unlikely to support an expanded CPP benefit in 
light of the provinces' fiscal challenge. 
Quebec had undertaken a similar QPP review and had settled to improve its' own 
reserves. The crucial problem with Quebec has to be its' declining population 
base. Maintaining strong reserves will auger well for the future given the 
demographic concerns there. So Quebec was supportive of the changes to the 
CPP and a signatory to the 1996 reform. 
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Alberta was on the opposite side of Quebec. With a robust economic and a fairly 
balanced population distribution, Alberta has no fears of declining population 
rather their population is increasing and the demographics look quite good. Both 
these factors have given the government and some of its' political elites reason 
to be optimistic of an Alberta Pension Plan (APP). 
Taken, together, the existence of multiple-action points, in which policy is set by 
seven - and potentially eleven - separate governments, creates a strong tension 
between openness to change on one hand and uniformity of pension regulation 
on the other (Banting 1984). Banting (1984) argues, that this veto points offer 
each government the legal freedom to alter its regulatory system as it sees fit: yet 
in practice, they are restrained by the actions of others. The federal government 
may act as the broker of deals in assessing what offers will be placed on the 
table and what provincial governments will ratify. There is also a possibility that 
intergovernmental relationship is quite strong and could curtail some unilateral 
policies and by connecting their internal and external interdependence. This 
would be a very useful line of query that deserves attention from investigators. 
It has been argued that this institutional barrier to change is reinforced by the 
economic realities provinces face. Ontario, for example, is one of the US largest 
trading partners and therefore must keep labour cost low. Equally, the rest of the 
ten Canadian provinces including Quebec face unique demands which affect 
their economic growth strategies. Although, not mentioned as a major concern, 
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global economic pressures impact the capacity of provinces to attract and retain 
new business ventures. 
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Chapter 5 Majoritarianism in the UK Policy-Maldng 
5.1 The Welfare State and British Society 
5.2 The UK State Pension System 
5.3 Pension Debate in the 1980s 
5.4 The 1986 Social Security Act - Radical Departure 
5.5 Pension Reform Effort in the 1990s 
5.6 The Centralisation of Political Authority - the Case of SERPS 
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5.1 The Welfare State and British Society 
State pension provision in the UK has undergone substantial reforms since the 
1980s onwards. The scale of these reforms provides the motivation for this 
chapter. It has been argued that the 1986 Social Security Act did represent a 
radical departure from the traditional European post-war approach to pension 
policy and in the view of many, a major variance within the family of liberal 
welfare state type (Myles 1999, 2001, Bonoli 2000, Blackburn 2003). In the face 
of external pressure arising primarily from a transformed global economy and 
demographic change, the UK embarked on reforming its' public pension system. 
In terms of demographic change, from the 1980s there were concerns over rising 
social and economic burdens. In 1911, shortly after the introduction of old-age 
pension (payable at age 70), just 5.2 percent of the population of the UK was age 
65 and over. By 1951 that figure had risen to 10.9 percent and was 16.0 percent 
by 1991 (Andersen 1996). The current chapter assess the UK's response to the 
pressure to reform it state pension system. The chapter consists of six sections 
and evaluate both the reform of the Basic State Pension (BSP) and State 
Earnings Related Pension scheme (SERPS). 
It has being argued that in the UK, a number of factors have enabled both major 
political parties to pursue policies that suited their ideological persuasion. Starting 
with the dominance of the Conservative Party in power from 1979 through to 
1997, the government of Margaret Thatcher successfully implemented, what had 
eluded Regan in the 1980s, Mulroney in 1985, and the other continental 
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European countries in the 1990s, radical reforms to its Basic State Pension 
(BSP) in 1980 and followed through with a major overhaul of the second pillar 
pension, the State Earning Related Pension Scheme (SERPS) in 1986. The 
Labour government that inherited office in 1997 departed very little from the 
reform agenda set by the previous administration - implementing what they 
called a 'New Insurance Contract' which espoused the stated objective of shifting 
the burden of pension provision from a 60:40 split between state and the private 
sector respectively to a 40:60 split (DSS, 1998a:31). 
Both parties have exploited a central feature of the UK political system, that is, 
the dominance of the party in power over policy. An assessment of the 
institutional environment of the UK government and its' welfare state is examined 
here. The thesis provides an analysis of the reform of the Basic State Pension 
and the State Earnings Related Pension (SERPS). The literature suggests that 
given the centralised nature of the UK's unitary state, and the absence of formal 
veto points, a weakness in the strength of organised interest to intermediate, 
policy making is achieved fairly easily in comparison to a federal state for 
example, where most policies are likely to encounter opposition from regional 
governments who may exercise veto power over such policy decisions. The 
Canadian case study illustrated this point. The second point is that economic 
globalisation had little impact on the UK welfare system in the same way it did on 
Canada, although, the rhetoric emphasised the 'decline' of the UK as an 
economic power - this had been noticeable in the political discourse in Britain 
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(McCarty 1989). There are two important explanatory contenders as to why. The 
UK was heavily involved in trade within the European Union (EU) and the United 
States (US) and much less with the 'Commonwealth Block' of nations and other 
evolving markets. So in this respect the UK economy was less vulnerable to 
economic globalisation as the Canadian economy was. Nevertheless, this did not 
prevent the Thatcher government from capitalising on the 'divided and 
disillusioned people' (The Conservative Manifesto 1979). Arising from the 
prevailing economic milieu, the confidence of the UK people in their economy 
and the government ability to manage it came under serious suspicion and 
doubt. Already there was a sense of division, embittered by the failures and 
contradiction of the Heath years, and deeply uncertain about its prospects, the 
agenda for reform was built around a twin conservative rhetoric which can only 
be understood strictly in the language of liberty, with a firm belief in individual 
freedom and an unshakeable respect for institutions and traditions. It aim was to 
promote acceptance of the idea that freedom and responsibility were indivisible 
(McCarty 1989). To carry forward this agenda, the Thatcher government relied 
on Parliament; the working UK Constitution (as opposed to its numerous 
ceremonial accretions) which simply means that a government supported by 
majority party in the House of Commons can do anything. 
Relatively speaking, policy making in the UK is characterised by an unchecked 
dominance of the party in government (Bonoli 2000). As previously noted the 
constitutional arrangement emphasises the influence of the majority party over 
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policy. The thesis argues that, despite this, like Canada, the UK also encounters 
institutional barriers to change but perhaps in a less severe manner. It makes the 
point that barriers to change may be found in the pension design and the political 
culture for example, and that because of the decision making power and an 
electoral arrangement that enhances the power at the centre, she is able to 
achieve the radical reform measure in 1980 and 1986. 
Table 5.1 Summary of Policy Change in Britain 
~ At Apogee After Reform 
= 
.Sl Dates 1978 1986 
l7.I 
= ~ Po. 
1~ Universality Universal Means-Tested 
~~ Pay-As-You-Go PAYG PA YG weakened :s (PAYG) ]J Level of Entitlement 25% 20% 
l7.I Contribution Rate 25% of Best 20 years of career 20% of full career employment ~ 
..... 
<:: employment ..... 
00 
Minimum Age of 65 for both Men/60 for Women 65 for both Men/60 for Women 
Entitlement 
Dates 1946 1983 
Universality Universal Universal but increasingly means -
---
tested Po. 
00 Pay-As-You-Go PAYG PAYG = '-' (PAYG) 
= 0 
.... Level of Entitlement Formula: Ind. Wage or/price made Change in formula: now benefit tied l7.I 
= ~ up to 25% to changes in price only less than Po. 
~ 25% ..... 
<:: 
Contribution Rate ..... Flat Rate Flat Rate 00 
.~ Minimum Age of 65 for Men/60 for Women 65 for Men/65 for Women. Age l7.I <:: 
= Entitlement equalisation start 20 I 0/2020 
Source: Department of Works and Pension 2004 
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Table 5.1 shows the pre and post reform measures which demonstrate 
significant changes to policy. In chapter 6, the thesis makes an explicit 
comparison between two case countries, to outline the similarities and difference 
between them. 
This chapter consist of six sections. It begins by providing an overview of the 
welfare state in the UK. This will highlight the key issues that relates to the 
retrenchment of the public retirement system. It follows through with a 
consideration of the reform of the two state pension systems. It then considers 
the debate in the 1980s and the SERPS reform in 1986. In the conclusion the 
chapter makes a strong case for the role of centralised political authority. 
The Welfare State 
The initial annual cost to the Exchequer of the 1908 Old Age Pension was £6 
million pounds (Blake 2003). The cost of the UK Basic State Pension and 
SERPS stood at about £20 billion pounds representing 40 percent of social 
security spending in 1989 (Government of UK Statistics Publication 2004). There 
has been a steady rise of costs in terms of GOP figures. In 1945 the total cost 
was about 5 percent of GOP, this has grown steadily to 17 percent of GOP in 
2000 (Government of UK Statistics Publication 2004). Evidently, this does 
suggest that the role of the welfare state and the place of retirement income have 
evolved in significant ways from its beginning. 
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From it earliest history, the UK's retirement income system has been dominated 
by a doctrine of self reliance. The retirement income system, which is a central 
part of the UK welfare state, has enjoyed a long and checked past. It was 
established on principle of 'deserving' and 'undeserving poor', which still remain 
an implicit part of the post-Beveridge welfare model. The roots of the UK welfare 
state can be traced to the Poor Laws of 1597 and 1601 under the reign of 
Elizabeth I, which resulted from threat to law and order caused by roaming bands 
of poor, starving people (Blake 2003). The law gave power to local authorities 
(the parish church) to collect funds through a poor rate and for allocating poor-
law relief to deserving individuals. Initially, the task of administrating poor relief 
was random and uneven in the application of the Poor Law - most of which was 
carried out by local parishes (Alcock et al 2000). The 1834 Amendment Act was 
an attempt to end this randomness and implement a program which was rational 
and centrally administered. The National Assistance Act of 1948 was to subsume 
the surviving components of the Poor Laws. 
Over the years there has been a strong tradition in the UK of meeting the 
temporary relief of the poor and not to end poverty. The ideal of poverty is 
attributed to idleness and the lack of thrift on the part of the working class. If a 
way was to be found to inculcate work ethic that instilled the discipline of saving 
for old age, then society might be better off and some could save themselves 
from the harsh realities of the workhouses. This social doctrine neglected the 
harsh realities the working poor faced at the time. For example, some of the 
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working poor tried to save but were frustrated by the mismanagement and fraud 
prevalent in the friendly societies of the time. Furthermore, old age was in itself a 
source of poverty. The debate about the rightness of a public pension system 
would continue until 1908 when the first serious effort was made by the state to 
guarantee a retirement income, although the history of a public pension system 
predates this 10 (see Blake 2003). 
The introduction of state pensions eventually arrived when the Old Age Pensions 
Act was passed in 1908, under the auspices of Lloyd George as the Liberal 
Chancellor of the Exchequer (Blake 2003). The requirements to qualify, unlike 
that in Canada which was satisfied with residency and evidence of age, the Old 
Age Pension made citizens eligible if they were over 70 years of age and made 
less than 12s. per week. The pension was non-contributory and was financed 
from general taxation (Blake 2003). 
The Old Age Pension was a means tested non-universal scheme. The large part 
of the benefit was awarded to those already old and unable to keep themselves. 
Initially the UK treasury was able to sustain the non-contributory nature in which 
the pensions where financed. However, they did underestimate the level of 
poverty amongst seniors. By 1911, the cost of providing for 900,000 pensioners 
10 Blake (2003) states that the first recorded state pensioner was a Martin Horsham, a civil servant who 
retired in 1684. The Poor Laws of 1597 and 1601 under the reign of Elizabeth I provided guidance for the 
state involvement in providing assistance to the poor. However, Blake does argue that the first direct 
concern by the state for the explicit provision of pensions was for civil and other public servants. This was 
in an act of parliament in 1810. The very first act to establish a non-contributory pensions for all civil 
servants was the Superannuation Act of 1834 (Blake 2003). 
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was costing the treasury about £12 million a year (Blake 2003). Crack in the 
administrative structure was first identified in the Ryland Adkins report in 1919 
(Report, Cmd.410 1919 p.8). The report had recommended that a national 
insurance scheme similar to the one operating for the national health and 
unemployment insurance be adopted for the Old Age Pension scheme. This 
would have had the effect of making the award of state pension a right rather 
then a privilege (Report, Cmd.410 1919). The Labour government at the time 
came under intense pressure to reassess the way in which pension was been 
provided seeing the cost of the pension scheme rising rapidly each year. 
By the time, the Conservative government of Baldwin came into power in 1925, 
the cost of providing for the Old Age Pensions stood at £18 million. The Baldwin 
government moved quickly to make the Old Age Pension a contributory pension 
in 1925. The pension age was dropped to 65. Although, while the numbers of 
contributors was sufficiently high, the amount of contribution which had accrued 
to the fund was insufficient to absorb the number of beneficiaries claiming 
pension and so the fund went immediately into deficit in 1926 (Blake 2003). 
A number of other issues have in the meantime surfaced. For example, the 
additional cost incurred by treasury to supplement the contribution was 
unforeseen; there were also the new retirees who were by now rightly entitled to 
the Old Age Pension because of their contribution to the scheme. Hence, the 
situation was such that in addition to the beneficiaries grandfathered into the new 
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scheme, 2 million new contributory pensioners have been added to the list. Other 
problems relating to women's and widow's pension was discussed and did 
receive favourable inclusion in the subsequent 1937, Widows', Orphans, and Old 
Age Contributory Pensions Act. The 1940 Old Age and Widows' Pension Act 
would reduce the pensionable age for women to 60. Second World War veterans 
were by the early 1940s beginning to press for a better hearing at the pension 
tribunals which considered their disability and incapacity pensions arising out of 
the war. There were also the problem with those who were at the creation of the 
national health and unemployment insurance excluded from the scheme by virtue 
of their self-employment or ineligible income. These were mostly women whose 
annual income fell below the stated £250 threshold. 
Thus the emerging welfare state in UK had a deep root in the Poor Law tradition. 
The principle of deserving and undeserving poor was to be a main part of it moral 
ethos. Although changes in 1925 made the provision of state pension a 
contributory scheme which meant that contributors can then claim pension 
benefits as their basic rights, the attitude towards state supported welfare would 
not change. 
Many commentators on the UK welfare state would comment on the strong ethos 
among the working poor of self-help and self-reliance and often a deep and bitter 
distrust of what the state tried to do (Johnson 1985, Finlayson 1994, Thane 
1996). For example, mistrust of the motives of the state in extending its welfare 
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role stems from the punitive and often brutal experiences of working people at 
the hand of local Poor Law Guardians. The reliance of family and community 
resources would be preferred to the workhouse (Thane 1996). Furthermore, 
there was a developed range of self-help organisations such as informal 
insurance, savings clubs to more formal insurance schemes provided by friendly 
societies and trade unions. Membership of such societies has been estimated at 
around a million by the end of the century (Thane 1996). 
From the middle of the century, the move towards permanent arrangement for 
mutual self-help in the areas of housing and social welfare will become stronger. 
The motivation for self-help was met favourable by the dominant Victorian 
political thought of laissez-fake which advocated for a residual state in the 
economic scheme of the nation (Alcock et al 2000). The success of the many 
self-help organisations would ultimately be their downfall. Organised self-help 
would become a preserve of labour aristocracy, those who were attracted to it 
and took hold of its' administration. This happened because the better-off 
working people had steady and regular income. A number of other working 
people would try but were not able to provide for themselves because benefits 
from the mutual society membership were as temporary as their work. The 
Utilitarian principles of the English Political Philosopher, Jeremy Bentham will find 
a receptive ear amongst a growing number. Bentham had argued that the 
existing social order was rather inefficient and wasteful of human resources. The 
situation was such that a very small number of the working people benefited from 
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the mutual aid society and from the state supported welfare. His principle of 
Utility presupposes a condition in which the greatest number gained from the 
actions of the state. This principle gave theoretical impetus for an expanded state 
role that allowed the market its free hand but would temper its worst effects by 
(collective) state action (Pearson and Williams 1984). 
The UK pension system is part of systematic welfare structure that is strongly 
grounded in the Victorian ideals of laissez-faire. It is an attitude that permeates 
British political culture and has allowed this variant of the liberal welfare model to 
reflect the core components of the model namely: a preference for market 
solutions to welfare problems. As will be shown, the political arrangement 
enhanced the UK reform effort in one principal way; that is, limiting the role of 
national actors in adoption of policy measure. This has been achieved largely by 
the power assigned to the governing party in Parliament. Before, considering 
how the reform measure was achieved politically speaking, some consideration 
is given, in the next section, to the UK pension system. 
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5.2 The UK State Pension System 
Prior to the 1942 Beveridge Report, Social Insurance and Allied Services, 
(Cmd.6404, 1942) the UK retirement Income system consisted only of one 
contributory scheme: namely the Old Age and Widow's pension. The Beveridge 
Report is often cited as laying the foundation for the UK retirement income 
system (Blackburn 2004, Blake 2003, Bonoli, 2000, Baldwin 1997). The report 
addressed a number of key issues. Principally, it called for the consolidation of 
the separate branches of national insurance that was in operation prior to his 
report. The second recommendation signalled a change in the principle involved 
in the provision of social benefits. Social benefits, he argued should not only be 
provided universally, they should be 'sufficient without further resources to 
provide the minimum income needed for subsistence in all normal cases 
(Cmd.6404). This meant that pensions had to be increased to ensure that this 
condition was achieved. The Beveridge report was thorough as in recognising 
regional differences in subsistence levels and recommended a private system 
that would absorb individuals wishing to enjoy their retirement at a higher living 
standard (Cmd. 6404, Blake 2003). 
The National Insurance Act of 1946, which followed the Beveridge Report, 
achieved the first recommendation which was to consolidate the separate 
national insurance schemes. It also saw limited increases to pension benefits. 
Contribution to the NI became compulsory for everyone, regardless of earnings 
or nature of employment (Blake 2003). For those already contributing to the old 
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pension scheme, their benefits continued but for all new entrants, there was a ten 
year waiting period. In 1948 further changes were made to the state pension 
system which made redundant the need for poor relief as resource for avoiding 
severe destitution. It had done so by consolidating all the pensions for old age 
which prior to 1946 reform was below subsistence levels - this was in effect the 
Basic State Pension for the UK. 
By the beginning of the 1950s, the uncoordinated UK pension system had 
become unified and coordinated. It provided state pensions at the subsistence 
level along the lines of the Beveridge Report. They were flat-rate pensions paid 
for by flat-rate contributions and related to what the state considered to be a 
person's very basic needs, not to the earnings he received when he was working. 
The Beveridge report had a number of shortcomings, the most obvious was the 
fact it only paid a flat benefit unrelated to prior employment earning. Perhaps it 
was a deliberate measure to allow the private provision to flourish. Most of the 
middle-income earners were able to build a second tier pension closely linked to 
their earnings through an occupational pension. The rest of the lower paid 
workers were excluded. 
In 1955, the Fabian Society released a tract on a new pension for old people 
(Fabian Tract, No. 171).The authors, Brian Abel-Smith and Peter Townsend, 
recommended that the government consider introducing an earnings-related or 
graduated supplementary (or second-tier) pensions. This was meant to bring on 
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board those excluded from occupational pension by virtue of their earning power. 
The two principal parties, Labour and the Conservative party took a different view 
of the issue of a second pillar state sponsored pension. The Labour Party, 
accepted the idea of graduated supplementary pensions in its policy document 
National Superannuation: Labour Policy for Security in Old Age in 1957 (Blake 
2003). The Conservative party in 1958 produced proposals for a graduated 
supplementary pension scheme, together with plans for reconstituting the 
financial basis of the existing national-insurance schemes (Cmnd. 538, 1958). 
This was contained in the white paper Provision for Old Age (Cmnd. 538, 1958). 
The first act to increase contributions and benefits after the introduction of the 
Boyd Carpenter scheme, the State Graduated Retirement Pension Scheme 
(SGRPS), in April 1961 (Blake 2003 p.13) was the National Insurance Act of 
1963. Both the flat-rate and graduated contributions were increased. The 
National Insurance Act introduced by the Labour government in 1966, offered a 
new earnings-related unemployment, sickness and widows' benefits, which have, 
in turn, affected the amount of graduated pension that individuals can earn. 
The Conservative government in 1973 brought in the Social Security Act which 
established statutory annual reviews of the contribution and benefit of the state-
pension scheme. Before this, reviews had taken place on an irregular basis. The 
rampant inflation levels during this period, from 1973, meant that contributions 
and benefits were to be uprated in line with the increase in the general levels of 
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prices. More significantly, the act also intended to replace most of the existing 
SGRPS. There was to be a new Social Security Pension Scheme, in which a 
system of wholly earnings-related contributions for employees would replace the 
existing combination of flat-rate and graduated contributions, with further 
contributions to the SGRPS ceasing in April 1975 (Blake 2003 p.14). 
The difference in the party position was clear. While Labour wanted a two-tiered 
system both earning-related and supported by the state equalling half of the 
industrial wage, the Conservative government wanted a limited state involvement 
and a strengthening of occupational pensions. Part of the Conservative 
government worry was that the financial house of the national insurance scheme 
was not in order. First, the number of people receiving pension benefits and the 
benefits granted to them were incompatible contributions. This was made worst 
by the agreement to raise benefit levels in line with the standard of living 
following the 1942 Beveridge Report. The second point which follows from the 
first was that the National Insurance was in large deficit. Despite the supplements 
from treasury, the cost overrun was still high outstripping the reserve fund, 
prompting the government to defer to a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) method of 
financing. In other words, the UK's government intensions were to establish a 
fully costed state pension system from the flat-rate contribution for flat-rate 
benefits. The reform of the national insurance scheme, transformed this system 
into an earning-related scheme which still paid a flat-rate contribution except 
sufficient to maintain subsistence of the pensioners. 
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The establishment of the second pillar pension for the UK came as a result of 
these discussions in 1975. The Social Security Pensions Act 1975 introduced a 
supplementary state pension scheme called the State Earnings-Related Pension 
Scheme (SERPS). It came as a result of the 1974 white paper Better Pensions 
(Cmnd. 5713). The development of state pension schemes in the UK has been 
more a case of stop and go measure. It has not been generally a coherent policy 
as was the case in Canada for example. The 1975 Social Security Act came into 
effect in 1978 with the objective of improving benefits provided by the social 
security pension scheme established by the 1973 Social Security Act. For 
instance, a general pension - known as the category A pension - was 
established consisting of two elements, a basic pension and an additional 
pension which related to a person's earnings factors over the their working life. 
Like, the Canadian model, the SERPS benefits formula is calculated based on 
band on earnings limits, that is, annual earnings between a lower and upper limit. 
Each band earnings is re-valued by the increase in national average earnings up 
to the state pension age. The additional pension paid under this new scheme, 
was equal to 1.25 percent averaged over the best 20 years factored for each 
year of membership of SERPS up to a maximum of 20 years. The additional 
benefit yielded 25 percent of relevant earnings. The 1975 Social Security Act 
determined that the Basic State Pension (BSP) would be uprated in line with the 
general level of earnings or prices, whichever was greater, while the revaluation 
of additional pension would be in line with prices only. The act also gave 
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permission for an opting out clause. Those contributing to SERPS can contract 
out of the scheme, if they are provided for by another guaranteed minimum 
pension which is equivalent to the additional pension under SERPS; in return 
both employees and employers paid lower national insurance contributions. 
Another significant change with the 1975 Social Security Act has to do with the 
better treatment of women. Women who married or began working after April 
1977, and contributed fully to the social security scheme were entitled to full 
benefits in their own rights. 
The third pillar of the UK retirement system consists of voluntary retirement 
savings, or what is commonly referred to as Additional Voluntary Contributions 
(AVCs). The third was the first type of pension scheme to emerge, so its' place 
in the hierarchical structure is inconsequential. The fact is the private scheme is 
intended to provide adequate coverage for those seeking to maintain their pre-
retirement earnings. In the UK there are several types of AVCs, available to 
consumers. As noted in the previous discussion, the design of SERPS pension in 
1975 allowed contributors to opt out of the state schemes as long as the 
contracted provision guarantees a minimum pension equivalent of the state 
pension under SERPS. Additionally, it is not possible to pay additional 
contributions to accrue extra benefits in SERPS, an employee can contribute 
extra amounts to company pension programmes to supplement payment of 
contracted-out rebates into personal pensions by additional contributions, and to 
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establish personal-pensions-type arrangements (Free-Standing AVCs or 
FSAVCs) in addition to membership of a company plan or SERPS (Disney et al 
2001). Both of these pension contributions, AVCs and FSAVCs, are subject to 
preferential tax treatment up to a ceiling, as do contributions to company-
provided pension schemes (Blackburn 2004, Disney et al 2001). The UK pension 
scheme can be depicted in schematically in Figure 6-1. The figure represents the 
categories of pensions as of 2001. 
Figure 5-1 UK Pension Scheme as of 2001 
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As noted the 1975 Social Security Act made it possible to contract out of SERPS. 
It is possible also to opt back in again. Following the 1988 changes, employees 
have the option of having their National Insurance contribution paid into an 
individual defined contribution retirement savings account provided by a private 
insurer (a personal pension), instead of SERPS. 
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The UK retirement income system consists of a basic pension scheme which is a 
contributory pension scheme. It pays out a flat rate benefit from a flat rate 
contribution. The second pillar is also a contributory scheme which is earning-
related. The maximum amount paid equal to only 25 percent of industrial wage. 
Both of these schemes have remained universal (in the sense that everyone 
could participate in the scheme) pre and post reforms and it has been modelled 
under a PA YG financing method. The benefits are calculated on a means-tested 
basis. 
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5.3 Pension Debate in the 1980s 
Observers of the UK welfare state point out that one common feature of the UK 
public policy in the 1980s, has been the dominance of neo-liberal ideas with 
regard to the respective roles of the state and the market in modern societies 
(Bonoli 2000, Ginsburg 2001, Jessop et al 1994). The reform of the state pension 
system was to a large part of a wider move to reform the UK economy and 
society which included the privatisation of state-owed firms and deregulation of 
financial services (Bonoli 2000). Ginsburg (2001) for example argue that if 
economic globalisation equates to the ascendancy of neo-liberal policies, then 
the UK was immensely affected. The point which should stand out here is that at 
the start of the 1980s, the adaptation process that first began in the United States 
had taken strong roots in the UK. This was favoured by the governing 
Conservative Party which had assumed office in 1979. The discourse of the new 
government under Margaret Thatcher has been dominated by a deliberate action 
to move the state away from it allocation role and emphasise the supremacy of 
the market instead, as the instrument of resource allocation. 
Bonoli (2000) reminds us that the debate and adoption of the UK reform occurred 
in a particular ideological and political climate. The ideology was neo-liberalism 
and the political climate was dominated by the Conservative Party who were 
supported by a number of London-based think-tanks that shared the party's neo-
liberal ideas. For example, in 1983, the Centre for Policy Studies (CPS) 
published a paper titled Personal and Portable Pensions for All (Vinson and 
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Chapell 1983). The CPS paper was the first important document which set out a 
strong position for a radical reform of pension policy. Some of the strong views 
expressed in that report made it way into the new legislation adopted by the 
Conservative government (Bonoli 2000). 
It is probably easy to postulate a linear link between economic ideas and public 
policy, but this fails to address the issue of why the Conservatives pursued a 
given set of ideas in relation to pension policy; and, equally crucial, is the 
question of how they were able to carry this through into actual legislation. Before 
considering these important matters, it is important to return to the pension 
debate in the 1980s. There several issues at stake. First, the finance of the UK 
state pension scheme has already begun to show signs of cracking and has itself 
been the source of most of the earlier reforms. Second, there was a perennial 
problem with providing adequate pensions. The 1942 Beveridge Report tried to 
address this but still managed to leave holes in the scheme. Third, the coverage 
of both the BSP and SERPS are universal but there are those still without 
sufficient coverage due to transfer between jobs. Fourth, the panic over pension 
expenses arising from the population ageing was adding unto the pressure for 
change. Another important addition was the maturation of SERPS which coupled 
with population ageing issued a formidable challenge. 
First, as noted, the overriding international economic environment had oriented 
the government's ideological perspective towards a neo-liberal policy response. It 
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would be proper to state that given the evidence of the size of the UK economy 
and the primary market for its export and trade, the UK was not in the same way 
vulnerable as Canada was to global economic pressure (Banting 1998, Bonoli 
2000, Pierson 2001). However, one could argue that governments in the UK in 
the 1980s exposed their economies to the forces of global economic competition 
(Ginsburg, 2001). It was the view, at least from some policy cycles that social 
expenditure undermines the competitiveness of both the individual and the firm. 
Hence it was a factor in the ensuing debate. Brown (1990) note that the 
preoccupation with cost of pensions has been a constant feature of pension 
debates in the UK. The introduction of SERPS in 1978 added a new component 
to pension expenditure, which was likely to increase significantly over the 
following years because of the maturation of the scheme (Bonoli 2000:61). This 
cost consideration combines with a potent intellectual climate of the early 1980s, 
to make the future cost of state pension provision an important political item. 
In addition to the 1983 CPS pension reform proposal, there were a number of 
other influential reports which also signalled a sharp rise in pension expenditure 
(Nesbitt 1995). In 1982 the Government Actuary produced a report entitled 
National Insurance Fund Long Term Financial Estimates, which included 
projections of future costs and receipts of the state pension scheme. The 
projections were based on estimated earnings and flat-rate benefits. According to 
the 1982 Actuary Report, it was expected that the standard contribution rate will 
rise to 16.5 percent in 2005 from 15.4 percent in 1985 and a further rise to 21.9 
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percent in 2025, and to increase further by 2 percent (UK, Government Actuary 
1982). The flat-rate SSP benefit would increase by 8 percent (average) a year 
while the earnings-related benefits would increase at 6 percent afterwards (UK, 
Government Actuary 1982). 
In light of this projections, the Actuary argued that 'if flat-rate benefits ... were 
uprated over a long period at a lower rate than earnings ... the increase in the 
standard rate of contribution might be less steep and it might even not increase 
at all depending on how big was the difference between earnings and benefit 
increases' (UK Government Actuary 1982). Two subsequent government papers 
will confirm the projected cost increases (Department of Health and Social 
Services; UK, DHSS 1984b). Although both these reports used slightly different 
figures to arrive at their conclusions, from the government's view point, both tell 
the same story - that cost will be going up. In the case of the government's 
paper, the projection was based on the notional contributions for pensions, that 
is, the part of the National Insurance contributions needed to finance the pension 
element of social security as opposed to the actual contribution rate used by the 
actuary office which also includes contributions to unemployment insurance and 
other contributory schemes. 
The government concerns over pension costs were clearly reflected in the 1984 
background paper put forward by the then Secretary of State for Social Services 
Norman Fowler (Fowler, in UK, DHSS 1984b). The government's reading of the 
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situation was such that they began to take immediate action to reduce their 
current commitment to the state pension scheme. 
The second problem facing the retirement income system had to do with 
providing adequate coverage for all, especially those transferring from one job to 
the next. This was referred to as the early-Ieavers problem. The stable work 
environment had soon eclipsed by flexible irregular contract work that are short-
term and temporary. Furthermore, workers were also changing jobs as a result of 
the instability in employment. According to one projection provided by the 
economist magazine, in 1983 it was estimated that some 95 percent of 
employees change job at least once (The Economist 11 June 1983). This 
problem raised the issue of portability of pension schemes in the UK. The main 
problem was the preservation of penSion rights for those employees who left an 
occupational pensions scheme before reaching retirement age (early-Ieavers) 
typically they changed employers. 
The problem with the early-Ieavers was simply that they lost out to those stayed 
with the same employer for their entire career. Based on the existing pension 
legislation, three options were available to those wishing to leave an occupational 
pension scheme. First, those who change employment could have their pension 
entitlement transferred to their new employer, but only if an agreement between 
the old and new employer can be reached. The second option involves paying 
out the contributed amount to a deferred pension which paid to the early retiree 
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at retirement. The only problem with this option is that the employer pays only the 
amount of contribution achieved by the employee up to the last date of work. The 
amount is paid to the early-retiree is not re-valued after contribution ceases. The 
third option was the easiest and most sort after option for most early-retirees, and 
that is simply to withdraw the pension contribution without interest. 
The problem of early-Ieavers was brought on to the agenda by a report of 
occupational Pensions Board (1981) which included some figures estimating the 
extent of early-Ieavers' losses. The estimate based on the assumption that 
earnings were going increase by 7.5 percent a year (Bonoli 2000). The early-
leaver would only earn 60 per cent of what someone who remained in the 
scheme would have earned. The Occupational Pension Board argued the 
government to improve the situation for early leavers. 
The Inquiry into Provision for Retirement furthered the debate and provided the 
forum to begin to address these and all the other issues identified with the state 
pension system. The inquiry was chaired by Norman Fowler himself and 
commenced in November of 1983. The stated objective of the inquiry, was to 
'study the future development, adequacy and costs of state, occupational and 
private provision for retirement in the United Kingdom, including the portability of 
pension rights' (UK, DHSS 1983:4). 
The inquiry faced a lot of criticism from pension lobby groups who accused the 
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government of stifling opposition. A look at the inquiry composition might provide 
some indication of the validity of the opposition's claim. The main team was 
chaired by Norman Fowler, and comprised of members from the Department of 
Trade and Industry CDTI), Department of Employment and the Treasury. The 
remaining came from the Conservative party and the insurance industry and 
experts. There were 12 members in total. It is striking to note how little 
representative of the interests involved was the team which did not include 
individuals supposed to represent employees and pensioners. 
The interest groups were invited to make submissions in the two months of 
consultation. Invitation for submission was offered to all interested groups. 1,500 
different items were submitted. Given the immensity of the pension problem and 
the fact that there no Royal Commissions, a process employed in the past to 
accommodate divergent in UK policy process, the government faced accusation 
from pressure groups for not providing adequate enough time for groups to 
present their views. The inquiry concluded it findings and published a Green 
Paper in June 1985. The Green Paper formed the basis of the 1986 Social 
Security Reform. In the next session the thesis evaluates the political process of 
reforming the pension scheme. 
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5.4 The 1986 Social Security Act - Radical Departure 
The 1986 Social Security Act (SSA) represented a radical departure from the 
West European standard in state pension provision. By the virtue of this reform, 
the UK is the only European country which does not have problems meeting its 
unfunded pension liabilities in the future (Bonoli 2000). The Green Paper that 
was released in 1985 following the Fowler inquiry spelt out the government's 
intention for the state pension system (DHSS 1983). The paper makes several 
important points. The first main proposal was the government's stated intention 
to abolish the SERPS program over time, although all entitlements earned to 
date would have been preserved, and it was to be replaced by compulsory 
personal pensions. 
The SERPS public pension program was first established in 1978 as the second 
pillar of the state pension system. It was regarded as a universal scheme that 
paid a maximum of 25 percent of industrial wage for who have contributed to the 
scheme and eligible to the full benefit. SERPS was open to all employed and 
self-employed people within established earnings bands. From the start, a 
number of interest groups opposed the reform proposal. One of the central 
issues they objected to was the proposal to phrase out SERPS. The abolishment 
of SERPS had several implications and attracted wide reaction from unexpected 
quarters. Like support for the OAS in Canada, the source of support for SERPS 
was diverse. The traditional actors who were expected to oppose the government 
proposal did oppose it. These included the Trade Union Congress (TUC), the 
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Labour Party which initially introduced the scheme in 1975, and the anti-poverty 
groups such as Aged Concerned, Help the Aged. However, those who would 
have supported the Conservative pro-business stand also opposed the reform 
proposal. These included the Confederation of British Industry (CBI), the National 
Association of Pension Fund (NAP F) and the UK Treasury, for example. As a 
consequence the UK government was denied the grand coalition sufficient to 
overcome the barriers to change, even with a strong central government. 
At the time of the reform, few understood the detail of SERPS benefits, however, 
the fact that the government dropped its initial proposal to phrase out SERPS 
seem to indicate their willingness to compromise. In its 1985 reaction to the 
subsequent White Paper the CBI described the paper as been 'broadly in line 
with CBI recommendations (CBI 1986). In an earlier submission to the inquiry, 
the CBI opposed the new pension proposal on a number of grounds. First, the 
CBI contested that the idea of a mandatory pension scheme which they claim will 
force members of occupational schemes, mostly younger employees to contract 
out into the personal pension schemes thereby destabilising the demographic 
balance of the occupational provision. Second, that the drive towards a personal 
private pension, would give rise to the 'double payment' problem. As a 
representation of the UK business concerned with competitiveness and levels of 
taxation, the CBI felt the switch would have meant a higher rate of pension 
contributions (National Insurance and occupational), as employers and 
employees would have had to fund current SERPS pensions and future 
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(occupational or personal) pensions. Thirdly, CBI viewed pension funds as an 
efficient stool in human resources management, because pensions encourage 
employee loyalty to the company, and provide a means for tax-efficient self 
financing (Lusenti 1989, Schmahl 1991). As such they were opposed to any 
measure which will have the potential to affect the stability of pension funds, 
which are a form of collective provision but highly valued by employers (Bonoli 
2000). 
In light of these, the CBI opposed the government White paper but supported the 
maintenance of a three tier pension system. On the contract out provision in the 
proposal, the CBI argued the government to consider more carefully, the 2 
percent tax-incentive provided to those who switched into a personal pension. 
The CBI argued the government to make the tax-incentive available to those who 
switched from the state scheme only or alternatively, to all contracted out 
employees (CBI 1985). 
The government's treasury department expressed similar concerns over the 
'double payment' problem. The treasury is generally regarded as exercising a 
veto power over expensive economic policies (Hall 1986). On this occasion the 
UK treasury, expressed concerns over the cost of the new policy. Treasury 
officials were operating under zero-cost requirement, set by Treasury (Nesbitt 
1995). This meant that new programmes would have had to be financed by 
restrictions in existing ones, within the social security system. 
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The prevailing internal political ideology was sufficient to silence any cabinet 
differences as long as it did not involve additional state expenditure. While this 
sense of unity existed at the top cabinet level, there were fundamental issues 
which were important to repairing the difficulties inherent in the existing state 
pension system, namely: current and future cost of pensions; the benefit 
inefficiencies that arises from job transfer (the early-Ieavers problem; the 
introduction of personal pensions; and finally the future of SERPS. 
From the treasury stand point, the Actuarial projection which stressed that 'after 
the turn of the century numbers [of persons above pension age] will rise rapidly 
as those born during the baby boom of the 1950s and 1960s reach retirement 
age' (UK, Treasury Department 1984). On the basis of their own assessment of 
the demographic impact and the actuarial report, the treasury conferred a sense 
of urgency to deal with the anticipated costs of state pension. For instance, the 
Green Paper argued that: 'we should not place on our successors the 
responsibility for meeting all our financial expectations in retirement. 'Instead we 
should ensure that everybody is able to save and invest for his own additional 
pension' (UK, DHSS 1985b in Bonoli 2000). The notion of individual responsibility 
for planning one's own pension had an implicit moral dimension characteristic of 
the debate in the UK. The 1986 Social Security Act criticised the PAYG system 
as been an infringement of economic freedom. In that regard, cost savings were 
ideological consistent with the neo-liberal policies and therefore attracted little 
controversy within the government. The unity between the government's 
204 
neoliberal policy and the treasury's pragmatism in budget balancing was not 
found everywhere in the 1986 SSA. According to Bonoli (2000) in other areas of 
pension policy these imperatives were in conflict. 
For example, the problem with the early-Ieavers was seen as an opportunity to 
introduce personal pensions and the creation of a competitive market for pension 
provision. Under the new proposal, early-Ieavers would find that their pension 
were to become fully portable with existing schemes and hence can transfer 
pension rights between one or more employers without incurring any loss. This 
would have addressed a problem that was general agreed to a cross section of 
actors. The method by which this end was to be achieved is where the conflict 
lay. The 1986 SSA introduced a twofold objective for dealing with the problem of 
early-Ieavers and preparing the conditions for the introduction of personal 
pensions, by creating a level playing field for competing pension providers 
(Brown 1990, Nesbitt 1995). 
The first objective in the twofold plan encountered little political resistance 
amongst cabinet colleagues. It involved the portability of employee's pension 
rights with existing pensions. This meant that employees could in practical terms 
from one job to the other without losing their earned pension benefits. This 
enhanced labour market mobility. The shift was consistent with the party's 
ideological position. The very notion of a personal pension implied that 
individuals are taking responsibility for their penSion planning. The second 
205 
objective however, met with some resistance from within and outside of the 
government. The proposal entailed the abolishment of the SERPS pension. The 
treasury had already registered strong reservations about the cost to the treasury 
as well as the 'double payment' problem discussed earlier. Despite this strong 
opposition, within the cabinet, Fowler was able to transpose his vision almost 
intact into the Green Paper (UK, DHSS 1985b:l, 22). 
The reform of the SERPS program diluted the scheme. One of the result of the 
reform meant that SERPS program would only replace 20 rather than 25 percent 
of average earnings and widows were to receive a half, rather than full, pension. 
SERPS was established in 1975, with a complex promise still largely in the 
future, few grasped what was happening and hence was unable to provide an 
effective opposition (Blackburn 2003). This is one line of explanation but surely 
not the only one. The thesis returns to this argument in section 6.6. In Figure 6-2 
below, it depicts the comparison between existing SERPS and new SERPS 
proposals. 
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Figure 5-2 Comparison of Pre-reform SERPS and New SERPS Proposal 
Existing SERPS New SERPS Proposals Outcome of 
Reform 
Status of SERPS Established through an Act Abolished outright replaced Existing SERPS 
of Parliament in 1975. by mandatory personal and state second 
Became effective on April 6th pensions (individual tier system made 
1978 collective pensions - pensions) weaker in terms of 
pooled risks demographics 
Revaluation of Revalued over the best 20 Revalued over the entire New valuation 
SERPS years of career career, that is, lifetime meant benefit 
average earnings received will be 
lower especially 
during periods of 
poor earning. 
Year's maximum Maximum SERPS pension Maximum SERPS pension No change 
pensionable equal 25 per cent of band would equal 20 per cent of 
earnings earnings indexed to wages band earnings indexed to 
wages 
Widow's Benefits Widow's pension was the Widow's pension would be 50 per cent lost of 
full amount of deceased half the spouse's pension income 
spouse's pension 
The Cost of Cost of providing for SERPS Cost of providing for SERPS Cost savings of 
SERPS £25.5bn benefits reduced to £13.2bn £12.3 although the 
cost of opting out 
not fully factored in 
Contract Out Absence of contract out of Incentive to contract out of Contract out 
Options SERPS incentive SERPS NIC rebates to weakened the 
employees and employers demographic 
structure since 
more younger 
workers' did opt 
out 
Source: Adopted from various sources (DHSS 1986, Bonoli 2000, Blake 2003: 
85-91). 
The figure highlights the key components of the SERPS reform proposal and 
does not reflect the actual reform measure. It is presented here to show what 
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was proposed and what was achieved. A number of these proposed changes 
survived, while others didn't. For instance, the government had to significantly 
scale down its proposal to abolish SERPS. Instead, they settled for a contract out 
option through tax incentive (2 percent rebate on NIC). The rest of the proposal 
survived intact. The cost reduction, however, has generated some interesting 
debate (Jessop et al 1998, Nesbit 1999, Bonoli 2000). It is unclear if the state 
achieved the cost saving it projected above given the amount of foregone tax 
incentives aimed at encouraging and promoting the switch from state to private 
provision. 
A British Household Panel Study (BHPS) show a peak of membership of 
personal pension in 1993 at 12.8 percent and a decline to 9.1 percent in 1998 
(BHPS 1992-8). 
One could argue that right from the drawing board of the 1986 Social Security 
Act, the political imprint of then Secretary of State for Social Services, Norman 
Fowler, was clearly to be seen. The objective as he stated them was to get the 
1986 reform bill pass his Cabinet colleagues (Fowler 1991). As is shown in 
Figure 6-2, he did not get all his wishes but managed to transpose many of his 
initial vision onto the final bill intact. The result of the 1986 Social Security Act 
does show that in relative terms, the centralisation of national political settings 
were underestimated in the literature. The unique UK institutional arrangement 
has allowed successive government after Thatcher to pursue aggressive 
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measures towards further decommodification as the next section will highlight. 
209 
5.5 Pension Reform Effort in the 19905. 
The momentum of the reform that began at the start of the 1980s under the 
Conservatives was maintained by the New Labour government. Prime Minister 
Tony Blair's predecessor, John Major who headed the last Conservative 
government which held power for 18 years (1979 -1997) was careful to present a 
more moderate and caring image. He crafted a traditional Conservative 
philosophy with a strong accent on economic competence. This was to come 
undone at the boundaries. The spectacular devaluation of the pound in the 
European exchange rate crisis of October 1992 was followed by a sudden and 
lasting collapse of support of the Conservatives (Sanders 1995). 
One of enduring characteristics of the Conservative Party was the image that 
they were competent managers of the economy. During this period, voters 
wanted good managers who had the ability to keep the economy and the 
financial system on an even keel. The troubled economy of the early 1990s had 
not disrupted the Conservative popularity amongst older voters as have been 
expected, because many, including many over-sixties, still regarded them the 
better economic managers. When that confidence was shown to be misplaced -
in the REM fiasco - confidence in the ability of the Conservatives to manage 
proved very hard to restore. This was further exacerbated by the revelation in the 
mid 1990s that more than 1.5 million people had been 'mis-sold' costly and 
underperforming personal pensions because of the legislation of 1986-87 
intensified disenchantment with the Conservatives among some of those 
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approaching retirement (Blackburn 2003). In 1995, the Major government 
introduced a new Pension Act. It was a voluminous piece of legislation that 
primary objective was to prevent a repetition of Robert Maxwell's pension fund 
looting spree. 
The outgoing Conservative left a number legacy for the UK public pension 
system. The value of BSP was significantly diminished, the second tier pension, 
SERPS has been weakened. The Conservative economy management 
competence has been called into question following the UK exist from the REM 
and the pension mis-selling. The raid of pension funds by the Maxwell brothers 
added to the worry over the Conservative financial management capacity. 
As part of new rebirth, New Labour Party abandoned it earlier pledge to increase 
the state pension in line with the growth in average earnings. It did so on the 
grounds that the pledge was expensive and irresponsible. This was a tough 
decision to justify for Labour and members of the party made their feeling known 
in various party conferences. More crucially New Labour committed itself, should 
it win the election, to remaining faithful to Conservative spending plans for the 
first two years in office. The massive New Labour election victory made such 
commitment overly cautious. Nevertheless, Labour strategist bent on hanging to 
power a little longer became obsessed with fiscal prudence. To temper the public 
mood, the party began to toy with old Labour idealism - 'social inclusion' and the 
need to empower the many, not the few'. The idea of a 'stakeholder' society will 
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emerge from this tinkering. The idea was to sell this notion of a 'stakeholder 
society' to all members of British society. In 1996, new labour unveiled their 
'stakeholder pensions' - which was an essential feature of its election manifesto. 
The target group for the 'stakeholder pensions' was younger and middle-aged 
voters. The discourse on stakeholder society resonated well in the contemporary 
economic reality. In spite of a fairly steady increase in average earnings for UK 
employees in the 1980s and 1990s, the dramatic rise in unemployment and 
inequality made this very uneven and unsettling process. To redress the potential 
decline in the state pension as a proportion of average earnings certainly helped 
to make the stakeholder pension idea appear timely. According to Blackburn 
(2003 p.295) it was an elegant way to bury the costly commitment to restore the 
'earning link' and the SERPS. The Labour government was able to assure 
pensioners of its commitment to improve the situation. A small sum was awarded 
to deserving pensioners, to cover the cost of winter fuels. 
To take forward the broad social ethos captured in the 'stakeholder society', 
Frank Field, a Labour Member of Parliament was charged with overseeing 
operationalisation of new pension scheme. Mr Field also did endorse a 
stakeholding pension scheme. He proposed that every citizen should acquire a 
claim to a secondary pension based on a national fund invested in stocks and 
shares, and thus giving all a stake in national prosperity (Field 1996). The idea of 
'property owing democracy' was traditionally associated with the Conservative 
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Party. Prior to 1997 elections, the Conservatives had reason to accuse New 
Labour of encroaching on their territory - this had to do with New Labour pension 
proposals which expressed similar conservative aspirations. The Conservative 
Minister for Social Security at the time, Peter Lilley, introduced the Basic Pension 
Plus, a plan to replace the state pension with mandatory plan based on 
contribution of £9 a month culminating in a pension of £130,000 after forty years. 
This will have worked out to about £175 a week in 1997 values (Blackburn 2003). 
This new Conservative pension policy proposal did not differ significantly, at least 
not in principle; from the New Labour pension document 'Security in Retirement'. 
Despite the closeness of both pension policy proposals the voters were still not 
impressed and many traditional Conservative supporters failed to vote for their 
party in the June 1997 general election. The results of 1997 election reflected a 
deep feeling amongst voters that there was something wrong with the country 
after eighteen years of Conservative rule (Blackburn 2003). 
Mr Field's charge over a new pension scheme, under New Labour was to soon 
come to a close but not before he laid out an elaborate pension proposal. In a 
paper jointly authored with Michael Owen. Frank Field urged that universal 
provision was essential. He proposed a pre-funded pension scheme that will be 
run by public and social bodies and he believed that the new government should 
cover the whole population rather than a small section. Contribution to the 
scheme will be made mandatory. Benefits will not be conditional to a means test 
since this would discourage personal saving. Under his proposal those unable to 
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save, for example, the unemployed, full-time carers of invalids and of infants 
under four would be credited with contributions at the rate of 6 percent of 
average earnings; this percentage would reflect the 6 percent of earnings paid 
into the scheme by employers on behalf of employees. Non-working parents of 
children between ages of four and twelve were to receive a contribution equal to 
3 percent of average earnings. The financing method envisioned in Field's paper 
was progressive because those who earn more paid more. 
Despite the progressive nature of the Field plan, critics of his plan point out the 
plan will do little to change poverty among low income pensioners. A direct route 
ought to be pursued. For example, directly increasing the benefit levels of the 
BSP would do more for the poor pensioners. His opponents included notable 
names such as Jack Jones the former trade union leader who now led the 
National Pensioners' Convention, Barbara Castle and two of her former advisers 
Peter Townsend and Tony Lynes who helped her secure the SSA in 1975. These 
opponents were formidable rivals. They proposed that New Labour restore the 
earning link between the BSP and industrial wages. 
The Labour National Executive agreed to review the call to restore the earning 
link. Initially this earning link was resisted on grounds of cost and its failure to 
improve the lot of those claiming 'income support'. In other words, according to 
the view of the Labour Party, the earning link would help better off pensioners, 
not those in need. Having debated the issue of pension indexation at length, the 
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proponents of cost consideration eventually won over those seeking to restore 
benefit parity with increases with industrial wage. Field's Green paper was 
undermined by leaks to the press about more money going into welfare. John 
Denham a Junior Minister drafted the final statement on 'stakeholder pensions' 
which was published in November of 1997. Still at the end of its first year in 
office, New Labour had not achieved much by way of pension legislation. When 
the Prime Minister reshuffled his cabinet, at which point Mr. Field resigned from 
his ministerial post citing the lack of authority to pursue his vision of pension 
reform. In an interview with this author, Mr Field still held this view and spoke of 
the secrecy of the Chancellor. Alistair Darling took control of the Department of 
Works and Pensions portfolio and was in a hurry to impose a swift resolution to 
the pension problem. The solution which was absent from the previous Field's 
proposal had to do with the cost of the new pension scheme. Alistair Darling's 
objective was economic. He needed to quickly implement a cheap pension 
scheme which was income or means tested (i.e., not universal) and also gave 
commercial providers some scope to provide services. 
The government new pension policy was introduced in December 1998 
Partnership in Pension described as a new contract for pensions between the 
state, the private sector, and individual' (DHSS 1998). The new pension was set 
to improve the Basic State Pension by providing additional income through the 
Minimum Income Guarantee (MIG). The MIG was to subsume the income 
security available to pensioners. The new pension policy was also directed to 
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provide winter fuel allowance as well as declaring the government's intentions of 
replacing the SERPS programme on the long run (DSS 1998). 
The State Second (2) Pension (S2P) was to replace SERPS starting from April 
2002. The first phrase was set to commence from April 2002 through to 2007 
(Blake 2003). During this period the S2P benefits will offer earning related 
benefits. The second phrase which was to commence after 2007, will issue 
pension benefits at a flat rate. In terms, of its administration all employed workers 
are entitled to receive the first-tier basic state pension for which they make 
national-insurance contributions (NICs). In addition, all employed workers whose 
earnings are above the lower earnings limit (LEL) will automatically be members 
of S2P unless they or their employers have specifically contracted out of S2P into 
an occupational pension scheme, a personal pension scheme or a stakeholder 
pension (Blake 2003). 
New Labour introduced several pension benefit schemes since taking office in 
1997: the, MIG, State Second Pension (S2P), and Winter Fuel Payment, 
revamped MIG, the stakeholder pension and pension credit. Pension Credit was 
introduced in October 2003. It was aimed at rewarding savings not penal ising 
those who save. The pension credit is untaxed and designed to make up the 
difference between the income a pensioner receives from all existing sources 
(including private pensions and savings) and the MIG. 
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UK governments since 1979, including New Labour, accepted the notion of the 
flexible labour market as being essential to the country's global economic 
competitiveness. This was clearly reflected in New Labour fiscal policies. An 
important indication of Blair's determination to change the nature as well as the 
image of the Labour party was the reframing of clause 4 of the party constitution. 
This constituted a significant shift from Labour socialist doctrine. Clause 4, the 
covenant as Harold Wilson once described it was the abiding prinCiple of the 
Labour party (Kavanagh 1997). Like Thatcher before him, Blair was able to 
achieve this by appealing directly to the grassroot of the party over the heads of 
the activists and trade union leaders. Working from this new elevated position, in 
1997, Gordon Brown announced that for the lifetime of the next Parliament, a 
labour government would not increase the top rate of tax, and accepted 
Conservative plans for public spending for the next two years. With a majority 
seats in the House of Commons Blair was able to move forward his vision for the 
UK welfare state. 
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5.6 The Centralisation of Political Authority - the Case of SERPS 
The political system in the UK also shapes its policy-making capacity. According 
to Blackburn (2003) Thatcher was able to accomplish at a stroke of the pen 
radical 'pension reform' that was to elude Reagan in the 1980s and most 
continental European governments of the 1990s. In her second book since 
leaving office, 'Preparing for Power' Lady Margaret Thatcher, recalls her decision 
to reform the UK pension system in this way: 
"Because we controlled public expenditure effectively in the 1980s - particularly 
by limiting the basic retirement pension and other long term benefits to prices 
rather than incomes and scaling back SERPS - Britain already enjoys an 
advantage over other European countries which failed to take such action" 
(Thatcher 1995). 
It is not difficult to see why such an assessment would attract the interest of 
analysts' observing the state pension reforms in the 1980s. Pierson (2001) for 
example had argued that Margaret Thatcher got her way on pensions because 
the UK public provision had features which weakened its ability to command 
support. SERPS as a second pillar of the UK pensions system was immature and 
most people were unaware of benefits changes and how it affected them. The 
retirement system is fragmented, with built-in opting out opportunities. It also 
lacks its own independently administered trust fund - features which could have 
provided a stronger constituent of support. 
While these are important features, the crucial factors relates to how the 
decision-making process is a paradigmatic case of majoritarian policy-making 
(Bonoli 2000). There is an absence of formal veto points as was shown in the 
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Canadian case study for example. In addition, the pension design, the political 
culture and the impact economic globalisation are important variables that push 
further the explanatory potential. First the argument made with respect to 
majoritarian policy-making is considered. Here a number causal relation exists to 
offer circumstantial evidence of the role of institutions. During the six months of 
consultations the government was firmly in charge of the agenda and policy 
direction. The Inquiry was itself chaired by the Secretary of State for Social 
Security, Norman Fowler. The composition of the inquiry reflected a deliberate 
plan by the government to control the agenda. External interests were excluded 
from the consultations. Interest group representation took place mainly between 
the publication of the Green and White Papers. 
Although, the governments decision to drop the plan for abolish SERPS does not 
necessarily constitute an instance in which the UK government abandoned its 
typical majoritarian approach to policy-making. Bonoli (2000) argue that the 
proposal to abolish SERPS was dropped because a wide cross-section support 
opposed the proposal. As the table 5-3 illustrates the consensus on reform 
measures were evenly matched. On the subject of means-testing and 
contributory penSions, most of all contending actors seem to be in favour of this 
model. This was useful because the cross section consensus meant a limited 
number of opposition to proposed changes. 
With respect to SERPS reform, a higher then normal support existed for this 
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second pillar state pension scheme. What explains the support for SERPS and 
not the BSP even though both are contributory type schemes is open to debate. 
The thesis argues that the financing implication for SERPS was much greater 
than for BSP. 
Table 5-3 Summary of the UK State Pension components after proposed reform 
Pension Current UK Confederation ~ational Associatio Trade Union Institute for 
Model of British Industr Help the Aged AgeConcem of Pension Fund Public Policy System (CBI) (NAPF) Congress (TUC) ~esearch (IPPR 
Universal Flat-rate 
PAYG Pension Not In Favour Not In Favour Not In Favour Not In Favour In Favour Not In Favour Not In Favour 
Universal Flat-rate 
funded Pension Not In Favour Not In Favour Not In Favour Not In Favour Not In Favour Not In Favour Not In Favour 
Univeral Second 
Pillar, pre-funded Not In Favour Not In Favour Not In Favour Not In Favour Not In Favour Not In Favour Not In Favour 
Affluence tested 
flat-rate PAYG Not In Favour Not In Favour Not In Favour Not in Favour Not In Favour Not In Favour Not In Favour 
Pension 
Means-tested flat 
rate PAYG pension In Favour In Favour In Favour In Favour In Favour In Favour In Favour 
Contlibutory flat-rate 
PAYG pension In Favour In Favour In Favour In Favour In Favour In Favour In Favour 
Contlibutory earnings 
related PAYG pension In Favour Not In Favour Not In Favour Not In Favour Not In favour Not In Favour Not In Favour 
Source: Adapted from Pensions Policy Institute 2003 
Second, because the SERPS program was also earning related, this may have 
accounted for the broadening of it natural support constituency. As was pointed 
out with respect to the OAS in Canada, the pension scheme design provides a 
moral basis for justifying cuts (Beland and Myles, 1997). The UK BSP is really an 
odd case because according Myles's (1997) design model explanation - pension 
benefits are much easy to cut if the state can justify the unfairness of transferring 
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resources from one group to the other. The BSP does not involve such a transfer 
since it is contributory, thus the pension design explanation does not hold true. 
Simply because the BSP is a contributory rather than a non-contributory scheme, 
contributors have earned the right to receive BSP benefits. This implicit right 
should mean that any adjustments that negatively impact the right to benefit 
ought to trigger opposition. Bonoli (2000) had argued that pension reform 
involves a process of adjustment that alters the distributional equilibria and as 
such would attract contestations from potential winners and losers. 
The ability of the Thatcher government to radically reform both BSP and SERPS 
highlights the strength of the institutional forces at play in the UK. It has already 
been demonstrated that pension design is important. An examination of the 
electoral environment shows one part of what Pierson (2001) referred to as the 
'institutional stickiness'. The electoral environment produces a two-fold impact. 
First, the first-past-the-post electoral system is likely to award a majority status to 
the party which obtains a popularity of seats at elections. Second once the 
majority party has formed a government, an absence of any written constitutional 
provisions leaves them 'free' to pursue policies that fit with their party's views. In 
parliament a strong tradition of party discipline, underpinned by the institutions 
such as the 'whip', the House of Commons, does not constitute an effective 
check on the government's actions (Bonoli 2000). 
This comparatively wide scope of political action must therefore be checked by 
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other competing political parties (Budge 1996). Opposition political parties do 
actively pursue different ideological policies that will distinguish their program 
from that of the governing party. The effectiveness of policy measure are 
routinely assessed by UK voters who are primed to punish unpopular policies. 
Therefore, governments seeking re-election is expected to take into account a 
wide range of external interests, precisely in order to reduce the risk of electoral 
defeat. This is a situation in which theory runs contrary to reality. Inter-party 
competition does not always moderate the excesses of the governing party. 
Bonoli (2000) argue that during the 18 year rule of the Conservative Party 1979-
92, and particularly under Thatcher, instead of smoothing the content of policy in 
order to appeal to wide sections of the UK electorate, the government of the 
1980s actively pursued radical and controversial policies. 
The government did not suffer electorally for its controversial policies because 
presumably the structural weakness of the Labour Party and the division in the 
anti-Conservative party gave the Thatcher governments a substantial degree of 
freedom to embark of their own objectives. She did successfully cancel the 
accountability effect due the weakness of the opposition, but also exploited the 
unique advantages of power concentration in the UK political institution. 
Two further features of the FPTP electoral system that enabled the adoption of 
radical reform measures is the less obvious one, that is, governments do not 
need broad, cross-class support in order to win elections. A plurality of votes is 
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enough. The Prime Minister, herself, confirmed this point in a comment that was 
credited to her by Riddel (1989) when she said: 
"it [is] important to have a philosophy and policy which because they are good 
appeal to sufficient people to secure a majority". 
The policy strategy adopted for the reform of the BSP and to a lesser extent, the 
SERPS reflected this split. The BSP and SERPS are asymmetric in the sense 
that the scheme caters to particular groups within the UK society based on 
income and ideological persuasion. 
The final point that is made is that the reform of the state pension system in the 
UK during the 1980s involved an ideological underpinning to rid the UK of its 
economic lethargy - a state of continuing economic decline (Jessop et al 1988). 
Thatcher was in this respect able to appeal to an aspect of UK political culture -
a culture built on innovative industrial spirit, a strong ethic on thrift and self-
reliance. During her tenure at No. 10 Downing Street, Margaret Thatcher eluded 
to this social ethos: a nation of proud people who will rather rely on their 
individual productive efforts then depend on the state for a handout. This attitude 
towards state welfare played well into the ideological dimension of her reformist 
agenda by allowing her to openly capitalise on a 'two nation' character (Bonoli 
2000). The productive 'elements' were compensated at the expense of the 
'parasitic' who relied on the state or non-competitive arrangements (Bonoli 2000). 
The reform of the SERPS usefully illustrates this point. Those who contracted out 
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of SERPS were rewarded with NIC rebates because they took individual initiative 
by accepting the risk associated with the competitive market forces. As noted at 
the section 5.1 the link between ideology and policy is one that is built on a shaky 
foundation. Such a position is difficult to defend as the governments' policy 
responses were neither coherent nor deliberate (Riddel 1989, Hayward and Klein 
1994, Bonoli 2000). 
With respect to the two case studies, the evidence is that changes to the BSP 
were hardly opposed when compared to the 1986 SSA that fundamentally 
altered the financial and administrative structure of SERPS. The BSP which was 
established in 1946 will have by the time of reform in 1980, developed a large 
constituency of support, yet the de-indexation decision that diminished the value 
of the BSP was not successfully challenged. The SERPS reform on the other 
hand was vigorously opposed. The thesis notes that treasury was opposed to the 
abolishment of SERPS because of the cost concern as well as with the 'double 
payment' issue. This could be one powerful reason for it temporary resilience. 
But as have been pointed out the SERPS programme has since 2002 been 
subsumed by the new S2P. In the final chapter that follows, the empirical 
evidence of their reform strategy for both case study but more particularly 
SERPS is presented. 
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Chapter 6 Understanding Policy Variation in the Liberal Welfare Model 
6.1 Strategies of Reform: Empirical Findings 
6.2 The Canadian Case Study: Consensus in a Rigid Framework 
6.3 The UK Case Study: Exercise of Concentrated Power 
6.4 Comparative Analysis: Political Institutions in Policy Making 
6.5 Future Research and Policy Implications 
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6.1 Strategies of reform: empirical findings 
The received wisdom has it that the welfare state expansion proceeded on a 
more or less single continuum while the retrenchment of its social provisions is 
expected to prod along on a similar thread producing within family of welfare 
states broadly speaking a convergence of policy measures (Bonoli 2000, Pierson 
2001). Despite the remarkably common pressures each country face, this has 
not been the experience of many, not least is the liberal welfare states. 
This thesis has argued that the domestic political institutions account for the 
direction of the state's response to international economic pressure for change. 
It has become customary for those analysing the current state of affairs to accept 
that the permanency of economic austerity and the changing population 
demographics as shaping government retrenchment efforts. Analysts thus argue 
that the tension that exists between these two conditions is responsible for 
driving the welfare state experimentation that has endured since the 1980s 
(Esping-Andersen 1990, Pierson 1994, Banting 1997, 2001, Scharpf 2001, 
Castles 2001). 
The story so far is that families of welfare state types will act in distinctive ways 
consistent with established ideological underpinnings that inform their economic 
management of the state (Esping-Andersen 1990, Castles 2001). The case study 
countries are characterised by a relatively advanced private market for pension 
provision, a weakness in the strength of organised interest, contrasting degrees 
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of concentration of political power and a political culture punctuated by pride in 
self effort and a laissez faire attitude towards collective ownership. Together, 
these variables strongly indicate the importance of political institutions in the 
extent in which it allow governments the capacity to implement reform. 
Both Canada and the UK encountered similar pressures for change. They share 
similar political and economic traditions, including functioning parliamentary 
democracies. The difference between the two countries lies in the concentration 
of political authority. Canada is a federal system, the UK a unitary state. 
The empirical findings of the study show that the key independent variable: the 
concentration of political authority is crucial in throwing light on the puzzling 
country specific response to the pressures. To a lesser extent the pension policy 
framework along with a general political culture that permeate the debate help to 
differentiate the choice between incremental change over a radical one. The four 
pension policies examined here: the Canadian, Old Age Security (OAS), Canada 
Pension Plan (CPP) and the British, State Earnings Related Pension (SERPS) 
and Basic State Pension (BSP) were reformed to various extents (Chapter 4 and 
5) and the evaluation of these cases in (Chapters 4 and 5) indicate the 
importance of political institutions to shape policy. They also reveal that the 
concentration of political authority is an asset for governments seeking to 
implement radical reform. This is particularly significant because in each of the 
case study countries the political institutions provided the political leverage for 
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the government's reform measure. Furthermore, trade openness associated with 
economic globalisation reveals relatively little about how governments respond to 
the pressure for change. The thesis stresses that while concentration of political 
authority is critical, it is not the sole condition for facilitating radical reforms. For 
instance, although the federal government exercises unilateral control over 
decisions on the Old Age Security (OAS), it never used this power to the same 
affect as the central government in the UK with respect to either the BSP or 
SERPS. The reason for this will be outlined in the next section when the OAS 
pension policy in Canada is examined. 
The main sections of this chapter summarise and draw together the empirical 
findings of the case studies. It does this step by step. In the first step, it highlights 
the importance of the degree of concentrated political authority based on the 
empirical findings of the case countries. It then focuses attention on the 
importance of the degree of concentration of political authority based on the 
explicit comparison of the policy cases. The influence of interest groups is also 
presented. The empirical findings is solid and confirms some of Pierson's (2001) 
assertions on the explanatory value of political institutions in accounting for 
welfare retrenchment and to lesser extent Bonoli's observations about 
concentrated political authority in pension policy making. The methodology 
adopted in this study has enabled it to point to the similarities and differences 
and to sUbstantiate the argument realised in this thesis. The concluding part 
explores the implications for Canada and UK more broadly. It then discusses the 
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specific implications of some of the thesis findings for neo-institutionalist 
explanations of welfare state reform. In the conclusion, the thesis examines the 
implications for pension reform among the case countries and beyond. 
Er,npiricalFindings 
The empirical findings show that the two case study countries responded to the 
external pressure from a country specific position. The traditional role of political 
institutions is to provide the appropriate rules for aggregating divergent 
preferences within a given polity was clearly evident. Two important political 
systems were evaluated in this thesis namely: federalism and unitary 
government. The UK and Canada are a variant of these models, justifying their 
selection as case studies. 
To test the validity of the thesis on the relevance of political institutions on the 
reform process, five independent variables were isolated and evaluated against 
the pension reform measure. The selection of the two case countries, allowed the 
thesis to draw firm conclusion about the impact of institutions on the policy 
process. Table 7-1 below shows the key independent and dependent variables 
of interest and their effect. 
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Table 6-2 Values of the key variables in case study 
Independent Variables Dependent Variable 
Centralised Political Pension Plan Economic Electability and Case Authority Design Globalisation Govemance Interest Intermediation Degree of Policy Change 
Canada 
CPP Moot High Impact low~impact Moot Moot Incremental change 
OAS High Impact Moot moot Moderate Impact Low Impact Significant change 
United Kingdom 
SERPS High Impact High Impact High impact Low Impact Significant change low impact 
radical reform 
BSP High Impact High Impact Impact - uncertain High impact Moot Significant change 
impact on scheme dramatic 
In each of the case countries, two state pension schemes were selected and the 
state reform evaluated against the key independent variables. It compared policy 
response within and across the case countries. 
The response across countries 
In Canada, as table 6-1 will show, concentration of political authority had no 
impact with respect to the CPP and had given the federal government 
remarkably freedom to act. Unlike the CPP, the OAS was impacted upon by the 
centralisation of political authority. It was to be expected that given the similarity 
between Canada and the UK in terms of the centres of political decision making 
authority residing in the central governments with respect to the OAS and the 
SERPS and BSP, the response to those schemes has been broadly neoliberal. 
As is shown in the dependent variable column, Canada only succeeded in 
reforming the OAS in a significant way but the impact was much narrower (low 
impact) relative to the scheme in general (HRDC 1997, Banting 1997, Myles 
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2001). In other words, the affect on the retired population was small limited only 
to high earners with income of $60,000 or more a year (HRDC 1997). One 
explanation is that the OAS was universal initially and had a high middle class 
integration built into the design scheme. In the UK, the severity of the reform 
was felt by a cross-section of the retired population. First, changes to the BSP 
indexation formula significantly reduced the benefit levels both in the medium 
and long-term (Akins 1994, Blackburn 2004). The SERPS scheme was 
weakened as more contributors opted out of the state funded scheme into 
individual schemes. The SERPS program was supplanted in 1998 by the State 
Second Pension (S2P), in large part to address the disruption of the scheme by 
the 1986 SSA. 
In terms of pension design, it has been shown that the design of the pension plan 
could potentially constrain what reform possibilities are available to national 
actors. There are at least two reasons for this. The first is that pension design 
lays down the structure for benefit and contribution arrangements. When 
individuals pay into a contributory scheme which is financed on a PAYG basis, 
they are entitled to receive benefits. Under such circumstances it is difficult to 
justify reduction in benefits. And second, depending on the pension design, the 
radical shift from one method of financing to another can raise real problems: 
notably the 'double payment' problems discussed earlier. Both the UK and 
Canada organise their state pension schemes along the lines of PAYG financing. 
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The enhanced electoral effect variable shows that the effect of the FPTP 
electoral system creates similar effects in both case countries, although this is 
less so in the UK than Canada. The reason is simply that the UK government 
dominance over public policy is greatly enhanced by the FPTP system of election 
which awards the party with the plurality of votes the majority in Parliament. In 
effect, a government that pursues policies that does not have mass appeal can 
still divide the electorate and still manage to win a majority in Parliament. The 
system does not tend to produce coalition governments. In addition, the absence 
any constitutional veto points make the UK government one of the most powerful 
in the industrialised west. Canada, although applies a similar electoral system, is 
handicapped by choices of the median voters who holds the balance of power for 
decisions that requires more than a mere majority. This is crucial with respect to 
pension policy making given the unique constitutional arrangement in Canada 
which requires 2/3 of the provinces with 2/3 of the population to back proposals 
for altering provisions under the CPP pension scheme. The federal government 
can not act alone or make promises of changing CPP benefits. 
The thesis findings show that the UK government can on both SERPS and BSP 
make promises of rate increases or cuts. Indeed, the current state of affairs in the 
UK retirement income system has come about as a result of inter-party 
squabbling on what is most desirable in public pension provision. This inter-party 
conflict plays out during elections and provides the electorate with alternative 
policy positions on which to gauge their own views on the subject. In Canada, 
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political parties attempt to avoid open discussion of pension issues. Even though 
the federal government exercises exclusive jurisdiction in OAS matters, it does 
so strategically to buttress its standing in the provinces, using the OAS and other 
such federally mandated income transfer as a vehicle of 'nation building'. The 
major political parties tend to be silent on the subject. 
With regards to changes to the OAS, voters can react negatively to the federal 
government proposals. For example, the failed attempt at de-indexing the OAS in 
1985 was a clear example that the federal government even when acting alone 
must try to aim at a 'grand coalition' with policies which alter benefits. It has 
already been noted that interest intermediation is weak in both countries. 
Therefore the mobilisation against proposed policies is not highly efficient in 
counteracting perceived negative policies. 
This is true in both the UK and Canada. Pierson (2001) and Bonoli (2000) both 
argue that in the absence of 'formal veto' points, organised interests are unable 
to pursue negotiated response to the reform efforts. The liberal welfare model 
also suffers from a disintegrated core support for public social provision. And 
because the welfare state tends to be small, the core support group is also 
relatively small (See also analysis in Chapter 2 of thesis, ( Pierson 2001). The 
application of means-testing of pension benefits can further divide and weaken 
the support base by separating those who benefit from other taxpayers. The 
experiences with the OAS in Canada and the SERPS program in the UK are a 
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clear example of this. 
Explaining Policy Variance 
This thesis began from the premise that differences in the degrees of 
concentration of political authority in both of the case study countries, are 
expected to exert particular influence on what reform takes place and how 
change to public programmes are achieved. The empirical data presented in this 
thesis broadly support this hypothesis. Yet, it also calls attention to the limited 
applicability of existing explanation within and across pension schemes. This was 
not anticipated in the initial formulation of this research project, but it has become 
apparent in the course of the research. 
In the UK the House of Commons may consent or dissent on proposed bills 
brought before it through a vote in Parliament. However, such a vote is often 
drawn along party lines massaged by a functional party whip whose duty it is to 
help the government maximize its vote in the house. This does not suggest that 
governments in the UK can ignore the electoral consequences of action taken on 
the basis of political expediency. This would be misleading. What it does, 
suggest however is that governments in the UK can take advantage of limited 
external interference in order to achieve set policy objectives contingent on the 
electoral incentives and pension design problem outlined. For example, there 
was unwillingness between the two principal parties, Labour and Conservative to 
restore the link of the Basic State Pension (BSP) to industrial wage. In 1997 
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when New Labour came into power, the Chancellor committed to maintaining the 
public service spending level pledged by the departing Conservative Party ( 
Jessop 1998, Bonoli 2000). 
In variance with the literature 
Setting this aside, the analysis is further complicated by suggesting that the 
Canadian economy, unlike that of the UK is more susceptible to radical reform 
measures because of its size and economic orientation which is 
disproportionately dependent on external trade. Although they share a 
comparable share of GOP, the UK economy is relatively larger than that of 
Canada so the expectation does not apply equally to it (see also FOI inward and 
outward flows in Chapter 1). This country characteristic is important because the 
welfare state literature does suggest that integration into the international 
economy promises large potential gains especially for small countries, but that 
such integration exposes economies to the ups and downs of global markets 
while undermining the capacity of governments to counteract these business 
cycles. According to this view, the way around this dilemma is for governments to 
accept high trade exposure, while simultaneously adopting comprehensive social 
programmes to compensate people for increased levels of labour market risk 
(see Cameron 1978, Ruggie 1982, Katzenstein 1985b). Countries with 
disproportionate dependence on external trade are then likely to suffer radical 
reform measures 11. However the research findings run contrary to this 
11 This will be consistent with the two schools of thought on the effects of globalisation: the one been 
'pessimistic' and the other 'optimistic'. The "pessimists' see globalisation as a serious threat to the 
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expectation, at least as it relates to the Canadian response. In one explanation, 
Myles (1998) argues that Canada is some of its pension design mimics the social 
democratic model where increase pressures is countered by an equal resistance 
- not necessarily though from interest groups but from provincial governments 
cooperating on matter of preferences. 
It is noted that contrary to expectation posited by the economic globalisation 
thesis it was the UK and not Canada that pursued radical reform measures (see 
also Skyes ed. 2001, Bonoli 2000). There could be a number of reasons for this. 
The empirical findings of this thesis suggest that the governments of Canada had 
cooperated on mutually agreed preferences and this had the effect of curtailing 
some unilateral policy tendencies. The result from the 4 pension schemes 
confirm the impact of concentrated political authority, although not entirely in the 
way we have anticipated. This was in many respects facilitated by the decision 
making rules outlined in chapter 4. The political culture surrounding the debate 
nursed the collective sense of national identity fostered by a long history of social 
programming. 
It could be the case that the Canadian economy is much more competitively 
positioned against external shocks than that of the UK. Or it could that the 
continuation of the Keynesian welfare state; and the 'optimists' predict globalisation to be compatible 
with, and even strengthening, the welfare state. The view presented here, takes the 'pessimistic' view, that 
is, it does suggest that welfare state reform to be rhetorically linked to the need for international 
competitiveness (Rhodes 1996b). Rhodes, Martin (1996b). 'Subversive Liberalism'. Journal of European 
Public Policy, 2 (3) (Sept.): 384-406. Yet the overall spending data support the 'optimists' (see Iversen, T 
2001). Iversen, Torben (2001). 'The Dynamics of Welfare State Expansion Trade Openness, De-
industrialisation, and Partisan Politics' In Pierson, P (ed). (2001) The New Politics of the Welfare State. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
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structure of the retirement income system in Canada is sheltered from external 
influences. In other words, this may be explained by the de-industrialisation scale 
of the two countries. Based on the data presented in the Iversen paper, Canada 
is behind the UK in the rate of de-industrialisation but slightly ahead of her in 
changes in welfare spending. 
What this thesis contends is that the UK is able to pursue radical reforms 
because of the centralised nature of it decision making process. It is possible to 
explore also how long the UK state pension system has being in place and the 
rate of reform. It has being argued that if support for the public pension is not 
deep rooted, it is possible that those who may be opposed to government 
retrenchment measure would be too few to constitute an effective opposition. 
Looking at table 6.1 below we see that while the reform of both the Canadian 
CPP and OAS were relatively modest, the British reforms represented a more 
substantive change to the schemes that was in place prior to the reforms. This 
justifies the severity scale shown on the right hand column of the table. The 
outcome of the respective schemes broadly maps the literature predictions. (see 
also chapter 4 and 5 for full discussion). 
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Table 6.3 Summary of Policy Change 
Severity of 
At Apogee MterReform reform in 
descending 
order 
Canada Pension Scheme comparable to UK Reform impact 
Plan (CPP) limited to 
contribution rate 1 
change and financing 
eo: model 
"0 
eo: Old Age Scheme comparable to UK Reform impact 
= eo: 
U Security (OAS) except in terms of moderate and limited 
contribution requirements to less than 10% of 2 
recipient population 
plus ended 
universality 
State Earnings Scheme comparable to Reform impact severe 
Related Pension Canada and spread across the 
Scheme entire plan. Plus 
(SERPS) financing, 
entitlement, and 4 
contribution plan 
== 
change. Ultimately 
0 lead to dismantling of 
"0 
I:)J) 
scheme 
= g Basic State Scheme comparable to Reform impact 
"0 Pensions (BSP) Canada, except in terms of moderately severe <lJ 
..... 
contribution requirements and spread across the ·2 
~ entire plan. Plus 
_~hange in 3 
universality, level of 
entitlement, 
contribution levels, 
and minimum age of 
entitlement 
Source: Adapted from Government of Canada, Department of Finance 20011UK Department of Works and 
Pension 2004 
238 
Returning to the discussion on the economic globalisation thesis, it is one of the 
central claims of the globalisation literature that the low labour costs in 
developing countries are a threat to the industries, the employment situation and 
the welfare states of the advanced industrial countries (Bonoli, George and 
Taylor-Gooby, 2000). Countries that operate in these low skills labour sectors of 
economy are bound to feel the shock of global economic competition from states 
with less payroll tax burdens. 
Historically, it has been the case that the industrial production in affluent states 
is based on advanced technology and on guaranteeing high-quality goods, high 
productivity and high wages. The chain between these three objectives no longer 
holds true because it is now possible to have high technology, high productivity, 
high quality and low wages amongst the developing economies (Schwab and 
Smadja 1994). This has become one of the major weaknesses in the claim by 
advanced industrial states. The economic globalisation argument claims that 
change to the state pension schemes had to take place in a context of severe 
pressures to do so given the prevailing economic competition and the reliance on 
pay-roll taxes to finance the PAYG public pension system (World Bank 1994). 
The basic tenet of this economic view is that high labour costs or a less flexible 
labour market increase production costs. The less obvious side of this argument, 
but which is equally important, is the availability of general tax revenues to pay 
for unfunded pension promises. In light of this, pension plan design is an 
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essential feature that, if properly established, may address the mid-term to long-
term problems associated with the anticipated population ageing. Pension funded 
by payroll tax deduction impacts upon labour costs. This cost is usually passed 
on to the employer and the employee. Increase in the ratio of the retired versus 
labour force is an important one because it determines the contribution rate for 
public pensions. 
The problem of public pensions however does not rest on pension plan design 
alone. Both the UK and Canada face similar design problems. The CPP, BSP 
and SERPS are built on a PAYG basis. This design method is prone to a double 
payment dilemma whenever a switch is made from PAYG to a fully funded 
scheme. There are however, some differences between the Canada Pension 
Plan and the corresponding UK equivalent, the SERPS. The CPP is partially 
funded and was a source low interest borrowing by the provinces. Given this 
arrangement the dynamics of the politics of pension reform in Canada is altered 
as this thesis has demonstrated. 
Reform of state pension also takes account of the electoral process because 
decisions have political consequences. It has been shown that the problems with 
state pension require immediate solution which is not necessarily politically 
expedient but which must transcend the four year electoral cycle. In the case of 
the UK, it has been shown that the system of FPTP electoral system allow the 
government to overcome the decisive and unpopular policies. Insufficient 
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mobilisation by organised interest fail to win the grand coalition necessary to 
frustrate policy change in two of the cases studied: CPP and BSP. 
So far the analysis has proceeded in stages to provide the structure for the 
thesis. First, the institutional conditions determine the 'rules of engagement'. 
They do this by providing specific veto points over policy decisions for some of 
the policy actors. It may very well limit the chances of others. Institutional 
conditions can stagnate or frustrate progress on policy options - the notion of 
institutional 'stickiness' is clear example. Second, the institutional conditions have 
in many respects determined the type of pension design and therefore the route 
to its reform. Both of these conditions work in a symbiotic way to shape policy 
direction. Pension design is institutionally embedded: having the decision rules 
surrounding its reform enshrined in primary legislation will be an example of this 
relationship. More specifically it has been demonstrated that, the 'double 
payment' problem commonly associated with transferring from a state second 
pension into a fully or partial funded individual private pension is one that is 
fraught with huge intergenerational headaches. Third, it is argued that the 
political culture that frames the pension debate rests on certain ideological 
principles that differ amongst states: either self-reliance or a collective sense of 
community. 
Although, Canada did inherit the British Poor Law traditions, it applied them 
differentially. In the predominately French speaking province of Quebec, for 
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example, the Catholic doctrine of subsidiarity was strongly influential in the 
development of pension in that province. Canada as whole, though seems a lot 
less laissez faire when discussing issues relating to state pension and welfare 
(See Banting, 2004). In other words, Canadians tend to support public provision 
of pensions and they seem to have crafted a progressive and fairly redistributive 
income transfer from middle income earners to the lower income seniors making 
poverty amongst the retired a little less stark than in the UK for example. Not 
withstanding their sense of collective good, both the UK and Canadian electors 
share a common tendency to object to high levels of taxation or drastic reduction 
in benefits (Courchene 1997; Jenson 1998). Ultimately, the electoral environment 
is so primed to punish politicians who push the frontier of reform too far. 
Interest groups 
The empirical findings show that with regards to changes to the OAS for 
example, voters can react negatively to the Canadian federal government 
proposals. The failed attempt at de-indexing the OAS in 1985 was a clear 
example that the federal government even when acting alone must try to aim at a 
'grand coalition' with policies which alter benefits. It has already been noted that 
interest intermediation is weak in both countries. Therefore the mobilisation 
against proposed policies is not highly efficient in counteracting perceived 
negative policies. 
This is true in both the UK and Canada. Pierson (2001) and Bonoli (2000) both 
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argue that in the absence of 'formal veto' points, organised interests are unable 
to pursue negotiated response to the reform efforts. The liberal welfare model 
also suffers from a disintegrated core support for public social provision. And 
because the welfare state tends to be small, the core support group is also 
relatively small (See also analysis in Chapter 2 of thesis, (Pierson 2001). The 
application of means-testing of pension benefits can further divide and weaken 
the support base by separating those who benefit from other taxpayers. The 
experiences with the OAS in Canada and the SERPS program in the UK are a 
clear example of this. 
Another key factor that needs to be considered in terms of the effectiveness of 
interest group participation 12 is Schmitter's pluralist model of policy-making 
(1982). The idea here is that liberal welfare states are pluralist societies. 
This means that pluralist societies, like the UK and Canada, tend to have 
voluntary, competitive and unorchestrated groups vying to influence the policy 
agenda. These groups, for example, the Trade Union Congress (TUC), Canadian 
Labour Congress (CLC), Age Concern, Canadians Pensioners Concerned, the 
Fraser Institute, Centre for Policy Studies, act in representative roles: that is, 
12 The tenns Interest and Pressure group have in this dissertation been used interchangeably, although I am 
aware that the tenn could conjure different meaning in different context. The word pressure group is used 
most often in the UK, while interest group is associated with North American political lexicon. Both of 
these tenns refer more generally to the idea that interest or pressure group exist to influence public policy 
by seeking to persuade decision-makers by lobbying rather than by standing for election and holding office. 
There are subsets of pressures groups (for a detailed discussion of pressure groups in the UK refer to Bill 
Coxall (2001). 'Pressure Groups in British Politics' London: Longman Pearson Education. For interest 
group discussion for Canada, see Pratt, H.J. (1996). Gray Agendas: Interest Groups and Public Pensions in 
Canada, Britain, and the United States. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press. 
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under incentives that favour policy choices responding to the interests of the 
collectivities they represent (Scharpf 2000). In the pluralist model, as would be in 
the other model, there are real possibilities that such policy choices may overlap, 
but there are no formal processes through which these preferences can be 
united. 
It becomes government's responsibility to aggregate such interests. The role of 
Interest organisations is institutionalised and therefore institutional 'rules of the 
game' will define competencies, veto points, and modes of interaction that 
circumscribe the repertoire of permissible 'moves'. As well as the outcomes 
associated with particular combination of moves, and they may also define 
institution-specific norms of appropriateness that may modify or even surpass 
preferences rooted in organisational self-interest (Scharpf 1997b). 
In a sum, it implies that interest groups need to overcome institutional rules that 
constrain potential moves, as well as shape incentives, and they may also 
influence actors' perceptions and preferences. Interest groups also face a 
different kind of challenge: a theoretical challenge about the very nature of their 
collective existence. This means that interest group formations appear logical 
given the shared concerns and insecurities faced by the retired, yet it 
nevertheless represents something of a conundrum from the standpoint of group 
theory, as expounded by Mancur Olson (1965) and others (Frohock 1987, Hardin 
1982, Moe 1980). The Olsonian rational-actor model, rests on the logic that 
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collective humanitarian efforts of this kind are inexplicable on any rational basis 
and instead must be considered irrational (Olson 1965). The element of altruism 
or its 'regardingness', inherent in pension reform collective effort, is alien to the 
notion of rational choice that lies at the core of Olson's logic. 
The Olson rational actor model was rejected as singular and too narrowly 
focussed. James Wilson provides for a broader view and argues that group 
maintenance can draw strength from altruistic or from purposive incentives 
(Wilson 1973). The rational actor model has been modified to give depth to the 
motivation for individual action common to the group (Frohock 1987, Hardin 
1982). 
The theories mentioned here are of value in accounting for some otherwise-
puzzling aspects of the field work findings in both countries. For example the 
groups in both countries were usually small and fragmented. This is partially 
explainable on the basis of Olson's logic, which regards selective benefits and 
coercion as the only bases upon which large, voluntary organisations can be 
maintained - neither of them being present, essentially, the groups considered 
with the exception of the trade union groups. 
Regardless of size, most of the interest groups in the arena of pension policy 
making, and in particular the not-for-profit ones, have shown to be incapable of 
vetoing government policy. In other words, the extent of the strength of these 
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interest groups begins to count when government is forced to abandon it policy 
initiatives because of threats or lobbying efforts. In the liberal welfare model, it 
has been shown that organised interests are generally weak. This finding 
collaborates with Pierson hypotheses on the impact of interest groups. 
We can take specific example from the case study to illustrate this. In the UK the 
evidence from the 1985 Social Security Act demonstrates a weaker alliance, if 
ever there was one, between the government, influential groups and leaders of 
agencies. The key influential groups and leaders opposed the Act. The 
government Green Paper Reform of Social Security (UK, DHSS 1985b) was 
opposed by a" groups including surprisingly the Confederation of British 
Business (CBI) and by the National Association of Pension Funds (NAPF). The 
reason they opposed the Green paper's proposal had to do with the most 
controversial issue in the Green Paper the idea of phasing out SERPS. As 
Bonoli (2000) suggests the 1985 Social Security Act was a major departure in 
terms of how state pension operated in the UK. The formal policy process began 
life as an 'Inquiry into Provision of Retirement' which was announced by then 
Secretary of Norman Fowler in 1983. The Inquiry was notably political in 
composition. It was chaired by Secretary Fowler himself, and had no 
resemblance of the Royal Commission credited in the past for building 
consensual approach to policy. It had two months of consultation and drew 
strong criticism from many groups (Ward 1985). 1500 different items were 
submitted (Bonoli 2000: p.66) 
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A similar exercise in Canada lasted for 12 months. The reform of the Canadian 
Pensions Plan (CPP) consulted nationally and extensively. As a basis for the 
consultations, the federal and provincial governments released 'An Information 
Paper for Consultations on the Canada Pension Plan' in February 1996 (HRDC 
1997). The public consultations commenced on April 15, 1996 through June 10 
1996, as part of a 12 month federal/provincial review of the plan. The 
consultation was not chaired by the Minister responsible for Human Resources 
Development Canada (HRDC), the department with the CPP portfolio, nor was it 
headed by the Finance department, but rather by David Walker, Member of 
Parliament for Winnipeg North Centre. Mr Walker was the chief federal 
representative on all the panel meetings. They received over 270 formal 
submissions in 33 sessions in 18 cities (HRDC 1997) In addition the CPP 
Consultation Secretariat in Ottawa received more than 140 written submissions 
and about 6000 telephone calls (HRDC 1997) 
The resultant paper 'Report on the Canada Pension Plan Consultations' was 
released at the end of the consultations in June, 1997 (HRDC 1997). The report 
highlighted the challenges facing the plan, presented a way of strengthening 
CPP financing, and set out a series of options for putting the plan on sound 
financial footing. There was limited debate on the desirability of investing the 
CPP funds in the market to earn maximum returns. The Canadian Labour 
Congress opposed the increase in contribution rate but was satisfied that benefit 
levels were maintained. Business Groups for example, the Association of 
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Canadian Pension Managers (ACPM) were clearly happy with the investment of 
the plan funds. Some of the provincial governments surprisingly objected either 
because the plan went too far or because it did not go far enough. For instance, 
the province of Alberta, opposed the reform, but did endorse its plan to replace 
the CPP by individual retirement savings accounts (Alberta 1999). 
In these two examples, important differences exist. In the UK, the notion of a 
single-actor is valuable in understanding how policy is shaped through the 
system of decision making namely through the electoral and party system. 
Interest representation can operate much more effectively at the national level in 
parliament or through political parties at elections. In Canada, there are two 
levels of governments responsible for the CPP portion of the state pension 
system. Ideally, interest representation will have to be channelled through these 
two routes. Regional interests are as effective as national ones in most 
instances, although, the capacity of provincial governments to force themselves 
on the overall national agenda will be contingent on the availability of veto. In this 
regard, not all Canadian provinces are equal. The not so powerful provinces 
have to rely on their ability to forge partnerships with other governments. 
Additionally, interests groups operating at sub-national levels need to be mindful 
of the relative strength of the provincial governments from where they operate 
and more crucially what strategic alliance might be forming between 
federal/provincial governments and provincial/provincial governments. This 
awareness is valid in terms of the consideration in the nature of political party 
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alignment as well as with specific policy issue at stake. 
Much has been said about policy convergence and the expectation that given the 
international economic pressure, the liberal welfare model will converge on a 
neo-liberal response. These arguments tend to exaggerate such concerns. 
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6.2 Canadian consensus in a rigid framework: theoretical implications 
In the case of pension reform, the external 'challenge' to the welfare state was 
actively moderated through this distinctive political arrangement. The 4 pension 
schemes reinforced the earlier findings. In this section, the thesis considers the 2 
pension schemes in Canada. The empirical findings show that the reform of he 
GAS and CPP were relatively modest. Figure 4.1 illustrates this. 
In that respect, Canada defied the prediction that it might be vulnerable to a 
radical reform measure given the size of her economy and openness to 
international trade. It shows that a number of reasons account for this. 
The concentration of political power is important in policy making in Canada. But 
the literature prediction did not play out as described. Governments in Canada 
cooperate and agreed on common preferences. The reasons for cooperation are 
many and this aspect of the policy making process would require further 
investigation. Nonetheless, the empirical findings seem to suggest that it was 
largely for financial reasons that provincial governments agree (see discussion in 
section 4.3). This sense of interdependence makes unilateral radical departure 
from common goals by key players unlikely. In the case of GAS the finding 
remain puzzling still. The Canadian federal government acting alone decided to 
implement a less radical measure. This is in sharp contrast with the British who 
implemented a dramatic change to both SERPS and BSP schemes. 
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What about economic g/obalisation? 
The argument is that economic globalisation does have the same impact as 
predicted. Canadian public service officials and some of the interest groups do 
not think economic globalisation has impinged upon the Canadian decision to 
reform its state pension system. One reason for this is that, Canada's share of 
trade remains strongly with the United States than elsewhere. The United States, 
although notorious for its low labour related costs is still sufficiently wage 
compatible with Canada. So if the pessimist economic globalisation thesis is to 
hold sway, then given Canada's trading partnership with the US such argument 
would not hold true since wages in low skill production would be competitively 
matched. 
Second, the Canadian public pension system is relatively small and less 
generous. Canada's state pension system exists, in the world of the liberal 
welfare model in this respect, although there have been serious efforts at 
redistributing in the manner of the World Bank report (Myles 1989, 2001). 
Third, the Canadian federal system imposes strict adherence to a constitutional 
negotiated pension settlements. This institutional arrangement constrains the 
actions of the ten provincial and territorial governments at their triennial 
ministerial meetings where detailed proposals are exchanged. Ontario which is 
the biggest province in terms of population declines to exercise it veto point over 
issues of difference between itself, the federal government and it provincial 
251 
counterparts. In the 1996 rounds of CPP reform, Ontario did however impose its 
view on the limit of the contributory rates recommended by the federal actuarial 
report (Ontario Ministry of Finance 2004). This can be considered as an implicit 
veto. However, by and large, the institutional rules of the games in Canadian 
pension politics, ensure that the preferences of the divergent actors closely 
match, making the exercise of such veto point unnecessary. 
Canada has thus succeeded in moving in an incremental manner ever since the 
first public pension was established in 1927. This has been as a result of political 
inertia which is underscored by the constitutional terms of engagement in this 
policy area. Thus, an incremental policy response has somehow managed to 
endure over the course of time and more recently in the face of international 
economic pressure on reform. It is difficult to see how radical the reform measure 
would carry weight in Canada, even in the future. There has been and continues 
to be rumbling about breaking up the CPP family, with Alberta seriously 
proposing changes to the current CPP financing method to account for 
intergenerational inequality. Ontario had made such claims in the past and could 
again in the future. Quebec exercised the option of a separate but equal second 
state pension system in 1965. The remaining nine provinces have a right to these 
option if they so chose. 
The design of Canadian penSion plan schemes are on a pay-as-you-go basis: 
while the CPP is a mandatory contributory pension, the OAS is not contributory. 
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It has been suggested that because of its contributory base, it is morally difficult 
to defend cuts to benefit levels. Hence reform could not be any more radical. The 
OAS suffers from neither of these defects. It is the sole responsibility of the 
federal government. The government in Ottawa can use the OAS as a tool to its 
political advantage. It can do by increasing benefits in the OAS and cut in other 
programmes with less visibility. 
Interest groups in Canada are actively solicited for input into the policy process, 
but most of them feel their input is completely ignored. In interviews with 
Canadian pension groups during the research field work it became apparent that 
despite regular meetings with politicians and civil servants, interest organisations 
make little impact on the type policy pursued by government. In addition to the 
other reasons outlined in the interest group section of this thesis, most of the 
interest organisations are small and poorly financed. Most are fragmented and 
therefore project a local rather a national voice. Given the decision making rules 
regarding the CPP for example, interest groups need to lobby two levels of 
governments. For those without adequate policy research facility and the ability 
to mobilise mass support beyond the narrow self-interests impact on policy is 
limited. 
Canada, thus conducted it pension reform in public, but the decision making 
remains within the political realm. And politicians on either sides of the political 
divide have responded to the international economic pressure by adapting to 
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unique Canadian tailored solution. In 1989 the OAS was reformed by introducing 
a means-testing component to the calculation of benefits. This had the effect of 
excluding higher income Canadians. The World Bank recommendation came 
after the reform so it is easy to see that it had no influence on the decision taken. 
Canada seems to be already on a road towards market-oriented reform, albeit in 
a way that redistributed income to the poorest percentile of the retired. The 1996 
reform of the CPP was again a unique Canadian response and not in keeping 
with the World Bank report. The CPP remains partially funded. Twenty-five per 
cent of the CPP funds is invested privately by an independent board. 
Part of the pension debate in Canada also involves concerns over demographic 
change. Some provinces are in better shape than others. Quebec for example is 
concerned about its demographic projections while Alberta is not. This factor 
adds to the policy mix, giving each province a little something to bring to the 
triennial Ministerial bargaining table. It would be difficult to see how Canada 
would break from it incremental traditions now or in the future in so much as the 
jurisdictional competencies for pension policy making rests evenly between the 
two levels of governments. It is possible however, that national standards and 
portability of pension provisions may be sacrificed in the deepening of political 
preferences from rich and populous provinces like Alberta. 
Policy actors need take note of possible implications of future economy realities. 
As regional economic inequalities deepen and begin to bite, some provincial 
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governments, for example, job scarce provinces like Newfoundland, PEl and 
Nova Scotia, may find it in their best interest to suppress labour related cost in 
order to attract investment. Current legislative rules provide safeguards for 
radical departure from incrementalism, although future preferences of provinces 
are hard to predict. 
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6.3 The UK exercise of concentrated power - theoretical implications 
The empirical findings of the reform of the state pension system in the UK shows 
that it followed a different trajectory from that observed in Canada. The UK 1986 
Social Security Act, moved the UK state sponsored pension system decidedly 
into the private sector: an implicit privatisation13 of the state provision (Blackburn 
2003). It has been argued that as a direct result of this the UK is the only 
European country which would not have any difficulty meeting its future pension 
obligations. The reforms were much more radical for this reason. It was 
somewhat puzzling because like Canada, the UK is one of the most 
'commodified' amongst the DECO. The question then is why and how was she 
able achieve what had already eluded others. 
First, the UK retirement system under review is relatively small and young. The 
BSP evolved after the Beveridge report in 1946. The SERPS program was 
established in 1975 after Labour election victory in 1974. The initial proposal for a 
second state earnings related retirement income was quashed by the previous 
Conservative government but was quickly resuscitated by Barbara Castle, the 
Minister responsibility for Social Security. The 1975 Social Security Pensions Act 
raised the BSP to its highest-ever level at 20 percent of average male wage, 
while the SERPS aimed to deliver an extra 25 percent of previous average 
earnings. 
13 Paul Pierson (1994) used this term to refer to a process of allowing for the secondary provision of 
pensions by the state, while simultaneously pursuing policies that minimises the attraction of the public 
provision that citizens are impelled to look to the private sector to insure their future: an implicit 
privatisation. Pierson, P. (1994) Dismantling the Welfare State? Regan, Thatcher and the Politics of 
Retrenchment. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
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The government of Margaret Thatcher, elected in 1979, introduced a modest but 
vastly damaging change in the indexation of the Basic State Pension in 1980. 
Henceforth, increases were to be pegged to rises in prices alone and not to 
earnings. Over the long term, the effect of the 1980 amendment was to reduce 
the BSP from 20 percent of average male earnings to being no more than 14 
percent (Atkinson 1994, Blackburn 2003). At the time, few grasped the 
significance of what had happened and hence few raised any objections. 
Second, Pierson has argued that it is in part due to the weakness of those who 
would oppose the retrenchment of pension benefits (Pierson 2001). This is also 
supported by Bonoli's thesis that the dominance of the party in power over policy 
is to account for the observed response. In the UK this is achieved in a number 
of steps. First, the lack of a codified constitution that stipulates the competence of 
government in this area, gives the government the freedom to pursue policies 
that suits it. For example, despite the winter of discontent in 1979, the Thatcher 
government was able to divide opposition and pass its pension legislation in 
1986. This will suggest that interest intermediation at best of times can be weak. 
The government correctly assumed this and was able to apply differential method 
of benefit assignment to benefit certain groups while at the same time taking 
benefits away from others. The SERPS scheme demonstrates this 'divide and 
conquer' rationale that seems pervasive at the time. In addition, because of it f1at-
rate benefit levels, most middle income earners seek pension schemes 
elsewhere. 
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Third the UK has avoided introducing a comprehension public pension scheme 
as was the case in Canada. Intraparty competition has made state pension an 
election issue in almost all elections still with very little agreement as to what type 
of pension UK citizens require. Thus there has been a radical piecemeal 
measure that has been political expedient. For example, when the SERPS 
programme was first introduced by Labour Minister Barbara Castle in 1975, by 
the 1980s barely less than a decade after its' introduction, the Conservative were 
busy taking down the edifice. In the absence of any regional power to challenge 
the central government, intraparty competition is the means through which policy 
preferences can be aggregated. 
Fourth the design of the UK public pension system is on a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) 
basis. Both the BSP and SERPS are financed along the PAYG method. It has 
been suggested that because of its contributory base, it is morally difficult to 
defend cuts to benefits levels. Nevertheless, unlike the Canadian experience, the 
UK was able to adapt a radical measure. This is interesting because even with 
sole management of the OAS in Canada, the federal government opted for a 
radical reform of this pension measure even though it found itself in the single 
actor status. One could argue that the federal government unlike the UK 
government use the OAS as a tool of nation building. Political gains in the areas 
of OAS can translate into useful political capital when handling the discussion on 
CPP reform measure. 
In the UK, a system of election that confers majority status to the political party 
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with a plurality of seats enables even unpopular government sometimes to win 
elections, and once in office the absence of effective checks on its power first by 
a constitutional provision and second by an articulate opposition, makes 
governing less encumbered. Thus the UK governments can pass laws with much 
less resistance. Bonoli points out that throughout the 1980s during the Thatcher 
period of reforms the UK opposition was weak and ineffective (Bonoli 2000). The 
point that needs to be made here is that although, Canada operates a similar 
electoral system, a majority government in the House of Commons does not 
accord the government the same degree of latitude in pension policy. The 
difference again, is the political institutional arrangement in Canada which is 
federal in character and the political parties tend to practice brokerage politics. 
The decision-making process which led to the enactment of the Social Security 
Act in 1986 was typical of majoritarian policy-making. It was a process that 
involved official bodies in the debate, such as the Inquiry into Provision for 
Retirement, which secured control for the government in terms of defining at the 
early stages what the new pension policy should be. The result was that the 
government was able to produce a Green Paper with relatively detailed 
suggestions for policy change before explaining its approach to external interests 
(Bonoli 2000). Interest groups had a chance to confront the government on its 
policy during the six period between the publication of the Green and White 
Papers. It was not a sufficient time to allow interference in government plans, 
though the government conceded under the pressure to drop plans to abolish 
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SERPS. 
The Thatcher government eventually dropped it plan to abolish SERPS in favour 
of drastic, benefit cutting reform programme. The thesis has already provided an 
explanation for this in previous sections of this thesis (see section 6.4). The 
diluted SERPS arrangements would replace 20 rather than 25 percent of 
average earnings and widows were to receive a half, rather than full, pension. 
This was a major concession by the government and can not be seen as 
constituting a quid pro quo. Interest intermediation in UK pension policy is not 
based on a corporatist arrangement. As such we need to look elsewhere for an 
explanation. 
One line of explanation is that the abolishment of the earnings-related scheme 
was the source of disagreement within the government as well as with organised 
interests. The Treasury opposed the abolishment which was supported by 
DHSS. Thus there was a division in cabinet between two important departments. 
Ultimately the Treasury was able to block the implementation of an unwanted 
piece of the legislation. Bonoli has argued that the Treasury decision to block the 
legislation can be conceptualised in terms of a veto point (2000). 
The UK pension system faces strikingly similar challenges as that of Canada. 
The solution to these challenges remains strikingly dissimilar in many respects. 
UK governments, unlike Canadian governments, do not have to contend with 
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regional or sub national governments. In the UK, the constitutional arrangements, 
to a larger extent nUllify internal constraints [non existent] on the pension system. 
The central government in Westminster is therefore able to deal with immediate 
national pension policy. In the absence of a formidable internal constraint, policy 
implication for the UK system is likely to be driven externally by initiative at the 
European Union level as pan European integration in social welfare provisions 
are pushed forward. This was something that is, for example, clearly 
demonstrated in the European Union directives on equal treatment of men and 
women implemented in the 1995 Pension Act (Blake 2003 p.310). At which point, 
institutional factors within the UK as already outlined in this thesis would interact 
with pension policy options. The crucial difference from the current processes will 
be the shift of the decision making foci to a supranational level. It is unlikely that 
given the sentiments that social policy carry amongst nationalists within the UK, 
that any of the post-devolved governments would want to challenge Westminster 
for co-jurisdiction in pension policy making. In the UK as in Canada, one reason 
for this would be that the regional centres, Scotland, Wales and Quebec, are all 
considerably less well off than the central government. 
261 
6.4 Comparative Analysis: Political Institutions in Policy Making 
The most striking element that emerges from the analysis of pension policy is 
that the UK and Canadian reforms can not be said to be similar. In the basic 
state pension scheme while Canada modest reform ended universality of the 
scheme, the UK reform effort was more intensive and extensive. The UK reform 
of the basic state pension continued to be means-tested calculated in line with 
changes to consumer price index rather on the previously favoured industrial 
wage. The value diminished significantly also. In the Canadian case study, it was 
argued that the OAS reformed only impacted a narrower range of the population. 
In the UK equivalent, the opposite was true. 
A similar account could be narrated for the second level pension: the Canadian 
CPP scheme and the UK SERPS program. The outcome of the reform measures 
have variously summarised and presented in chapter 6.1 and in the case study 
chapters 4 and 5. The UK and Canadian governments have used different 
strategies to secure the adoption of typically unpopular pension reforms. In 
particular, in the UK, the government was able to introduce radical reforms 
despite a lack of agreement amongst the left and labour movement. The reform 
measures both in Canada and the UK did not include any quid pro quo, and were 
achieved at the exclusion of external groups from decision-making. 
It has been argued throughout this thesis that political institutions are key 
determinant of the strategy adopted by governments to secure the adoption of 
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potentially controversial policy change. There are at least three reasons for this. 
First, national institutions provide or limit opportunities for resistance to unwanted 
policy change by those ideologically opposed to the common neoliberal 
responses to domestic and international pressures (Swank 2001). It is also the 
case that institutions provide opportunities for seeking compensatory policies by 
those who are adversely affected by domestic structural shifts and internalisation. 
Canadian brokerage political parties exemplify this (Kitschelt 2001). 
Second, national institutions can influence directly and indirectly the relative 
political strength of affected groups and the relative strength of traditional welfare 
constituencies and coalitions. This can be demonstrated on the basis of federal 
versus unitary systems of government as this thesis suggest. Third, political 
institutions can foster or hinder certain combinations of values important to social 
welfare policy change: some institutions foster cooperation and consensus as 
well as support for the welfare state specifically, and the efficacy of state 
intervention generally; other institutions tend to promote competition and conflict 
and pro-market orientations. 
Returning back to the first of the three points, it does show that as was unlike the 
case in Canada, the UK managed to impose radical changes to the SERPS 
programme despite a lack of a clear mandate from external interests on the 
issue. This was due to evident from the institutional climate which allows a 
majority government to pursue policies from start to finish in the absence of any 
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formidable opposition. This was particularly true during the Thatcher years 
because of the disarray of the Labour party. External interests had little or no 
impact on the 1986 SSA. In Canada, on the other hand, there was a period of 12 
months of consultation and a series of ministerial reviews before an agreement 
was reached for reforming the CPP in 1996. Both the CPP and SERPS are 
second pillar state earning-related pension scheme. Both are mandatory and 
contributory. While CPP retained its core functions of providing 25 percent 
retirement income, the SERPS programme has reduced benefits as well as 
destabilised the demographic base of the scheme by providing a opt out clause. 
The UK experience has the hallmark of majoritarian decision-making which was 
referred in the early discussion. 
Pierson (1994, 1996) outlines the general logic of welfare state retrenchment by 
noting that, unlike the politics of welfare expansion, welfare retrenchment 
involves taking away concentrated, politically popular benefits from organised 
constituencies for the promise of future, diffuse benefits. In the case of the reform 
of the BSP programme and to a limited extent the CPP, the organised 
constituencies were unable to act decisively and effectively. As argued by Bonoli 
(2000) it is not the mere existence of veto points but it matters if organised 
interests recognise the problem and have the political resource to mobilise 
against unwanted policies. The case of the BSP and CPP is not so much of lack 
of recognition as it is to the lack veto opportunity. It is true that reaction to the 
reform of the BSP in the 1980 was minimal; the public response to the CPP 
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reform in Canada was huge. Yet, the outcome was decidedly the governments to 
make. This has a lot to say about how the institutional provisions of pension 
plans constrain various retrenchment strategies for both governmental actors and 
interest groups. 
Another way to look at the institutional impact is to consider the manner in which 
institutional features of the welfare state strengthen (weaken) constituency 
groups and their allies. Pierson (1994) argues that the politics of welfare 
retrenchment is the extent to which welfare state institutions promote large, 
unified constituencies and unify the panoply of interests that may mobilise to 
resist roll-backs in social provision. In the liberal welfare model, these 
constituencies tend to be fragmented. There is a significantly low support base 
for welfare programmes because benefit levels are very low and often the 
government subsides the upper middle class so they can seek alternative 
services in the private market place (Howard 1997). In terms of receiving 
electoral support it is less likely the 'pivotal voters' in these conditions will have 
stronger attachment to social provision, and to be more susceptible to alternative 
political appeals, such as tax cuts. This means that political parties have the 
potential to be at the forefront of negotiation for detailing the terms of reform. It is 
also possible that the pivotal voter can be within reach under certain 
circumstances. For example, in some countries labour could be sidelined, 
making the contest equally matched between political parties. This is the case in 
the liberal model and we have seen that in particular with UK under Thatcher. 
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Following the winter of discontent, for example, subsequent labour legislation 
aimed at reducing their strength and leaving the debate open only to the other 
political contenders who were at this time quite in disarray. Canada has not used 
this 'divide and conquer rule' but has through federal sponsorship of senior 
groups through the grants provided by the New Horizons programme obtain their 
acquiesce. The New Horizons programme was first established in 1971, by then 
federal Minister of Health and Welfare, John Munro. The programme was 
intended to issue grants to seniors that set up groups to enrich their leisure 
through self-organisation. The rules for grant eligibility were amended in 1987 to 
remove direct political lobbying and single-issue organisations (Gifford 1990). 
This effectively removed any serious prospect of confronting the state on key 
pension policy issues, except such groups could seize to apply to the grant: 
which was a difficult choice. 
The government of both countries can learn from it others experiences. Canada 
can adopt radical reform measure by taking a more aggressive stand with the 
constitutional arrangement and seeking further amendment. Provincial 
governments can be encouraged to take, the Quebec route in establishing their 
own pension plans which can be made portable across schemes provincially. 
This will free the federal government to concentrate on redistributing at the basic 
state pension level. The UK appears to be set to implement a measure that 
encourages individuals' employers to provide a second state pension in the 
absence of other centres of power doing so. The central government having won 
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significant cost saving can modified the Basic State Pension to redistribute to the 
lower income pensioners. 
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6.5 Future Research and Policy Implications 
Deciding on what public programmes to cut is difficult at the best of times, but the 
proposal to cut a programme that enjoys deep and popular support, it is doubly 
hard. The reform of the state pension scheme in the two case countries has 
presented such a policy problem. The concern is not who it might offend, 
although this is important, but because the process of reforming is plagued with 
perplexing dilemma. Through this thesis it has being shown that to resolve this 
dilemma state actors have to work through existing institutional rules. Successful 
policy outcome depends on the capacity of reformers to overcome barriers and 
opponents to change; for programmes that often command deep and popular 
support. The inevitability of old age makes penSion a very accessible subject to 
most people. The issues and decisions that are covered in this thesis affect 'real' 
lives. For these analysts focus not so much on pensions, but on the terms under 
which governments in the liberal welfares states choose to participate in its' 
provision. 
The empirical findings of this study clearly implicate the concentration of political 
authority as being the driving force behind the reform measures adapted by the 
case countries. It does not however, address other competing variables that 
might also be implicated. The thesis single out two: political culture and 
intergovernmental relations. The latter of these: that is intergovernmental 
relations, constitutes a different dimension of political institutions. The task of 
future research would be to identify the criteria under which cooperation override 
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veto in the Canadian federal system, and to establish the observed patterns. 
This pertains to the Canadian political environment and less so to the UK. It 
warrants attention because not enough scope was given to this current study. 
Intergovernmental Criteria 
Starting with the latter, the thesis argued that state pension reform is the result of 
the interactions between governments' preferences and interests groups 
demands which is structured within the institutional framework they are situated. 
The concentration of political authority while very useful in explaining policy steps 
taken in the Canadian case study, it does not tell us much about why provincial 
governments with divergent interests and preferences would agree on common 
thread for change. Alberta and Ontario as the case study show appear to want 
out of the CPP arrangement. Their individual political rhetoric, however, is yet to 
be matched by any concrete public policy. This would suggest that the 
constitutional veto present in the Canadian system operates at different levels. It 
is possible that the federal veto system does more than simply provide the rules 
of the game. It may well shape the provincial governments' preferences and 
relative power by curtailing some unilateral policies and marrying their internal 
interdependencies. This would be a useful line investigation because while we 
know that institutional framework matter - how it matters for 10 independent 
minded governments is quite another. To this end, there would be need to 
develop a more robust intergovernmental criteria for cooperation amongst the 
two levels of governments. 
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Political Culture 
Issues of political culture do not easily lend itself to the debate on concentrated 
political authority. It can nonetheless be viewed in the institutional sense and 
appears to underpin more broadly the political discourse and help shape the 
orientation of policy actors. The question of whether or not a society's moral 
ethos is built around a shared value of collective responsibility or is driven 
forward by individual effort is important in evaluating the basis of support or 
opposition to the welfare state. Political culture in that regard is considered as an 
intervening variable that define how individuals relate to the state penSion 
scheme and the institutional framework including the aggregation of preferences. 
In the evaluation of interest intermediation, for example, the analyses note that 
dispersion of policy making power tends to complement and reinforce the 
competition and conflict of pluralist politics. Swank (2001) argues that the 
prevailing climate for welfare state retrenchment may be enhanced by prevailing 
political culture in fragmented polities. Such fragmentation as observed in the 
federal system for example, places a downward pressure on an extensive 
welfare state. The argument here is that federalism tends to accentuate 
differences between rich and poor regions and, in turn, generates conflicts over 
the content of policy, it undercuts the formation of coherent national policy 
strategies by groups and parties: the organisation of parties and groups tends to 
be focused on narrow distributional issues within regional and local jurisdictions 
(Bradford and Jensen 1992) The reverse is true for concentrated political 
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authority because dispersion of authority favours conservatives forces and 
produces a small welfare state, pro-welfare and pools of social programmes and 
services which will be relatively stronger (Swank in Pierson 2001 :211). 
To put this argument in a broad sense, political culture is important because the 
input into decision making legitimises the policy process. This is particularly true 
in cases where the policy issue at stake is one that raises questions of trust. 
State pension reform is a classic example. In the state pension debate, given the 
vulnerability of those seeking to modify popular programmes, it has been argued 
that the party with the best prospect of winning the grand coalition necessary to 
implement long-term reform will be the party with strong credibility on issues 
relating to pensions. In this regard the way in which political parties aggregate 
preferences in public policy is important (Kitschelt 2001). 
It would be beneficial if the relationship between policy making in the area of 
pension can be assessed against the political culture dimension. In the 
development of welfare state the political culture embedded in existing political 
ideology seem to have played a key role. Clearly the Birmarckian and Beveridge 
design bear the imprint of the political and moral convictions of its framers. 
In a recent household survey report Canadian and British residents appear to be 
in less support of collective ownership and were more inclined towards 
individualism (Household Survey Report 2004). The pooling of resource which 
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the public pension scheme tends to foster goes against the grain of such 
thinking. 
Policy Implication 
The question that has been raised throughout this thesis and to be concluded in 
this section is simply this: how political institutions interact and constraint external 
pressure to change. The evidence provided here show that pension reform is the 
result of the interaction between governments' preferences and the institutional 
framework within which they operate. Political institutions shapes the national 
governments' preferences and relative power of political actors internally and the 
interaction externally. The case studies were able to demonstrate the scope of 
the constraint. 
For example, the Canadian reform of the first pillar state pension scheme was 
quite different from the second pillar CPP. The reason stated earlier was that 
GAS is a federal programme while the CPP is jointly managed by the federal and 
provincial governments. The GAS is non-contributory scheme, which up until 
1989 was a universal scheme. It provides a small amount of benefits and thus 
attracts limited electoral support. The CPP on the other hand is a contributory 
scheme directed at the employed. The earnings-related aspects make this 
pension attractive to a lot of people. The federal government cannot move 
unilateral to make change to the scheme without consulting first with provincial 
governments. The federal nature of decision-making creates a veto for provincial 
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actors. 
The UK policy style is characterised by the dominance of the party in 
government. Both reform of the BSP in 1980 and the 1986 SSA is a 
demonstration of the sheer strength of UK governments over pension policy. In 
both countries interest intermediation is weak and therefore there is potential for 
political parties to reconcile the divergent aggregate interests. So far there has 
been less difference in approach toward state pension provision by both two 
major political parties in the UK. For example, New Labour has been unwilling to 
restore the link between pension and increases in industrial wage. 
Such an impact may have important implications for analysis and explanation of 
variance and the extent of pension reform in other welfare regime types. The 
work of Bonoli (2000) is quite instructive in that regard. Bonoli (2000) provided an 
analysis of pension reform in four different welfare regime types. The current 
discourse of welfare state restructuring may benefit from the neo-institutionalist 
thesis in explaining the variance in policy response (Pierson 2001, Bonoli 2000). 
Whilst the current explanation are plausible and supported by this thesis, but to 
date little work has been done to investigate the relative importance of ideas 
compared to interests and institutions. This reflects the fact that the ascendancy 
of scholarly interest in ideas and politics began only recently. It might be usefully 
also to consider reform efforts across similar political systems within family of 
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welfare regimes types. This will likely highlight the extent also of the institution 
led thesis. 
Future direction does show that institutional provision in the UK may change with 
it closer ties with the EU. This might mean a different pension regime for the UK. 
If it continues to remain outside of the EU monetary union 14, the institutional 
framework will still be flexible enough to allow for dramatic changes. As it stands, 
the UK welfare state is one the most 'commodified' in the DECO, and therefore it 
may be morally difficult to justify further moves in which direction. Both the 
Pickering and Turner report seem to hint at improved individual saving portfolio, 
though this will be difficult to implement, for reasons already argued. For 
example, because of the compulsory nature of such a scheme, as well as the 
burden it would impose on existing S2P members. Canada is not that far behind 
the UK in this respect. Already we have seen in the Canadian reform effort, a 
gradual move towards a private managed public pension funds. Threats by 
provinces like Alberta, Ontario and Quebec will make the other provincial 
governments consider a more dramatic step away from incrementalism. 
Two final observations about this summary statement underscore key 
characteristics of the contemporary politics of the welfare state. The first, as 
already noted is that the changed economic environment was critical in the 
14 The Maastricht criteria for monetary union - balanced budgets, low inflation and low debts - have forced 
several countries to introduce policies designed to control public expenditure, particularly in the social 
field. The UK Government at present is not part of the treaty and may join when its five economic tests set 
the Chancelor, Gordon Brown has been met. 
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retrenchment measures adapted by the case countries. This was set within the 
context of economic globalisation, although the thesis has argued that the effect 
of globalisation is marginal on the policy measures reached in both countries. It 
has however stressed that it is not politics alone that determines how or when 
these countries undertake important reform initiatives. It implies that the future of 
these countries welfare infrastructure is likely to depend upon the economic 
performance of their trading partners. To this end, there could be some 
consideration on labour market relations with a view of renegotiating the terms of 
trade with the less developing states with whom it might compete in some 
sectors. It is possible that the terms of trade could include a global pension fund 
that is portable and accessible to all workers in selected sectors. 
The second observation is that both countries will continue to strive for cost 
containment in the areas of social provisions, including state pensions. This 
shared emphasis reflects the onset of difficult economic times. The basic ideals 
of state pension schemes will survive, although efforts to achieve restructuring 
will generate interesting innovations. The contemporary climate will not favour 
any efforts of improving provisions, even for those in more vulnerable position. 
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(Vancouver) 
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Cosco - Judy Lawrencce May 13, 2004 (Vancouver) 
Department of Finance (Government of Canada) - April 30th , 2004 (Ottawa) 
FADOQ Federation de I'age d'or du Quebec Montreal- Louise Aubert April 
30th, 2004 (Ottawa) 
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